America’s Hamas Dilemma: Spreading Democracy or Combating Terrorism? (JCPA) JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Jerusalem Issue Brief Vol. 5, No. 8 by Dore Gold 11/01/05)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief0005-8.htm
JCPA-Jerusalem Center Public Affairs
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The Bush administration had not agreed for some time with the
Israeli position that Hamas be excluded from the upcoming
Palestinian parliamentary elections. At Princeton University on
September 30, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was
absolutely clear that Palestinian violence could not co-exist with
Palestinian politics in the future. She also reiterated that Hamas
was a terrorist organization. Where she was fuzzy was about whether
the disarming of Hamas had to precede the Palestinian elections.
Hamas leader Dr. Mahmud al-Zahar has explicitly stated that the
goals of Hamas extend beyond the West Bank and Gaza, or even the
destruction of Israel, and also affect the future stability of
neighboring countries: “Our main goal is to establish a great
Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic.” Al-Zahar puts Hamas
squarely in the camp of militant Islam: “The Islamists’ view, which
Hamas adheres to, is that a great Muslim state must be established,
with Palestine being a part of it.” In the past, Hamas had sent a
small number of operatives for training in bin Laden’s camps in
Afghanistan, and even established operational links with a Pakistani
al-Qaeda cell in Britain, but it obfuscated these connections and
had never been so explicit about identifying with global jihadi
goals.
Originally, the realpolitik thinking underpinning the Bush
administration’s support for democratization of the Middle East was
based on the assumption that democracies are inherently peaceful and
will not encourage extremist political systems that might host
terrorist groups. Non-democratic regimes need to produce an external
enemy as a control mechanism over their populations. What happens if
democracy empowers a political movement like Hamas, whose core
ideology is based on belligerency, regardless of whether it needs a
control mechanism or not?
Westerners engaging in a dialogue with Hamas have also been
speaking with the Muslim Brotherhood, the original Egyptian
fundamentalist organization, founded in 1928, from which Hamas grew
as its Palestinian branch. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has the
status of being “illegal but officially tolerated.” Some have
observed that voter participation increased in the 2005 Egyptian
presidential elections because the Muslim Brotherhood called on
voters to go to the polls. Organizations like the International
Crisis Group have already recommended that the Muslim Brotherhood be
decriminalized and permitted to take a more active role in Egyptian
politics. In the Middle East, however, both intellectuals and
officials, like Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, have warned
against legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood. A former Kuwaiti
education minister reminded his readers in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in July
2005 that all of al-Qaeda’s terrorism started from the ideology of
the Muslim Brotherhood.
Today, the Muslim Brotherhood remains fiercely anti-Western. Its
newly-appointed head in 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Othman ‘Akef, denied
that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks and calls the U.S.
a “Satan” that will soon collapse. The Muslim Brotherhood has
published an Arabic weekly in London called Risalat al-Ikhwan,
the “Message of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Several months after 9/11,
it changed its masthead, which until November 2001 did not even
pretend to hide the organization’s global intentions. It read: “Our
mission: world domination.”
Disarming Hamas Before or After the PA Elections?
All eyes were riveted on President George W. Bush during his joint
press conference on October 20, 2005, with Palestinian Authority
Chairman Mahmud Abbas. Would the U.S. insist on Hamas being excluded
from the upcoming Palestinian legislative elections, now scheduled
for January 2006? Bush cautioned the Palestinian leader that “the
way forward is confronting the threat armed gangs present to
creation of a democratic Palestine.” But Bush did not directly
question Abbas’ intention to permit political participation by Hamas
and other Palestinian groups that have carried out terror attacks
against Israelis.1
Political commentators immediately noted that Bush was defining the
threat of Palestinian militancy in terms of “armed gangs,” without
mentioning Hamas. Indeed, on October 24, 2005, Bush appeared on al-
Arabiyya, the Saudi-owned Arabic satellite channel, and in answering
a question about whether he would like Abbas to disarm Hamas and
Islamic Jihad prior to elections, he said he would be satisfied if
Abbas followed through on his commitment “to make sure that there’s
no armed presence on the streets.”2 Was the U.S. essentially about
to tolerate Hamas involvement in the elections?
As Robert Satloff, the director of the Washington Institute, noted
in The New Republic, the Bush administration had not agreed for some
time with the Israeli position that Hamas be excluded from the
elections. Indeed, he notes that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
urged Israel to help the PA hold West Bank elections, with full
Hamas participation: “This is going to be a Palestinian process and
I think we have to give the Palestinians some room for the evolution
of their political process.”3
Rice also commented on the same subject in response to a question at
Princeton University on September 30, 2005. She was absolutely clear
that Palestinian violence could not co-exist with Palestinian
politics in the future. Where she was fuzzy was about whether the
disarming of Hamas had to precede the Palestinian elections or would
be a consequence of the political process.
She used two contradictory examples: there was the British model of
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, where the IRA was admitted into the
political process with the assumption that it would eventually
disarm, and in contrast there was the U.S. model which did not
permit Afghan warlords to participate in the 2005 Afghan election
without first disarming. Rice was unclear over whether the U.S. was
following the precedent set by Prime Minister Tony Blair or by
President Bush when it came to Hamas.
To make matters worse, Israel itself appeared to be folding on the
issue. On October 24, 2005, the New York Times headlined a story by
its bureau chief, Steven Erlanger: “Israel Retreats from Objection
to Hamas Role in Elections.”4 The article cited an unnamed “senior
Israeli official” who stated that it would be impractical to try to
hinder the elections. This same unnamed official also told the
Associated Press: “Are we going to war on this issue or interfere on
this issue? No.” According to the AP, Israel was “acknowledging
defeat” in its campaign to ban Hamas from the Palestinian elections
after the Bush-Abbas summit.5
Still, two days later, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz tried to
correct the impression created by the unnamed Israeli official; he
told President Husni Mubarak of Egypt that Hamas
continues “producing terrorist acts and at the same time they want
to run in the elections; they can´t have it both ways.” Even if
Hamas members are elected, he warned that Israel would not speak
with them.6
In the aftermath of the Islamic Jihad suicide bombing attack in
Hadera on October 26, White House Spokesman Scott McClellan also
appeared to try to correct the impression of the U.S. stand on
Hamas. While he mistakenly attributed the attack to Hamas, he
asserted that “our stance on Hamas is well-known. It must be
disarmed. A terror organization can’t be involved in politics and
carrying out terror attacks. The PA must make it clear to Hamas that
as long as they continue to operate militarily, they have no place
in the political system.”7
Hamas Identifies with Global Jihadi Terrorism
U.S. spokesmen still insist that Hamas is an international terrorist
organization. Rice stated at Princeton: “We’ve been very clear that
Hamas is a terrorist group and it has to be disbanded, both for
peace and security in the Middle East and for the proper functioning
of the Palestinian Authority. After all, it is a roadmap obligation
of the Palestinian Authority to disband militias and armed
resistance groups.”8 Furthermore, the Hamas leader in the Gaza
Strip, Dr. Mahmud al-Zahar, has explained that his organization’s
cessation of violence at different times is only conditional and in
any case will come to an end in December 2005.9 In other words,
Hamas has not agreed to the roadmap’s very first requirement of “an
unconditional cease-fire,” but instead has chosen a less obligatory
tahdiyya (or calm) that has already been broken with massive Kassam
rocket fire on Israel whenever Hamas sees fit.
Al-Zahar has also explicitly stated that the goals of Hamas extend
beyond the West Bank and Gaza and even affect the future stability
of neighboring countries: “Our main goal is to establish a great
Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic.”10 He added: “In the
past, there was no independent Palestinian state; there was no
independent Jordanian state; and so on. There were regions called
Iraq or Egypt, but they were all part of one country. That is why it
is not permitted to [agree to] establish separate countries.” Al-
Zahar puts Hamas squarely in the camp of militant Islam: “The
Islamists’ view, which Hamas adheres to, is that a great Muslim
state must be established, with Palestine being a part of it.”
On a different occasion, al-Zahar had no qualms identifying Hamas
with the global jihad by expressing his confidence that Israel’s
Gaza disengagement, for which Hamas took credit, “will lift the
morale of the Arab and Islamic world and will affect the battle for
Afghanistan and Iraq.” Openly sympathizing with the ousted Taliban
regime, al-Zahar has been fiercely anti-Western in his most recent
interviews.11 He plainly admits: “We are part of the great world
plan whose name is the world Islamic movement.”12 In the past, Hamas
had sent a small number of operatives for training in bin Laden’s
camps in Afghanistan, and even established operational links with a
Pakistani al-Qaeda cell in Britain, but it obfuscated these
connections and had never been so explicit about identifying with
global jihadi goals.13
U.S. Policy Choices
If this is the Hamas position, then why is the U.S. not doing
everything in its power to keep Hamas out of the Palestinian
elections? On October 6, 2005, President Bush delivered a major
address on the subject of the war on terrorism in which for the
first time he identified the enemy as Islamic radicalism. He went
into considerable detail about the global jihadi network: “Many
militants are part of global, borderless terrorist organizations
like al-Qaeda, which spreads propaganda, and provides financing and
technical assistance to local extremists, and conducts dramatic and
brutal operations like September the 11th. Other militants are found
in regional groups, often associated with al-Qaeda – paramilitary
insurgencies and separatist movements in places like Somalia, and
the Philippines, and Pakistan, and Chechnya, and Kashmir, and
Algeria. Still others spring up in local cells, inspired by Islamic
radicalism, but not centrally directed.” He warned that these groups
want “to establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to
Indonesia.”14 Hamas was not mentioned by Bush, but it certainly fit
perfectly into the definition of who the U.S. was categorizing as
its primary adversaries.
It seemed that when it came to the question of the January 2006
Palestinian legislative elections, the U.S. faced a tough dilemma of
choosing between its support for the spread of democracy and its war
on radical Islamic terrorism.15
Originally, the realpolitik thinking underpinning the Bush
administration’s support for democratization of the Middle East came
from the observation that democracy would help defeat terrorism.
Thus, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated at her confirmation
hearings in January 2005:
The world should apply what Natan Sharansky calls the “town square
test”: if a person cannot walk into the middle of the town square
and express his or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment,
or physical harm, then that person is living in a fear society, not
a free society. We cannot rest until every person living in a “fear
society” has finally won their freedom. In the Middle East,
President Bush has broken with six decades of excusing and
accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of purchasing
stability at the price of liberty. The stakes could not be higher.
As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny and
despair and anger, it will produce extremists and movements that
threaten the safety of Americans and our friends.16
Her analysis was correct. It was based on the assumption that
democracies are inherently peaceful and will not encourage extremist
political systems that might host terrorist groups. Sharansky
himself explained in the book, to which Rice referred, that non-
democratic regimes need to produce an external enemy as a control
mechanism over their populations.17 But there is one caveat. What
happens if democracy empowers a political movement like Hamas whose
core ideology is based on belligerency, regardless of whether it
needs a control mechanism or not? Actually, Sharansky warns in his
book that elections alone are not a true test of democracy.
Democracy requires, as a prerequisite, the emergence of a political
culture that is supportive of freedom. Can a radical Islamist group
like Hamas, that envisions the militant takeover of neighboring
states, be regarded as a partner in such a democratization process?
The question is especially pertinent since the Islamist
organizations across the Middle East, with which Hamas so closely
identifies, have openly declared war on the very idea of democracy.
The False Analogy of Northern Ireland
Another argument that might be affecting the U.S. position is the
hope that elections will actually moderate or transform Hamas by
imbuing its members with more democratic values. U.S. officials have
not stated this, but Secretary Rice’s references to the Good Friday
Agreement indicate an effort to learn from the British experience
with the IRA. Ze’ev Schiff, the national security correspondent for
Ha’aretz, has revealed that recently “an intensive public relations
campaign has been conducted on behalf of Hamas in various parts of
Europe and the U.S.,” led by former intelligence officials like
Alistaire Crooke, from Britain’s MI-6.18 Former U.S. intelligence
operatives have also joined Crooke in a series of meetings with
Hamas, including the CIA’s Milton Beardon who brokered the U.S.
relationship with the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets, Graham
Fuller who was with both the CIA and the Rand Corporation, and Fred
Hoff who worked on the Mitchell Report. A former Saudi official also
joined the group.19 Some of these individuals have made inroads in
the past into the American and British foreign policy establishments.
The Northern Ireland model of peacemaking, which has informed the
British component leading this effort, is a poor example upon which
to base a Western dialogue with Hamas. The Good Friday Agreement was
not the success story that is often presented, despite its being
perceived by parts of the British establishment as a crowning
achievement of its foreign policy initiatives.20 For example, the
inclusion of the IRA in the political process in 1998 did not bring
about immediate disarmament of the group thereafter; rather, the
issue of decommissioning the IRA’s weapons dragged on for years and
its commitment to non-violence was highly questionable. IRA members
were caught red-handed in 2001 in Colombia engaging in new arms
deals with anti-government rebels. The IRA was later linked to bank
robberies and murders in 2004 and 2005. But more importantly, the
IRA and Hamas have very different sorts of political aims; for years
the IRA sought to remove the British presence from Northern Ireland
and unify the districts of the north with the Irish Republic in the
south. But the IRA did not seek to destroy Great Britain. In
contrast, as already noted, the Hamas leadership has made absolutely
clear, right up to the present, that it seeks to eliminate the State
of Israel. The scale of hostility in the two conflicts cannot be
compared, so there is little reason for concluding, on the basis of
the Irish example, that moderating the goals of Hamas through a
political process is a realistic option.
The Broader Debate Over the Muslim Brotherhood: The Parent
Organization That Spawned Hamas
Those engaging in a dialogue with Hamas have also been speaking with
the Muslim Brotherhood, the original Egyptian fundamentalist
organization, founded in 1928, from which Hamas grew as its
Palestinian branch. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has the status
of being “illegal but officially tolerated.” Brotherhood leaders
have stated that the group disavows violence today, even though it
was involved in political assassinations and terrorism in the past.
Independent members of the Egyptian parliament identify themselves
with the Muslim Brotherhood, so that indirectly it is part of the
political system, in addition to its penetration of Egyptian
professional associations and the religious establishment. Since the
1980s it has sought to coordinate its political moves with non-
fundamentalist parties like the Wafd and more recently with Ayman
Nour. Some have observed that voter participation increased in the
2005 Egyptian presidential elections because the Muslim Brotherhood
called on voters to go to the polls. Outside organizations like the
International Crisis Group have already recommended that the Muslim
Brotherhood be decriminalized and permitted to take a more active
role in Egyptian politics.21 Is this model inspiring those who
advocate engaging Hamas?
In the Middle East, however, both intellectuals and officials have
warned against legitimizing the Muslim Brotherhood. A former Kuwaiti
education minister reminded his readers in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in July
2005 that all of al-Qaeda’s terrorism started from the ideology of
the Muslim Brotherhood, tracing the doctrine of takfir (claiming
that other Muslims are apostates and hence worthy of death) to
Sayyid Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood leader in the 1960s. A Kuwaiti
political scientist, writing in both the Kuwaiti and Egyptian press,
challenged the U.S. to place the Muslim Brotherhood on its terrorism
list, considering that Middle Eastern leaders like Prince Nayef, the
Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, also attributed the rise of
terrorism to the Brotherhood (Nayef’s own backing of radical Wahhabi
charities notwithstanding). In answer to a question about the Muslim
Brotherhood from Der Spiegel, in an interview published on December
20, 2004, President Mubarak came out firmly against the group: “The
Muslim Brotherhood has a terrorist past. They have killed a prime
minister and others who don’t agree with their political goals. In
1954, they even tried to blow up President Gamal Abdel Nasser. No,
the last thing our country needs is a group like the Muslim
Brotherhood.”22 It is true that the Mubarak regime maintains
contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood, but it does so through
Egyptian security organs – not through the political system.
Today, the Muslim Brotherhood remains fiercely anti-Western. Its
newly-appointed head in 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Othman ‘Akef, denied
that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks and calls the U.S.
a “Satan” that will soon collapse.23 Further evidence of its
orientation can be gathered from its official publications. On the
Muslim Brotherhood website, ‘Akef asserted: “I have complete faith
that Islam will invade Europe and America.”24 While Muslim
Brotherhood publications are illegal in Egypt, nonetheless the
Muslim Brotherhood has published an Arabic weekly in London called
Risalat al-Ikhwan, the “Message of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Several
months after 9/11, it changed its masthead, which until November
2001 did not even pretend to hide the organization’s global
intentions. It read: “Our mission: world domination.”25
Democracy Based on Standards
The dilemmas facing U.S. policymakers go beyond the question of
Hamas and the Palestinian elections. In confronting radical Islamic
militant groups, should Washington try to isolate purely jihadi
movements, like al-Qaeda, by drawing other Islamist movements into
the beginnings of a democratic political process? This is a very
dangerous option because radical Islamist groups have shown that
they can expertly utilize the language of political pluralism and
tolerance without altering their highly aggressive ideological
agenda. Forcing Egypt to accept the Muslim Brotherhood or insisting
that Israel accept Hamas as a partner in a future Palestinian
government will likely accelerate a radical Islamist takeover across
the Middle East.
In the Palestinian case, if Abbas shares power with Hamas in the
future, wouldn’t he be even weaker than he is today? Hamas could
still resist calls for it being disarmed; it could point to the
precedent of Lebanon, where Hizballah has representatives in the
Lebanese parliament and yet maintains a separate militia, distinct
from the Lebanese Army. Once elected to the Palestinian parliament,
Hamas representatives will have little incentive to change. If Abbas
provides Hamas members with Palestinian Authority ministries as part
of a power-sharing arrangement, who is going to prevent
international assistance going through these ministries to Hamas
charities, where they can be used to build up the military
infrastructure of Hamas? And once Hamas has been legitimized in this
way by the electoral process, it will be extremely difficult for the
U.S. and its allies to criticize the Saudis and others who have
funded Hamas in the past, for by aiding Hamas they will be assisting
part of the Palestinian Authority.
There are precedents for handling the problem of terrorist groups
seeking to enter the democratic process. In 2002, Spain banned the
political arm of the ETA, the Basque separatist group, from running
for office. France and The Netherlands have also dissolved political
parties “that aim to promote violence.”26 It would be the height of
hypocrisy if European states did not insist on the same
preconditions for political participation that they use to protect
their own societies, when they are asked their view on the
Palestinian elections. The U.S. could use this argument with its
Quartet partners, but it first must establish a position no less
firm than that of the EU regarding the exclusion of terrorists from
democratic politics.
The key to handling these movements in the Middle East is to demand
that they disarm before entering the political process, and totally
renounce violence. They must also accept the rules of the political
process which they seek to join: inside Arab states, they must
recognize the legitimacy of their political opposition and accept
the will of the majority. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, they
must accept the legitimacy of the State of Israel and express
willingness to reach a permanent peace, and not just a temporary
cease-fire from which they can resume their war at a later time.
Unless these minimal standards for democratic inclusion are first
set and then firmly maintained, the entire drive for democratization
in the Middle East could prove self-defeating.
Notes
1. “Bush Expresses Confidence in Mideast Peace Process,” CNN,
October 20, 2005;
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/20/bush.abbas.ap/index.html
2. “Interview of President Bush by Al Arabiyya,” White House,
October 24, 2005;
Question: So you would like him to disarm the Hamas and Jihad before
the election?
President Bush: Well, as he said, what he´s going to do is to make
sure there´s no armed presence on the streets, and I would like for
him to follow through on that. I believe that his party will win
because his party is one of peace. And I think most people want
peace. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051024-
6.html
3. Robert Satloff, “Control Issues,” New Republic, September 22,
2005; https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=w050919&s=satloff092205
4. Steven Erlanger, “Israel Retreats From Objection to Hamas Role in
Elections,” New York Times, October 24, 2005;
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/24/international/middleeast/24mideast.
html
5. “Israel Bows to Pressure on Hamas Question,” AP, October 23,
2005.
6. Nir Hasson, “Mofaz: Hamas is a Terrorist Organization, Not a
Party,” Ha’aretz, October 27, 2005.
7. Yitzhak Benhorin, “U.S. to PA: Ban Hamas from Elections,” Ynet
News, October 26, 2005; http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3159902,00.html
8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Questions Taken at
Princeton University,” September 30, 2005;
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/54178.htm
9. “Interview with Hamas Leader Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahar,” MEMRI, August
19, 2005; http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?
Page=countries&Area=palestinian&ID=SP96405
10. Yaniv Berman, “Interview with Hamas Leader Mahmoud A-Zahhar,”
Media Line, September 22, 2005;
http://www.themedialine.org/news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=11354. For
background on the international Islamist orientation of the
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (which became Hamas), beyond the
struggle for Palestine, see Ziad Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in
the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 23-25. In
addition, the affinity of Hamas for groups that are part of the al-
Qaeda network was dramatically demonstrated in 2004 when Hamas
distributed computer CDs in the West Bank and Gaza that express the
organization’s identification with Chechen terrorists and with
other “holy wars” in the Balkans, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. Pictured
together on these CDs are Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Chechen
leaders al-Khattab and Shamil Basayev, and Osama bin Laden.
See “Hamas Identifies With and Supports Chechen and International
Islamic Terrorism on CDs Found in the Palestinian Authority-
Administered Territories”;
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/9_04/chechnya.htm
11. “‘Hamastan,’ as Described in Interviews by Mahmoud al-Zahar,”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for
Special Studies, October 9, 2005;
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/hamastan_e.htm
12. “Hamas: Disengagement Will Lift Morale of Global Islamist
Forces, Affect Battle for Afghanistan and Iraq,” News First Class,
August 17, 2005; http://www.nfc.co.il/archive/001-D-78357-00.html?
tag=9-09-57
13. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and David Keyes, “Will a
Gaza ‘Hamas-stan’ Become a Future Al-Qaeda Sanctuary?,” Jerusalem
Viewpoints No. 524, November 1, 2004;
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp524.htm
14. “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for
Democracy,” White House, October 6, 2005;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html
15. There is a second U.S. policy dilemma with the inclusion of
Hamas in the Palestinian elections. Although Israel no longer makes
reference to the Oslo Agreements after their security provisions
were massively violated by the Palestinian Authority, the U.S. has
not been so clear on this matter. There is an explicit Palestinian
obligation under Oslo not to nominate candidates in their election
process who “advocate racism” or seek to advance their political
aims by “unlawful means” [Oslo II Interim Agreement, Annex 2,
Article 3, Paragraph 2]. Failing to insist that the Palestinians
honor this commitment virtually buries what remains of the Oslo
Agreements.
16. “Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza
Rice,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 18, 2005;
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm
17. Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy; The
Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004), p. 88.
18. Ze’ev Schiff, “Should the Hamas be Made Kosher?” Ha’aretz,
October 14, 2005.
19. Marc Perelman, “Ex-officials Push Engagement with Hamas,
Hezbollah: Americans, British Meet with Islamists,” Forward, October
21, 2005.
20. Dean Godson, “Lessons from Northern Ireland for the Arab-Israeli
Conflict,” Jerusalem Viewpoints No. 523, October 1, 2004;
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp523.htm
21. “Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy,” International Crisis
Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 46, October 4, 2005;
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3718&l=1. For
background on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see also Gilles
Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 276-298.
22. “Kuwaiti Intellectual: The Muslim Brotherhood Organization
Should Be Put On the U.S. Terrorist List,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch
Series No. 843 - Persian Gulf, January 7, 2005;
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?
Page=countries&Area=persiangulf&ID=SP84305
23. “New Muslim Brotherhood Leader: Resistance in Iraq and Palestine
is Legitimate; America is Satan; Islam Will Invade America and
Europe,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 655, February 4, 2004;
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?
Page=subjects&Area=jihad&ID=SP65504
24. Ibid.
25. “London as Center Stage for Anti-American Incitement: The Moslem
Brotherhood’s Weekly Magazine, Published in London and Distributed
to Arab and Moslem Countries, Continues Its
Calls for Active Resistance against the American Army in Iraq,”
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for
Special Studies;
http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/britain/sib3_10_03.htm
26. David Makovsky and Elizabeth Young, “Toward a Quartet Position
in Hamas: European Rules on Banning Political Parties,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Peace Watch No. 515, September 12,
2005.
Dr. Dore Gold, who served as Israel’s ambassador to the United
Nations in 1997-1999, heads the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
His book Hatred’s Kingdom surveys the rise of Islamic militancy in
Saudi Arabia.
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