The Growing Hamas-Al Qaeda Connection (JCPA) Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan Dahoah-Halevi Vol. 7, No. 1 17 May 2007)
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Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central authority of
governments is collapsing and therefore its current success in the
war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as a surprise.
Just
after Israel´s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip
in August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the
new security vacuum that had been created and begun to dispatch its
operatives to this territory. By March 2006, no less than the
president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)
told the London Arabic daily, al-Hayat, "We have signs of the
presence of al-Qaeda in Gaza and the West Bank."
In the
meantime across the Middle East the external Hamas
leadership maintained close ties with well-known figures associated
with the al-Qaeda network, like the leader of the Kashmiri
organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salahal-Din, in Pakistan and
Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden loyalist, in Yemen. The latter
met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006.
Significantly al-
Hayat reported on April 4, 2006: "a definite
presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza, who had infiltrated from
Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Moreover, a little over a month later
Egypt´s Ministry of the Interior disclosed that two terrorist
operatives involved in the April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea
resort of Dahab, underwent military training in the use of weapons
and explosives in the Gaza Strip.
On May 9, 2007 the "Army
of Islam" organization (Jaish al-Islam)
published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda (www.alhesbah.org),
an official announcement in which it took responsibility for the
kidnapping of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston and called for the
release of the Palestinian sheikh, Abu Qatada, who is considered one
of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in Europe and is known to be the
one with whom the heads of the group that carried out 9/11 consulted.
Hamas spokesperson, Ayman Taha, acknowledged the fact that Hamas
and "Army of Islam" had cooperated on the military operational level.
Increasingly, there are signs that al-Qaeda is gaining strength
in
the Gaza Strip. In the midst of the decaying internal situation in
Gaza, with its regular gun battles between the well-established Hamas
and Fatah militias, there are more incidents reported of attacks
against symbols of any Western presence from a UNRWA school to a
Christian bookstore. Al-Qaeda generally thrives wherever central
authority of governments is collapsing and therefore its current
success in the war-torn Gaza Strip should not come as a surprise.1
Seeming to copy the operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the militants in
Gaza belonging to these new terrorist organizations are targeting
Western reporters, like the famous cases in which journalists from
FOX News and the BBC were taken hostage. Even external appearances
show al-Qaeda´s growing influence as members of its affiliate
movements in the Gaza Strip will often wear the same black head
covering that was a trademark of the late al-Qaeda leader in Iraq,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. All the evidence indicates that rather than
challenge al-Qaeda´s bid to expand its presence in the Gaza Strip,
Hamas prefers to collaborate with these new militant groups.
Al-Qaeda Enters Gaza
Just after Israel´s unilateral
disengagement from the Gaza Strip in
August 2005, there were reports that al-Qaeda had exploited the new
security vacuum that had been created and began to dispatch its
operatives to this territory. The Hamas leader who would later become
its first foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, admitted to Corriere
della Sera, on September 13, 2005 that "...a pair of men from al-
Qaeda has infiltrated into Gaza." Within a month an organization
calling itself "Al-Qaeda in Palestine" was distributing leaflets in a
Gaza mosque. By March 2006, no less than the president of the
Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) told the London
Arabic daily, al-Hayat, "We have signs of the presence of al-Qaeda in
Gaza and the West Bank."
While Abbas described this as a "very
dangerous situation," no
Palestinian security service subsequently took any measures against
al-Qaeda. Indeed, this became official Palestinian Authority policy
especially after Hamas swept the Palestinian parliamentary elections
in January 2006 and formed a new government. A Hamas official, Said
Sayyam, who became the Palestinian Authority Interior Minister at the
time, stated openly that he would not order the arrest of terrorist
operatives who would attack Israel; this essentially amounted to an
open invitation to global jihadi organizations that they could find a
new sanctuary in post-withdrawal Gaza, under Hamas rule. It was the
first clear indication that Hamas could work together with elements
from al-Qaeda coming into the Gaza Strip. In the meantime across the
Middle East the external Hamas leadership maintained close ties with
well-known figures associated with the al-Qaeda network, like the
leader of the Kashmiri organization, Hezb ul-Mujahidin, Sayyid Salah
al-Din, in Pakistan and Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a bin Laden
loyalist, in Yemen.2 The latter met with Khaled Mashaal on March 20,
2006.
Gaza Becomes an International Terrorist Base
There
was one question about al-Qaeda´s presence in the Gaza Strip
during 2006 that needed to be answered. Did it involve a foreign
presence of al-Qaeda operatives from other Arab countries or was this
Palestinian al-Qaeda affiliate just a group of Gazans who
ideologically identified with global jihad, but had no actual
operational links with Osama bin Laden´s organization? Significantly
al-Hayat answered this question when it reported on April 4, 2006: "a
definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in Gaza, who had
infiltrated from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.
Moreover, a little
over a month later Egypt´s Ministry of the
Interior disclosed that two terrorist operatives involved in the
April 2006 attack on the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Dahab, underwent
military training in the use of weapons and explosives in the Gaza
Strip. They confessed to belonging to an organization called al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was also an earlier name for Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi´s organization before it became al-Qaeda Iraq.3 Thus al-Qaeda
related groups in Gaza appeared to have become involved in military
operations and were not just propagating their religious worldview
alone.
"The Army of Islam" and al-Qaeda
This year a new
aspect of the al-Qaeda presence in the Gaza Strip
became evident. On May 9, 2007 the "Army of Islam" organization
(Jaish al-Islam) published, on a website identified with al-Qaeda
(www.alhesbah.org), an official announcement in which it took
responsibility for the kidnapping of the BBC journalist Alan Johnston
and called for the release of the Palestinian sheikh, Abu Qatada, who
is being held in a British prison. Abu Qatada is Sheikh Omar Mahmoud
Othman, who is considered one of the main ideologues of al-Qaeda in
Europe and is known to be the one with whom the heads of the group
that carried out 9/11 consulted.
The announcement by the "Army
of Islam," which also appeared in a
recording delivered to al-Jazeera, made these additional points:
1. "We will not sit idle in the face of the Crusader
attack. . .Britain more than any other state wanted to humiliate the
Muslims...it settled the ‘sons of monkeys and pigs´ in Palestine...it
fights against Islam and the Muslims...and is a partner to the
Crusader war against Islam.
2. There is no protection for the
British subjects in the Muslim
states because the British government is fighting the Muslims, and
therefore all of them are fighters [i.e.-they have no protection and
can be killed].
3. Alan Johnston is being held under the laws
of the Islamic shari´a
concerning prisoners...Britain must release our prisoners and
particularly the Palestinian Abu Qatada...We do not forget our
prisoners in other countries and we say to release all of them,
otherwise we will behave the same way toward all of them without
exception."
The form and content "Army of Islam" recording
generated press
speculation about al-Qaeda in Gaza. A Palestinian security source
confirmed yet again in an interview to Al-Quds Al-Arabi (May 12,
2007) that al-Qaeda branches indeed have been set up in the Gaza
Strip. In fact, it emerges from his statements that there is close
cooperation between al-Qaeda in Gaza and the Hamas movement. He
identified the "Army of Islam" directly with al-Qaeda, and also noted
that it is the one responsible for kidnapping the BBC journalist Alan
Johnston and for publishing the demand to release Abu Qatada from the
British prison. The same source verified that the local branch of al-
Qaeda was established by activists from various Arab states who came
into the Gaza Strip from outside the Palestinian Authority. The
organization was also responsible for blowing up internet cafes,
barbershops, pharmacies, and cellular telephone stores.
The "Army of Islam" was indeed one of the three organizations
that
kidnapped the Israeli solder Gilad Shalit in the summer of 2006
together with Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees which also
had contacts with al-Qaeda.4 This means Hamas and an al-Qaeda branch
in Gaza have joined together for operational cooperation in terror
attacks against Israel. This fact has been largely overlooked by
observers of Middle Eastern affairs. Indeed, Musa Abu Marzuk, the
deputy political secretary of Hamas, has commented in the newspaper,
al-Liwa (April 10, 1007) that it is an honor for the Hamas
government "that it did not arrest a single jihad fighter nor condemn
a single action against the Zionist enemy."
Hamas did not want
the impression to be given that it had any
coordination at present with local al-Qaeda affiliates. The Hamas
leadership was probably relieved when the deputy leader of al-Qaeda,
Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at it for agreeing to a Palestinian
unity government. But its defensive response indicated that it was
still committed to the goals of al-Qaeda, namely resistance and
jihad: "Be assured, Dr. Ayman...Hamas is still the same movement it
has been since its foundation." 5
Hamas spokesperson, Ayman
Taha, acknowledged the fact that Hamas
and "Army of Islam" had cooperated on the military operational level.
However he claimed that "the contacts between Hamas and ‘Army of
Islam´ existed only in the beginning while abducting the (Israeli
soldier Gilad) Shalit, I think it was ended a while ago."6
Nevertheless, Muhammad al-Madhoun (Hamas), a political adviser
to
Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, confirmed (Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, May 10,
2007) that the demands that were made in the "Army of Islam´s"
recording detailing the terms for Johnston´s release were the same
ones the group conveyed clandestinely to the Hamas government. For
Hamas it was clear who was responsible for the abduction. In an
official announcement after the video clip was broadcasted Hamas
said: "taking responsibility of Johnston´s abduction made it clear
and didn´t leave any room for speculations with regard to the
organization responsible for the abduction, which we had known from
the first moment."7
Just after the British journalist was
abducted Hamas on its website
called on the Palestinian government "to issue immediate orders and
to chase the criminal group which caused harm to the supreme national
interest of our people, to arrest them and to beat strongly on their
hands in order to make them a lesson for others."8 However, Hamas
kept quiet and never took any actions against "Army of Islam." In
other words Hamas knew right from the start about the "Army of Islam"
operation yet did not intervene to free the British reporter and
dismantle the "Army of Islam."
The Palestinian government,
headed by Ismail Haniyeh, has for some
time been involved in contacts aimed at freeing Johnston. Haniyeh
disclosed in mid-April that there is close cooperation with British
officials, who are given relevant information obtained by Palestinian
security operatives.
The Johnston affair reveals, then, the
complexity of the reality of
Palestinian terror. The Hamas prime minister is working for the
release of a British journalist who was kidnapped by al-Qaeda, which
is maintaining close operational cooperation with Hamas. Since it
came to power, Hamas has had no interest in acting against the al-
Qaeda branch that is functioning in the Gaza Strip but is interested
in preventing an international crisis that would likely harm the
Palestinian
Authority, and it criticizes the "Army of Islam"
only for
its "mistaken choice" of a target. The Palestinian Authority thereby
shows that it has no moral legitimacy to demand to be recognized as a
political entity like other nations and that it is an entity
providing sanctuary for international terrorism.
Notes
1 Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back, Foreign Affairs, May/June
2007.
2 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "Understanding the
Direction of
the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and al-Qaeda
Jihadism" in Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 5, No. 22, Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs/Institute for Contemporary Affairs, April 6, 2006.
3 "The Egyptian Interior Ministry exposed operative
collaboration
between terrorist elements in Sinai (connected to the Global Jihad
and suspected of involvement in the attacks at Dahab) and Palestinian
terrorist elements in the Gaza Strip (whose identity is unclear),"
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for
Special Studies (C.S.S.), May 26, 2006. See: http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/dahab_250506.htm.
4 http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-24.htm
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50340
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3388249,00.html
5 "Ayman al-Zawahiri lashed out at the Hamas movement once
again,
accusing it of abandoning jihad and ‘selling Palestine´ for seats in
the Palestinian unity government. Hamas spokesmen defended their
political activity, stressing the continuing adherence of the
movement to its radical principles, namely ‘resistance´ and ‘jihad,´
and non-recognition of Israel." Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage &
Commemoration Center (IICC), March 22, 2007. See:
http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/al_zawahiri_e.htm.
6 Al-Nahar (Lebanon), May 10, 2007.
7
http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=ar&DSNO=981543
8 http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%
2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%
2bi1s7HL2orUHY2IGeTpHIV52PkmUmWJfKM6CzaZSnKT1mY3s02bMI60Bkxu9dnAj4HPB9
Xb6kuLh8ig0MGZqlvOnwllzdBmnMFGfTzfcn5pbwbrw%3d
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