Destabilizing Implications of Iranian-U.S. Rapprochement for Israeli and Global Security (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER PUBLIC AFFAIRS) JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF Vol.1, No.14 01/03/02)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/art/brief1-14.htm
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During the U.S. military build-up for America´s anti-terrorism
campaign in Afghanistan, speculation grew over a possible political
by-product of the war: a U.S.-Iranian accommodation after years of
mutual hostility. The apparent driving force of this shift was the
shared opposition in the U.S. and Iran to the Taliban, who had
mistreated Afghanistan´s Shi´ite minority in an expression of extreme
Sunni fundamentalist doctrine. Yet Iran´s alarmingly rapid
development of strategic missiles and its continued backing of
Hizbullah terrorists makes any Iranian-U.S. rapprochement premature
and potentially destabilizing -- especially in the aftermath of the
Rafsanjani threat to Israel´s existence.
Signs of Warming
Relations
There were multiple signs of this developing U.S.-Iranian
relationship over the last three months. First, Iran agreed to
perform search-and-rescue missions for downed U.S. pilots on Iranian
territory, despite Tehran´s opposition to the American war effort
(Washington Post, October 18, 2001). Second, Iran´s ambassador to the
United Nations, Hadi Nejad Hosseinian, was hosted by Senator Arlen
Spector (R-PA) at a dinner on Capitol Hill; the movement of the
Iranian UN ambassador outside of the New York area generally requires
Washington´s prior approval (Washington Post, October 29, 2001).
Third, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi shook the hand of
Secretary of State Colin Powell during the opening of the UN General
Assembly in November (Reuters, November 13, 2001). This was the first
public gesture of this sort between cabinet-level members of the U.S.
and Iranian governments in 20 years. Former Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering and John Newhouse view Iran
as one of the "big opportunities" for the U.S. in the wake of
September 11, and have called for relaxing U.S. trade sanctions,
including the importation of Iranian oil to the U.S. (Washington
Post, December 28, 2001).
Appraising the Iranian
Threat
Prior to September 11, there were very strong reasons for the U.S. to
continue a policy of firmness towards Iran:
Iran, which has
long had hegemonial ambitions in the Middle East,
particularly toward Shi´ite populations in Bahrain, in the UAE, in
Lebanon, and in eastern Saudi Arabia, recently accelerated its
military build-up; in 2000-2001 alone its defense budget grew by 50
percent (Michael Eisenstadt, MERIA Journal, Volume 5, No. 1, March
2001).
Meanwhile, Iran remained one of the worst sponsors of
international
terrorism: in June 2001, a U.S. District Court in Virginia identified
Iran, along with Lebanon and Syria, as having hosted the training of
Saudi Hizbullah for the 1996 terrorist attack on U.S. troops in al-
Khobar, Saudi Arabia, that left 19 American servicemen dead and 372
wounded.
Iranian defense spending over the 1990s was not
devoted to
understandable security challenges along its immediate perimeter. For
example, by the decade´s end, Iraq´s tank forces still outnumbered
Iran´s (2,000 to 1,520) (The Middle East Military Balance, 1999-2000,
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies). Rather, Iran´s top priorities
were its programs that had strategic reach well beyond Iran´s
borders: the Iranian Navy, which even sought facilities in the Indian
Ocean (Mozambique) and Red Sea (Sudan), and Iran´s missile/non-
conventional capabilities.
Iran´s missile programs have been
particularly alarming. After first
test-firing its Shahab-3 1,300 kilometer range missile in August
1998, that had sufficient range to strike Israel and Turkey, the new
missile became operational in February 2000. While it acquires a more
reliable missile capability against Israel, Iran has forward-deployed
Fajr-5 artillery rockets in Lebanon, under Iranian command and
control. Meanwhile, Iran is proceeding with the Shahab-4, with a
range of 2,000 kilometers, that could pose a threat to central and
southern Europe. Iran is known to be planning a 10,000 kilometer
range Shahab-5. For this reason the 1998 congressionally-mandated
Rumsfeld Commission concluded that Iran already "has the technical
capability and resources to demonstrate an ICBM (inter-continental
ballistic missile)" in less than a decade. In other words, with
Russian technological assistance, it is likely that Iran could
possess the capability of striking U.S. territory with ballistic
missiles by 2010 (W. Seth Carus in MERIA Journal, Volume 4, No. 3,
September 2000).
Understanding Iranian Intentions
The Iranian regime´s development of missiles of this range is
indicative of intentions that go well beyond its hostility to Israel
or its regional hegemonial ambitions. Furthermore, Iran´s former
president, Ali-Akbar Hasheimi-Rafsanjani, who currently serves as
Chairman of the "Assembly to Discern the Interests of the State,"
explicitly declared in mid-December 2001 that a nuclearized Iran
could pose an existential threat to Israel:
"If a day comes
when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the
arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face
a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave
anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in
the Muslim world."
In a December 25, 2001, letter to UN
Secretary-General Kofi Anan,
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres warned that Rafsanjani´s
statement "contradicts the Iranian claim that its plans to acquire
nuclear technologies are designed for peaceful purposes." Peres´
written conclusion about Rafsanjani was simple: he "left no room for
doubt" that the Iranian regime´s "declared goal" was to destroy
Israel. This was further substantiated by other Iranian declarations.
On November 14, 2001, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi
addressed a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in New York.
Emphasizing that "the issue of Palestine can be settled only"
with "the right of return," he proposed that after its implementation
a referendum then be held of all original "residents of Palestine" to
determine its future political system. Kharazi was essentially
presenting a program for nothing less than the eradication of Israel.
The Iranian foreign minister had made the same proposal in September
at Durban.
Implications
If Iran only posed a threat to Israel, while offering new diplomatic
opportunities to the U.S. and its NATO allies, then it would be
possible to anticipate a threat perception gap between Jerusalem and
Washington. However, Iran´s continuing support for international
terrorism through Hizbullah -- an organization with proven global
reach from South America to Saudi Arabia -- and its declared interest
in achieving a nuclear-strike capability demonstrates the severe
hostility and broad geographic scope of involvement of the Iranian
regime.
An existential threat to Israel can easily evolve into
an existential
threat to other states, given the planned ranges of the Iranian
missile forces.
Despite short-term tactical joint interests in
defeating the Taliban,
the present Iranian regime has a very different foreign policy agenda
from that of the West. Without a strategic change in Iranian support
for terrorist organizations, any accommodation with Tehran is
premature and even dangerous. (www.jcpa.org. © Copyright 01/03/02)
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