How Successful is Al-Qaeda’s Strategy of Depriving the West of Essential Oil? (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF Vol. 3, No. 26 by Mordechai Abir 24 June 2004
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-26.htm
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Developments in Saudi Arabia and Iraq should cause oil prices to
decline further and to reach $30-35 a barrel.
Iraq’s southern oil terminal exports are back to 1.0 million b/d
after the bombing of three pipelines by al-Qaeda terrorists led to
the temporary stoppage of all Iraqi oil exports.
The Shi’ite territories in southern Iraq are hostile to al-
Qaeda’s Sunni Wahhabi militants. Therefore, repeating the successful
operation against Iraq’s southern oil terminals should be far more
difficult in the future.
The many Saudi and other Muslim casualties caused after the May
2003 bombings alienated the majority of the conservative (not to
mention the better educated and liberal) Saudi population and helped
the regime to largely isolate the al-Qaeda mujahidin.
Aramco’s two new Saudi fields (al-Qatif and Abu Safah) are about
to come on line and initially produce about 500,000 b/d.
he strategy of al-Qaeda to undermine the Western economy by
hitting Persian Gulf oil production is unlikely to succeed as long as
Iraq’s Shi’ite majority cooperates with U.S. authorities and the new
regime in Baghdad.
The bombing of three pipelines leading to Iraq’s southern export
terminals (the two Basra and Khor al-Amaya terminals) led to the
temporary stoppage of all Iraqi oil exports. This was a major success
in al-Qaeda’s strategy of undermining the Western economy by hitting
the oil supply from the Persian Gulf. That, and the assassinations in
Saudi Arabia of Western expatriates related to the oil industry,
caused NYMEX oil prices to sharply spike to $42.23 a barrel. Since
then, oil prices have declined to below $40 a barrel due to
increasing oil supply (and more to come at the beginning of July)
that has helped raise OECD inventories (especially U.S.) to above
last year’s average. Moreover, developments in Saudi Arabia and Iraq
should cause oil prices to decline further and to reach $30-35 a
barrel.
Al-Qaeda Targets Iraq
Iraq’s oil authorities have now announced that the country’s southern
oil terminals’ exports are back to 1.0 million b/d as the pipelines
leading to one of the Basra terminals and Khor al-Amaya have been
repaired. The third pipeline carrying oil to the other Basra terminal
will be repaired within a few weeks. Subsequently, Iraq should soon
be able to export the 1.8-2.0 million b/d it had previously delivered
to the world market. This does not include the shipment of about
250,000 b/d from Iraq’s northern fields by the Kirkuk-Ceyhan
pipeline, which is being hurriedly repaired. Furthermore, according
to Baghdad’s new/old petroleum minister, Thamir Ghadhban, Iraq’s
output and exports should rise further in the third quarter of 2004.
It is believed that the well-planned bombings of the oil pipelines in
Shi’ite southern Iraq were perpetrated by al-Qaeda terrorists. It has
been claimed that Iraq’s al-Qaeda is led by Abu Mus’ad al-Zarqawi,
the seasoned Jordanian veteran of the “Afghani” mujahidin. In
addition to Saddam’s Ba’athist diehards, al-Zarqawi masterminded
numerous attacks on U.S. forces and major infrastructure
installations in Baghdad, the Sunni triangle north and west of the
capital, and the Kurkuk-Mosul region. However, the Shi’ite
territories are hostile to al-Qaeda’s Sunni Wahhabi militants.
Therefore, repeating the successful operation against Iraq’s southern
oil terminals should be far more difficult to carry out in the future.
The Threat to Saudi Stability
The killing of Abdul-Aziz al-Muqrin, the self-proclaimed head of al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is an important achievement for the
Saudi anti-terrorist forces and U.S. intelligence, which cooperates
with them. The three additional al-Qaeda members who were killed with
al-Muqrin in the firefight in Riyadh and the incarceration of 12
other (alleged) members of his cell revealed interesting facts about
Saudi al-Qaeda members and how they function. It is clear that al-
Muqrin’s network operated independently of al-Qaeda’s central
command. Although the Saudi al-Qaeda has lost many of its
former “Afghani” mujahidin since last May, it has managed to attract
scores of lower class, unemployed, and uneducated young Saudis who
have participated in attacks led by veteran al-Qaeda members.
It is alleged that al-Muqrin’s group even managed to win the support
of some members of the security forces (attributable to tribal
affiliation or religious fanaticism) and that it has sympathizers
among the more fundamentalist, anti-regime elements of the Saudi
population. However, the increasing persecution by the regime’s
security forces after the May 2003 bombings of housing compounds in
Riyadh reduced the ranks of al-Qaeda’s veteran fighters, who were
either killed or incarcerated. The many Saudi and other Muslim
casualties caused by the militants’ operation in Riyadh and other
urban centers in the kingdom alienated the majority of the
conservative (not to mention the better educated and liberal) Saudi
population and helped the regime to largely isolate the al-Qaeda
mujahidin and their younger offshoot. Indeed, six leading ultra-
radical clerics, who have spent long periods in Saudi jails, together
called upon the Saudi population to help the regime in its anti-
terrorist endeavors.
The elimination of al-Muqrin’s group does not mean that the Saudi
authorities managed to wipe out the militants’ threat to the kingdom.
Other cells, made up of former Saudi “Afghanis” and younger
volunteers, are likely to continue to operate, although with
increasing difficulty, in Riyadh and regions of the kingdom where
they still manage to enjoy shelter with ultra-fundamentalist and anti-
Saudi elements (for instance, the al-Bureida region in the Najd and
Assir on the Saudi border with Yemen). Under such circumstances, the
remaining militants will find it more difficult to operate in the
future, although their willingness to die for their cause may still
enable al-Qaeda to mount limited “showy” operations. For example, it
would be difficult to protect the tens of thousands of Western
experts employed in the kingdom who are essential for the operation
of the Saudi oil and related industries. Indeed, just a handful of
murderous terrorists were necessary to carry out operations that led
to the assassinations of Western and other expatriates in Yanbo, al-
Khobar, and Riyadh.
The State Department has again strongly advised Americans to leave
the Saudi kingdom (as did the British government) “due to recent
information that the extremists may be planning to carry out attacks
against Westerners and oil workers in the Persian Gulf region beyond
Saudi Arabia.” Ironically, on June 18, Secretary of State Colin
Powell called upon foreigners to stay in Saudi Arabia “because their
departure would be a victory for the kind of people who beheaded
kidnapped American Paul Johnson.” Indeed, Powell was particularly
concerned that Western experts, who are essential for the operations
of the Saudi oil industry (about 35,000 Americans and other
Westerners are employed by Saudi Aramco and other bodies in the Saudi
kingdom), would join the exodus of expatriates from Saudi Arabia.
The Future of Saudi Oil
It seems that the initial panic of Westerners employed in the Saudi
kingdom has somewhat subsided, although fear for personal safety has
caused a good number to leave the kingdom and others are about to
follow them. Nevertheless, the Saudi oil industry seems to continue
to function normally, protected in the Eastern (oil) Province by
about 30,000 Saudi security personnel and the Saudi and U.S. navies.
Riyadh is keeping up with its undertaking to supply the market with
all the oil required. Aramco’s two new fields (al-Qatif and Abu
Safah) are about to come on line and initially produce about 500,000
b/d. This will help the Saudis to eventually produce (if necessary)
up to 9.5 million b/d in the second half of 2004. With current
production quickly approaching 9.1 million b/d, Riyadh is most likely
(with other OPEC producers) to provide the market with all the oil
required.
The strategy of al-Qaeda and related Sunni militant organizations to
undermine the Western economy by hitting the Persian Gulf’s oil
production is unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future, as long
as Iraq’s Shi’ite majority (and other Shi’ite communities in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia) cooperates with U.S. authorities and the new
U.S./UN-appointed regime in Baghdad. (www.jcpa.org. © Copyright.
06/24/04
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Mordechai Abir is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
and Professor (Emeritus) of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His books include Saudi Arabia:
Society, Government and the Gulf Crises (1993) and Saudi Arabia in
the Oil Era: Regime and Elites: Conflict and Collaboration (1988).
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