Bush Erases the Clinton Parameters (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Jerusalem Issue Brief Vol. 3, No. 21 By Dore Gold 04/15/04)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-21.htm
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President Bush’s April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon
represents a significant shift in U.S. policy, as compared to the
Clinton Parameters advanced by the former president after the failed
Camp David Summit of July 2000 and in subsequent months.
In his plan, Clinton provided conditional approval of settlement
blocs, but insisted that there needed to be “territorial swaps” of
land from pre-1967 Israel in exchange for any West Bank land Israel
would retain. Bush does not insist on any land swaps involving
Israeli territory.
Clinton spoke of Palestinian refugees finding homes in other
states including Israel, while Bush states that Palestinian refugees
should be settled in a future Palestinian state “rather than Israel.”
The Clinton Parameters dropped the idea of defensible borders and
replaced them with “security guarantees” including a
proposed “international presence” in the Jordan Valley. In contrast,
Bush refers to “defensible borders” in the context of preserving and
strengthening “Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, by
itself.”
According to the Clinton Parameters, Israel’s security
needs “need not and should not come at the expense of Palestinian
sovereignty or interfere with Palestinian territorial integrity.” In
contrast, Bush allows for Israel to continue to control airspace,
territorial waters, and land passages in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank “pending agreements or other arrangements.”
During the Clinton era, the signing of a peace treaty was
supposed to produce security for Israelis. Under Bush, security must
be achieved first as a prerequisite for peace. Given the threats
Israel still faces from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Yasser Arafat’s own
Fatah Tanzim, the approach taken in the Bush letter represents a
significant improvement for Israel and for the prospects of a lasting
peace.
President George W. Bush’s April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon represents a significant shift in U.S. policy toward the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prior to the Bush-
Sharon summit, U.S. policy pronouncements were largely procedural,
with the important exception of Bush’s public backing of Palestinian
statehood. For example, the Quartet Roadmap outlines a diplomatic
pathway for reaching Palestinian statehood, but it takes no positions
on final status issues such as borders, Jerusalem, or refugees.
The last administration to take a public position on these issues was
that of President Bill Clinton, who addressed the Israel Policy Forum
in New York on January 7, 2001, at the end of his presidency. In that
address, he laid out what became known as the “Clinton Parameters,”
which summarized positions he advanced after the failed Camp David
Summit of July 2000 and in subsequent months.
1. Settlement Blocs
It is not entirely accurate to say that Bush was the first U.S.
president to envision the incorporation of West Bank settlement blocs
into Israel. In his plan, Clinton provided conditional approval of
settlement blocs with certain caveats. There needed to be
some “territorial swaps” – that is, Israel had to trade land from pre-
1967 Israel in exchange for any West Bank land that it would retain.
Bush did not use the expression “settlement blocs.” But he did state
that final borders would have to be based on “new realities on the
ground including already existing major Israeli population centers.”
Significantly, Bush did not insist on any land swaps involving Israel
having to concede pre-1967 territory. In that sense, Bush has
restored the original terms of reference in the peace process that
confined the territorial issue to the dispute over the West Bank and
Gaza Strip alone, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242,
without involving any additional territory.
2. Refugees
Clinton spoke about the idea that the Palestinian state “will provide
all Palestinians with a place they can safely and proudly call home.”
But he also allowed the Palestinian refugees to find a new home in
other locations, consistent with the immigration policies of other
states. He specifically said that Israel could be one of those
states, though he clarified that it would be Israel’s sovereign
decision to let them in. This formulation could subject Israel to
political pressure from international bodies to make the decision to
accept certain numbers of refugees, since, in principle, Israel is
identified as one possible place of residence for Palestinians. To a
large extent, Bush closes this door.
Bush reiterates in his letter the point he raised at last year’s
Aqaba Summit, that the U.S. is committed to Israel’s security and
well-being as “a Jewish state” – a position which should dissuade
Palestinians hoping to overwhelm Israel demographically. But, more
importantly, he states that Palestinian refugees should be settled in
a future Palestinian state “rather than in Israel.” Of course,
tighter language could have been used like “and not in Israel.” But
clearly Bush went farther than any previous U.S. president in
protecting Israel from the Palestinian claim of a “right of return,”
which does not emanate from UN General Assembly Resolution 194,
Palestinian arguments not withstanding.
3. Defensible Borders
Bush restored the traditional U.S. view that Israel has a right to
defensible borders that are to be different from the 1949 Armistice
Lines (the pre-1967 borders). Initially, the Clinton administration
supported the idea of defensible borders in its January 17, 1997,
letter by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu. But with the 2001 Clinton Parameters, the idea of
defensible borders was dropped and replaced by “security guarantees.”
Indeed, Clinton proposed “an international presence in Palestine to
provide border security along the Jordan Valley.”
In contrast, Bush refers to defensible borders in the context of
preserving and strengthening “Israel’s capability to deter and defend
itself, by itself.” There is no multilateral body that is supposed to
replace the Israel Defense Forces. Preserving Israel’s doctrine of
self-reliance, fashioned under Israel’s first prime minister, David
Ben-Gurion, is consistent with the national security doctrine of
Prime Minister Sharon; its premise is that only Israeli soldiers
should risk their lives in Israel’s defense.
4. Israel’s Security
Clinton’s commitment to Israel’s security needs included a huge
caveat. Security guarantees to Israel, according to the Clinton
Parameters, “need not and should not come at the expense of
Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian territorial
integrity.” For example, if Israel needed to retain an early-warning
station on a West Bank hilltop, this principle could be used to
preclude an Israeli claim. Essentially, it placed Palestinian
national sensitivities above Israeli security needs. In contrast, in
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Bush allows for Israel to continue
to control airspace, territorial waters, and land passages, “pending
agreements or other arrangements.” This includes continuing Israeli
control of the Philadelphia corridor between Gaza and Egyptian Sinai.
5. Jerusalem
The Clinton Parameters explicitly envisioned the re-division of
sovereignty in Jerusalem according to a formula whereby “what is Arab
should be Palestinian” and “what is Jewish should be Israeli.” Bush’s
letter is silent on the issue of Jerusalem. While support for a
unified Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty is missing, at least
there is no attempt to return to the Clinton formulations.
Conclusions
Both the Clinton parameters and the Bush letter were offered in the
context of Israeli concessions: in Clinton’s time, Barak proposed
giving up almost all of the West Bank and Gaza (as well as dividing
Jerusalem), while Bush’s positions were in the context of an Israeli
pull-out from Gaza alone. Thus, there is no question that the Bush
letter to Sharon represents a major shift in U.S. policy toward
Israel. Part of this shift is undoubtedly due to Bush’s special
relationship with Israel. Of course, some of the unique specifics of
the Bush letter can also be attributed to the collapse of the
negotiating process between former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and
Yasser Arafat. Undoubtedly, Bush’s strong stand on terrorism – which
does not appear in the Clinton Parameters – can be traced to the post-
9/11 environment in the U.S.
Here, there is an important policy development. During the Clinton
era, the signing of a peace treaty was supposed to produce security
for Israelis. Under Bush, security must be achieved first, as a
prerequisite for peace. Given the threats Israel still faces from
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Yasser Arafat’s own Fatah Tanzim, the
approach taken in the Bush letter represents a significant
improvement for Israel and for the prospects of a lasting peace.
(JCPA.ORG 04/15/04)
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