The Islamist Threat to Jordan (JCPA) Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) Jerusalem Issue Brief Vol. 5, No. 25 By Nibras Kazimi 05/25/06)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief005-25.htm
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The elusiveness of a unifying Jordanian identity now provides a
window of opportunity for the jihadists, for whom Jordan is to be
the "Land of Mobilization and Fortitude" - the staging ground for
the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of Israel. Alienated
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin (who form the majority of
the population according to most estimates) will always be
vulnerable to an agenda that politically agitates for a return to
the Palestinian homeland through armed struggle.
For an increasing number of Palestinians, Hamas has ceased to be
militant enough, and they will seek out an alternative organization
through which to channel their militancy. This trend will probably
be mirrored among Palestinians in Jordan as well, with many finding
their way to al-Qaeda, or setting up home-grown and organizationally-
independent (and thus harder to track) al-Qaeda affiliates.
There is a historical precedent for this: young Palestinian
Muslim Brothers - such as Abu Iyad, Yasser Arafat, and Abu Jihad -
left the organization to train and fight under the auspices of new
groups like Fatah in the 1960s that gave vent to their militancy.
The convergence of the "global jihad," conducted by
organizations such as al-Qaeda, with the concept of "local jihad,"
that was the niche of homegrown militants such as Hamas, is
something of a homecoming for the traditional presence of
Palestinians within the ranks of Islamic extremists fighting far
beyond their borders. Palestinians now have the opportunity to serve
their own cause - the convenience of being a "good" global jihadist
and a "good" Palestinian nationalist both at once.
Zarqawi has vowed to cut off the head of King Abdullah II. The
Iraq phase has taught many Palestinians and Jordanians fighting
skills, who may have returned to Jordan. Today, these experienced
elements pose the most direct threat to Jordan´s security.
What is a Jordanian?
Jordan does not enjoy a compelling historical narrative about its
inception, for it was a country first conceived upon a map by a
bureaucrat armed with a pencil and ruler. A portion of Jordan´s
borders follow geographical realities: the Yarmouk River in the
north and the Jordan River and Wadi Araba in the west. Otherwise,
most of what demarcates Jordan from Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia is
a series of straight lines across unforgiving deserts.
The Hashemite ruling family - and the British colonialists
who "designed" Jordan before them - had hoped to turn this piece of
Middle East real estate into a sovereign country. The Hashemites
harbored further ambitions for enlargement into Syria and Palestine,
retrieving the Hijaz, or seeking a union with a pre-1958 Hashemite
Iraq. Somehow, this make-believe territory of Jordan was never
enough as a stand-alone nation, but after over eight decades since
its first inception as the Arab Emirate of Transjordan, a period
that saw the annexation and then loss of the West Bank, massive
demographic changes with the arrival of successive waves of
Palestinian refugees, and endless regional crisis and internal
challenges, the Hashemites have had to make do with their lot.
Understandably, within these borders and throughout this history, a
distinctive feeling of Jordanian identity, sprouting from the
notions of patriotism and citizenship, has failed to coalesce.
Jordan as a Staging Ground for the Destruction of Israel
The elusiveness of a unifying Jordanian identity now provides a
window of opportunity for the jihadists who seek another raison
d´etre for Jordan´s borders and history: it is to be the "Land of
Mobilization and Fortitude" (Ard al-Hashdi wal-Rabat) - the staging
ground for the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of
Israel.1 Therefore, the "usefulness" of Jordan is to provide an
opportunity for jihadists such as the Jordanian terrorist, Abu
Musa´ab al-Zarqawi, to transfer the fight from the various battles
being waged around the world to what they have traditionally
called "The Direction of Delayed Jihad" (Qiblet al-Jihad al-
Mu´ejjel) in Palestine. Zarqawi claimed in a recent video
release, "We fight in [Iraq] but our eyes are on Jerusalem."
But for that to happen, the Hashemites and their reasonably secure
intelligence and military apparatuses would have to be overthrown,
or at least weakened by a campaign of mayhem and chaos to the point
at which they lose control over some portion of their territory from
which the jihadists can launch attacks on Israel - a strategy
followed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) prior to
September 1970. By that measure, it appears that the Zarqawi branch
of al-Qaeda is aiming to create a ring of chaos around Israel in
Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the Sinai, as well as Jordan.
Zarqawi and the Amman Bombings
Yet, even if there is an identity void in Jordan, what indicators
are there that the extremism of Zarqawi would be welcome among
Jordanians? A feature story appeared in Al-Hayat newspaper in August
2005 that described the "legendary status" of Zarqawi even among the
Western-educated elite. He was something of a "popular hero" among
the youth, who were enamored of the fact that one of their own had
been propelled to such international prominence in the "struggle"
against the American "occupiers" in Iraq. The article suggested that
a combination of poverty, corruption, and lack of democracy
contributed to the gradual but perceptible movement of Jordanian
society toward extremism.2 The same newspaper in February 2006
highlighted the popularity of songs and video CDs glorifying
the "resistance" to foreign occupation in both Iraq and Palestine
that included footage of Hamas and Islamic Jihad operations against
Israeli targets, and titles such as "The Battle of Fallouja." These
were briskly sold in downtown Amman, despite recurrent government
raids aimed at confiscating them.3 In the time interval between
these two features, Zarqawi struck at his home country.
On November 9, 2005, Zarqawi´s organization attacked three hotels in
Amman, killing and maiming scores of Jordanians. Public outcry over
the Amman attacks found expression in spontaneous demonstrations and
vigils, as well as palpable Jordanian anger voiced through the local
and foreign press. Zarqawi´s tribe, the Bani Hassan, disowned him
and called for his blood. It was even suggested that the tide of
extremism had turned in Jordanian society, evidenced by such
unexpected outcomes as the inability of the Muslim
Brotherhood´s "hawks" to get elected to the Shura Bureau during
internal elections held in February 2006.4
Even Zarqawi was compelled to respond in a widely circulated audio
recording justifying his actions. He claimed that he was not
targeting civilians, and that the targets were actually Jordanian,
Israeli, American, Iraqi, and Palestinian Authority intelligence
officers meeting at those hotels at the time and using them as
secure stations for their operations. He claimed to know this
because members of his organization had reconnoitered the hotels for
two months before attacking.5 Zarqawi tried to show his Jordanian
bona fides by listing all the civilian targets which he did not
target, such as Amman´s Safeway or the Hashemite Square, as evidence
that he meant no harm to civilians. He continued by citing U.S.
press reports that claimed that Jordan´s General Directorate for
Intelligence (GID) had surpassed Israel´s Mossad as America´s most
effective counter-terrorism ally in the Middle East, and that
Jordanian cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had
grown closer in hunting down terrorists since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, on New York City and the Pentagon.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the internal resentments
Jordanian citizens harbor against each other and against the ruling
Hashemites would far eclipse the backlash against Zarqawi and his
brand of extremism. Jordan is riveted by tension between those of
Palestinian or West Bank origins, and those of "native" East Bank
credentials. Furthermore, even though Amman looks prosperous on the
surface, Jordanians are mindful that only the affluent neighborhoods
of West Amman - the ones that visitors and tourists get to see - are
doing well, but that East Amman and the majority of the country´s
urban centers are in deep stagnation.
Since ascending to the throne, King Abdullah II has tried to develop
a unifying sense of Jordanian identity to deflect those political,
social, and economic tensions, but has failed in large measure to
give most Jordanians a sense of ownership in their country´s
destiny. "King Hussein never veered far away from Arabism in
expressing Jordan´s identity," says Salameh Nematt, the Jordanian
bureau chief of Al-Hayat in Washington, D.C., "but his son,
Abdullah, has tried to play up a Jordanian identity through
the ´Jordan First´ public relations campaign, but failed to give his
people a stake in the country. There is this sense of malaise and
disenfranchisement in the country, especially among the
Palestinians, who feel that political reforms in the direction of
equal rights and responsibilities is mere rhetoric, and does not
amount to facts on the ground."
Thus, alienated Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin (who form
the majority of the population according to most estimates) will
always be vulnerable to an agenda that politically agitates for a
return to the Palestinian homeland through armed struggle,
especially in light of the failure of peace initiatives.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
Such a drawing point is not something new to the traditional
Islamist platform in Jordan as characterized by the rhetoric of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Historically, the Brotherhood made its first
radical forays into politics after it was spurred into action by the
Palestinian issue in the late 1940s, but remained loyal to the
Hashemite throne during the Nasserist challenge of 1957 and the
PLO´s bid for supremacy in 1970.6 Even though it strives to keep an
East Bank face to its leadership,7 the Muslim Brotherhood has always
put Palestine at the top of its rhetorical agenda. Recently, its
newly elected general supervisor, Salim Falahat, an East Bank
Jordanian from Madaba, said: "[Our] relationship with Palestine is
special. Jordan and Palestine, historically speaking, form a single
area. The blood is mixed here and there. And the sacrifices of the
East Jordanians on Palestine´s soil are no less than the sacrifice
of Palestinians on Palestine´s soil....We in Jordan believe that the
enemy is one....Distinguishing between Jordan and Palestine is an
arduous task and it is difficult for it to happen and no one can
reach that point. The intermingling and intertwining are too great."8
Furthermore, the long tenure of the "hawkish" wing at the helm of
the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to a general trend towards more
extreme positions, thus mirroring some of the fanatical stances
generally attributed to the jihadists. One such posture is the
adoption by the former deputy general supervisor, Humam Said, of
Seyyid Qutub´s ideas on hakimiyya - the illegitimacy of any state or
form of government if not guided by the laws of shari´a. This is
particularly relevant in viewing how the hawks understand the
sovereignty of Jordan in an Islamic context, or as Said put it, "The
nation state is a disease and is not a healthy matter....The
foreigner manufactured these borders and drew them, and this
imported measure must disappear, and with this line we represent the
conscience of the ummah."9
Given the looming presence of Palestinian affairs over Jordan and
specifically its Islamists, the Hamas victory in the January
elections has put further strain on the Muslim Brotherhood and its
various and conflicting loyalties. In one sense, they are expected
by the bulk of their constituency to stand by an isolated sister
organization that has become an international pariah after forming
the new PA government, and in another sense, Hamas is seen as a sell-
out by an increasingly disillusioned radical wing. This latter trend
has been growing in strength since Hamas´ offer of a cease-fire in
June 2003, which incensed many in its militant wing, the Izzeddin al-
Qassam Brigades, fueling speculation that al-Qaeda´s alternative
vision and methods would be welcomed among these disgruntled
militants.
Al-Qaeda in Gaza
Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has already publicly
warned of an embryonic al-Qaeda organization that may be active in
Gaza.10 New hitherto unknown groups have recently emerged (albeit in
leaflet form) with menacing names like The Army of Jihad and the
Deflection of Corruption (Jaish al-Jihad wa Rada´a al-Fasad) and The
Al-Quds Islamic Army - Al-Qaeda Organization (Jaish al-Quds Al-
Islami - Tandheem al-Qaeda), vowing fealty to Osama bin Laden, Ayman
Zawahiri, and Zarqawi, but they are not known to be operationally
active.11 One such organization that has emerged, calling itself the
Jerusalem Brigades of Palestine (Kata´ib Beit al-Maqdis fi
Filesteen), claimed responsibility for firing mortars at a Jewish
neighborhood in southern Jerusalem.12
What is clear is that for an increasing number of Palestinians,
Hamas has ceased to be militant enough, and they will seek out an
alternative organization through which to channel their militancy.
This trend will probably be mirrored among Palestinians in Jordan as
well, with many finding their way to al-Qaeda, or setting up home-
grown and organizationally-independent (and thus harder to track) al-
Qaeda affiliates.
There is a historical precedent for this: young Palestinian Muslim
Brothers - such as Abu Iyad, Yasser Arafat, and Abu Jihad - left the
organization to train and fight under the auspices of new groups
like Fatah in the 1960s that gave vent to their militancy.13 At the
time, Fatah even set up a camp for the Islamists north of the
Jordanian town of Irbid that was aptly called the Sheikhs´ Camp,
where Abdullah Azzam trained in his early jihadist career.14
Interestingly, even Hamas has spotted the trend and one of its
leaders, Younis al-Astel, recently warned that "a new Zarqawi would
emerge in Palestine" if his party´s cabinet fails to govern.15
The convergence of the "global jihad," conducted by organizations
such as al-Qaeda, with the concept of "local jihad," that was the
niche of homegrown militants such as Hamas, is something of a
homecoming for the traditional presence of Palestinians within the
ranks of Islamic extremists fighting far beyond their borders. The
Lebanese writer Hazim al-Amin published two features in Al-Hayat
where he perceptively discussed the odd phenomenon whereby
Palestinians became "the radical fuel for most of the Islamic
movements in which they joined starting with Egypt through Jordan
and finally in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq" - but not
predominantly in Palestine. Al-Amin begins with the career of Salih
Sarriya turning radical in Egypt in the mid-1970s, and ends by
highlighting the prominence of the "new stars" of the post-
Afghanistan jihadists such as their chief ideologues: ´Issam al-
Barqawi (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi), ´Umar Muhammad ´Uthman Abu ´Umar
(Abu Qutadah al-Filisteeni), and ´Umar Yusuf Juma´a (Abu Anes al-
Shami).16 The implication is that Palestinians have served distant
causes well, and now have the opportunity to serve their own - the
convenience of being a "good" global jihadist and a "good"
Palestinian nationalist both at once.
Zarqawi´s changing strategy of moving the fight to Israel´s doorstep
would thus further compel alienated Palestinians in the diaspora and
militants in Gaza and the West Bank to throw in their lot with him.
His claim of responsibility for the December 2005 attack on Kiryat
Shmona that involved firing ten Russian-made GRAD missiles from
southern Lebanon (as claimed in an Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia statement
released on several jihadist websites) came a month after the Amman
attacks and were probably - in his mind at least - the opening salvo
in a new front against Israel.17
Zarqawi has vowed to cut off the head of King Abdullah II, and even
though Zarqawi is an East Banker,18 he seems not to mind that
Jordan´s relevance will be subsumed as part of the anti-Israel phase
of jihad. For the time being, the Iraq phase has taught many
Palestinians and Jordanians fighting skills, who may have returned
to Jordan, notwithstanding the watchful eyes of the GID. Today,
these experienced elements pose the most direct threat to Jordan´s
security, and their increasing numbers, as well as geographical
proximity to Iraq, will further stress the capabilities of local law
enforcement and intelligence services to keep up with their
movements.19
Yet again, Jordan seems poised to witness a battle between those
loyal to the Hashemite throne and to its own unique national
character, and those who express loyalty to the cause of liberating
Palestine. However, this time around, the liberation of Palestine
would be coached within the larger goals of jihad and the
resurrection of the caliphate. With the triple promise of martyrdom,
Jerusalem, and Islamic glory, many of Jordan´s alienated youth,
spurned by a political system that refuses to assimilate them as
equals and an economic monopoly wary of sharing wealth, will turn to
Zarqawi. This could be the gravest challenge yet to the Hashemites,
and its success would further rupture the tattered fabric of
stability throughout the Middle East. It is a struggle between
Jordan´s sovereignty and the jihadist fantasy of turning that
country into the "Land of Mobilization and Fortitude."
Notes
1. The "Land of Mobilization and Fortitude" label has long been the
Islamist designation for Jordan, notably among the "hawkish" wing of
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. See the speech given by the former
deputy general supervisor, Humam Said, on September 17, 2004,
www.ikhwan-jor.org/ikhwannews/hamam.htm. The term derives from a
tradition weakly attributed to the Prophet Muhammad about the "End
of Days."
2. Rana Sabbagh, "Diraseh amreekiya taduq naqoos...,"Al-Hayat,
August 1, 2005.
3. Fadwa al-Dabbagh, "Inti´ash aswaq aljihadiyeen fi ´amman
youqidh...," Al-Hayat, February 15, 2006.
4. Nabil Gheishan, "Intikhabat ikhwan alurden tudhher taraju´...,"
Al-Hayat, February 19, 2006.
5. Zarqawi even claimed that Azzam Azzam, the Israeli-Druze "spy,"
used to lounge around the Grand Hyatt Hotel waiting to meet his
Mossad paymasters (minute 10:15 on audio recording). However, Azzam
was arrested in Cairo in November 1996, while the Grand Hyatt Hotel
in Amman (one of the three establishments that were bombed) was not
built until 1998.
6. Mishari Al-Dhayedi, "Alikhwan almuslimoon wel ´arsh
alhashimi...," Asharq Alawsat, October 9, 2005.
7. Mishari Al-Dhayedi, "Ahadeeth urdeniya fi alusooliya wel
siyaseh...," Asharq Alawsat, October 10, 2005. Al-Dhayedi quotes
Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarian Ali Abul-Sukker giving the
breakdown of the Brotherhood´s Political Bureau at the time as five
East Bankers and two Palestinians. The most recent composition of
the Political Bureau (since February 2006) is probably six East
Bankers and one Palestinian, based on the brief biographies on the
movement´s official website.
8. "Almuraqib al´aam lil jama´a fil urdun yenteqid...," Al-Hayat,
April 20, 2006. Ali Abu al-Sukker also said, "The Palestinian issue
has its special category among Jordan´s Brothers because of
demography, geography, and religion." See "Ahadeeth urduniya fil
usuliya wel siyassa...," Asharq Alawsat, October 10, 2005.
9. Ibid.
10. Ghassan Sherbil, "Abbas lil hayat mu´eshirat ila wujood
alqaeda...," Al-Hayat, March 2, 2006.
11. Fathi Sabbah, "Ishtibakat fath wa hamas...," Al-Hayat, May 9,
2006, and "Majmou´a gheir ma´aroofeh tumhil...," Al-Hayat, March 3,
2006.
12. Salih al-Na´ami, "Bayan mansoob bi isim jaish...," Asharq
Alawsat, March 5, 2006.
13. "Alikhwan almuslimoon fil urden wa...," Asharq Alawsat, October
9, 2005.
14. Hazim Al-Amin, "Alqaeda weselet illa aldhifa algharbieh wel
qita´...," Al-Hayat, April 4, 2006.
15. "Zarqawi filisteeni qad yadhher idha...," Al-Hayat, April 16,
2006.
16. Hazim Al-Amin, "Alqaeda weselet illa aldhifa algharbieh wel
qita´...," Al-Hayat, April 4, 2006. It is interesting that Barqawi
and Juma´a, along with the Hamas´ politburo chief Khalid Mesha´al,
share the experience of being expelled from Kuwait after the Gulf
War, and having to move to Jordan. It may be suggested that their
exaggerated militancy was proportional to their lack of an
established association with Jordan.
17. Zarqawi´s alleged plan for the "encirclement" of Israel with a
ring of chaos from southern Lebanon to the Sinai was first discussed
by Abdel-Rahman ´Ali in an op-ed in Asharq Alawsat on March 11,
2006.
18. Zarqawi, whose real name is Ahmad Fadheel Nazzal al-Khalayleh,
is of the Khalayleh subsection of the Khawaldeh clan of the Bani
Hleil sub-tribe of the Bani Hassan tribe. An interesting supposition
as to his lack of East Bank "loyalty" to the Hashemite throne and to
Jordan as a country is the assertion that "some of the Khalayleh
clan have long been influenced by Wahhabism, and many men of this
section of the clan do not wear the ´uqal and do not smoke." See
Mishari al-Dhayedi in Asharq Alawsat, October 13, 2005.
19. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the three men shown on
Jordanian TV as members of the recently exposed "Hamas cell" all had
links to the jihad in Iraq: one whose brother had died in the
fighting in Iraq, another who had served alongside the deceased
brother, and a third who had traveled to Al-Qa´im to purchase
weapons. See Nabil Gheishan, "´Itiqalat fi sufoof alislamiyeen
alurduniyeen...," Al-Hayat, May 12, 2006. Furthermore, two long-time
Syrian residents of Jordan who had fought in Iraq, and whose father
was a Muslim Brotherhood refugee from Syria, seem to have been the
principal plotters in the attack on a U.S. Navy frigate in the port
of Aqaba on September 9, 2005. See Nabil Gheishan, "Khaliyet da´am
logistic harebet...," Al-Hayat, March 15, 2006.
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