UNILATERAL SEPARATION AS ROADMAP INSURANCE (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Jerusalem Viewpoints No. 502 by Gerald M. Steinberg 08/15/03)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp502.htm
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The record of formal efforts to negotiate peace in protracted
ethno-national conflicts (Balkans, N. Ireland, Sri Lanka, etc.) is
not encouraging.
Israel needs a serious insurance policy, in the form of
unilateral separation, to minimize vulnerability to another and
potentially more deadly terror campaign, should the "roadmap" fail.
The construction of a separation barrier is supported by over 70
percent of the Israeli public, representing a broad consensus from
across the political spectrum that favors a physical barrier blocking
access to Israeli cities in order to prevent a resumption of the
Palestinian terror campaign of the past three years.
Political separation will also promote a two-state solution,
allowing Israel to remain a culturally Jewish and democratic society
while fostering Palestinian sovereignty.
Key policy issues concern the pace of construction and the route
to be taken for the remaining sections. While options range from a
minimalist 300 km line to a 600 km alternative that would include
most Israeli settlements, a pragmatic middle route including
settlement blocs like Ariel and Gush Etzion may provide the optimum
mix under present circumstances.
If the Palestinian security framework proves its capabilities in
preventing terror, and political negotiations on borders progress,
the barrier can be relocated.
Israeli Public Opinion Strongly Favors a Barrier
According to public opinion polls, over 70% of Israelis strongly
favor continued construction of a separation barrier, in parallel
with the "roadmap" and renewed efforts to end Palestinian violence
through negotiation.1 Although a majority also supports trying the
roadmap, Israelis have learned to be realistic, and expectations that
this process will reach a successful conclusion, or even make serious
progress, are very low. Three years of Palestinian terrorism, in
which over 800 Israelis were killed, have left a great deal of
skepticism regarding the likely outcome of another Middle East peace
process. Many also question whether Israel should proceed with what
is widely viewed as a poorly drafted and highly ambiguous document,
with room for interpretations that do not serve the national
interest. The roadmap does not even attempt to provide a basis for
resolving core identity conflicts, such as Israel´s legitimacy as a
Jewish state, Palestinian refugee claims, and ensuring access to
Jerusalem´s sacred sites. Without fundamental and widespread changes
in attitudes on these issues, these negotiations will not provide
stability or security for Israelis. This realistic/pessimistic
evaluation of the roadmap, and the determination to block another
wave of Palestinian terror attacks, are central to understanding the
broad support for the rapid construction of a barrier and unilateral
disengagement.
Instead of maintaining the status quo, with all of its dangers, while
waiting for the political environment to change, unilateral
separation provides a short-term alternative that will at least allow
for conflict management. Words, in the form of declarations,
promises, or another round of agreements - as in the case of the Oslo
process - are ephemeral, but the construction of a physical
separation barrier has a very visible and immediate impact. As
Israelis see the barrier going up across the "seam line" between the
two populations, the sense of increased security is immediate, and
statistics demonstrate a precipitous decline in infiltration and
terror attacks where the barrier has been completed. After the waves
of attacks that accompanied the Oslo process and the creation of the
Palestinian Authority from the start, culminating in the terror
campaign that began in September 2000, the construction of a barrier
is widely viewed as a vital defense against another and more deadly
round of violence.
Support for separation, whether based on a negotiated agreement or
unilateral Israeli action, is also propelled by recognition of
the "demographic threat" to the Jewish and democratic nature of
Israeli society. As Prime Minister Sharon has recently acknowledged,
the majority population in a single political entity between the
Mediterranean and the Jordan River will soon be Palestinian, and the
Jewish population would be forced to accept minority status in an
Arab and largely Islamic state, thus reversing the accomplishments of
the Zionist movement and the reestablishment of Jewish self-
determination.
These arguments in favor of unilateral separation have been
reinforced by the hidden agendas that are reflected in the intense
Palestinian opposition to such separation. While usually couched in
terms of confiscated land (exploiting overstated maximalist proposals
that draw support from a small group of Israelis, as will be
discussed below), a full-scale separation barrier and de-facto
boundary would also undermine the Palestinian rejectionist position
by demonstrating that the long-held goal of reversing the 1947 UN
Partition Resolution and the creation of a Jewish state is more
unattainable than ever. If the efforts to negotiate a two-state
solution continue to be blocked by the Palestinians, the alternative
is separation through unilateral action.
As a result of these considerations, Israeli support for accelerated
construction of a barrier between the Israeli and Palestinian
populations is viewed as a vitally necessary "insurance policy,"
should the roadmap fail.
The Logic of Unilateral Separation
Over the past six decades, a number of often intense negotiation and
mediation efforts have been undertaken to end the conflict and bring
peace to Israelis and Palestinians. All have failed. Furthermore, the
experience in efforts to negotiate solutions to similar conflicts in
former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya suggests that the Israeli-
Palestinian case is far from unique.
In contrast to this standard and generally unsuccessful formal
approach, in which the parties to the conflict negotiate very complex
legal agreements, unilateral actions based on reduction in friction
are often more realistic and useful. Instead of unrealistic and often
counter-productive efforts to reach and then implement peace
agreements, measures to manage the conflict are based on pragmatism
rather than ideology. Without "ripeness" and readiness for far-
reaching compromise on issues that have fuelled the conflict for
generations, the detailed agreements, often containing hundreds of
pages, clauses, and appendices drafted by an army of legal experts,
become sources of even greater conflict and anger. During the Oslo
process, accusations and recriminations regarding the failure to
implement the details of the agreements were key reasons for failure.
Cyprus provides an appropriate example of the potential of an
informal and unilateral approach to conflict management. The Greek
and Turkish populations of Cyprus have been involved in a very bitter
and often violent ethno-national conflict with many of the
characteristics that are found in the Israeli-Palestinian
relationship. The Cypriot environment also includes ancient hatreds
and religious incitement, wars and terrorism, "occupied territory,"
refugee claims, as well as settlements and settlers. However, for
over 25 years, the level of violence in Cyprus has been steadily
decreasing, following the construction of a separation barrier. While
this fence (or wall) was not loved by anyone, the daily friction
between the populations largely disappeared, and the division has
brought a significant degree of stability and even relative
prosperity. In April 2003, the leadership on the Turkish side opened
the barrier to allow for free movement across the divide, and tens of
thousands of Cypriots from both sections visited the other side.
Although analogies in the political realm are often problematic and
there are many significant differences, the lessons from the Cypriot
experience are important for the Israeli-Palestinian situation. For
Israelis and Palestinians, this type of physical separation could
also provide a cooling-off period, without Palestinian terror attacks
and the necessary Israeli security measures, and with minimal points
of daily friction.
Options for Unilateral Disengagement
The separation concept has been considered in Israel for many years,
even before the failed Camp David summit and permanent status
negotiations of July 2000.2 As the terror campaign escalated, extra-
parliamentary groups on both the Left and Right campaigned for
immediate construction of what became known as "the separation
fence." Prominent individuals including Maj. Gen. (Res.) Uzi Dayan,
David Kimche (former Mossad deputy director general), and Prof.
Shlomo Avineri joined the campaign, and analysts and officials noted
that the barrier around the Gaza Strip had been totally successful in
preventing any infiltration of terrorists into Israel. The fence
along the Lebanese border, restored following the Israeli withdrawal
in May 2000, is also seen as highly effective in preventing
infiltration.
Following the Passover eve terror attacks in March 2002, which
triggered the Israeli military counteroffensive against entrenched
terror strongholds in Jenin and other Palestinian cities, Prime
Minister Sharon formally endorsed the need for a full separation
barrier. He emphasized that this barrier would be a "security fence"
only, and would not be the basis for political separation, but this
distinction may not be feasible in reality (as will be discussed in
more detail below).
Public interest in the progress of construction grew, and the issue
became a central theme in the political and media debate. One year
later, the first 11 kilometer section of the barrier was completed,
and by July 2003, the 128 km section from Salem (north of Jenin) to
Elkana (south of Kalkilya, adjacent to Kfar Saba) was in the final
stages of construction. This section has been built on a route that
generally follows the "green line," with small deviations determined
by geographic factors and inclusion of some settlements built along
the line. However, many small settlements to the east, such as Kadim
and Ganim (near Jenin), are clearly beyond the "fence," with
important political and security implications (as will be discussed
in detail below). Major parts of the barrier north and south of
Jerusalem have also been completed, and a section at the northern
edge of the Shomron region of the West Bank from Salem to Beit She´an
should be finished by the end of 2003. Additional sections in the
west from Elkana to Jerusalem and Jerusalem to the Dead Sea are still
being planned.
The parameters of the Elkana-Jerusalem section are currently the
subject of intense discussions between the U.S. and Israel. A number
of different plans have been proposed, and Palestinian maps
purporting to show this part of the "separation map" are entirely
speculative, based on political objectives. While there are many
possible routes, for purposes of analysis it is useful to envision
three alternatives:
1. A "maximalist" route that incorporates a large number of Israeli
settlements west of the barrier;
2. A "minimalist" route, generally following the "green line" - the
1949 armistice demarcation line that was in place until the outbreak
of the 1967 war.
3. A middle "pragmatic" route, incorporating the settlement blocs
presented at the Camp David summit in July 2000, that includes the
major Israeli (consensus) settlements and security positions adjacent
to the "green line," as well as the city of Ariel in Samaria and the
Etzion Bloc (Gush Etzion) south of Jerusalem.
In weighing the various costs and benefits of the different routes
for the remaining two sections, questions regarding security,
demography, economics, political dimensions, and impact on the
Israeli Arab population are most acute.
Security
The foundation of the intense demand from the Israeli public for a
separation fence and unilateral disengagement is based primarily on
security factors. Supporters argue that a complete system of
barriers - that included an eastern section as well from Beit She´an
to the Dead Sea - would provide a very important source of protection
against infiltration by Palestinian terrorists. Its security impact
depends on a number of factors, including topography, technology, and
the actions on the other side. From this perspective, the barrier is
being built and policy made based on worst-case scenarios, meaning no
cooperation from the Palestinian Authority, and maximal efforts to
escalate attacks against Israelis. Critics note that no barrier is
impermeable, some terrorists could still get through, over and under,
while missiles like the Kassam can be launched over the barrier. In
response, proponents note that these potential breaches could be
closed with additional security measures. As long as the threat of
terror continued, Israeli military forces would operate as necessary
on both sides of the barrier.
In comparing the security impacts of the different routes under
consideration, the shorter and more direct alternatives will be
easier to patrol and monitor, and the maximalist 600 km route,
winding around dozens of settlements and past Palestinian cities,
would impose significant burdens in terms of patrols and maintenance.
However, there are also distinct advantages to maintaining a military
and intelligence presence in some of these areas to provide early
warning of terrorist movement, arms and explosives smuggling, and
similar activities.
At the same time, a separation barrier that is initially built
further to the east can, when security conditions allow, be moved to
reflect improvements and decreased threats, while moves in the
opposite direction will be more difficult.
Demography
As noted, Israeli support for unilateral disengagement is also based
on the need to respond to the demographic threat posed by the
developing Palestinian majority in an undivided political unit from
the Mediterranean to the Jordan River. Such a development would
directly counter the core goal of the Zionist movement: the
establishment of a Jewish state to revive and insure the survival of
the Jewish people and culture in the modern world of sovereign nation-
states. (Indeed, some Palestinians publicly advocate a "demographic
strategy" designed to trap Israel in the political status quo,
thereby undermining the viability of a Jewish state.)
Unlike the situation in Cyprus, in which the 1974 separation left a
relatively clear distinction between the Turkish population in the
north and the Greek population in the south, Israeli settlements are
dotted across the West Bank regions of Judea and Samaria, as well as
in Gaza. While the maximalist route would incorporate most of these
settlements, it would also incorporate 110,000 Palestinians. In
contrast, the minimalist separation route and options similar to the
permanent status proposal presented by Barak at Camp David would
include only a few thousand Palestinians, primarily in the area
around Jerusalem.
Economic Dimensions
There are two sets of economic issues related to the construction of
the separation barrier: the costs to the Israeli economy, and the
implications for the Palestinians. The Israeli end of the equation is
easier to assess - at approximately NIS 10 million per kilometer
($2.5 million), cost estimates run from NIS 3 billion ($750 million)
for the 300 km version, to over NIS 6 billion (approximately $1.5
billion) for the full version. While by no means inexpensive, the
budgetary resources are available, particularly as the construction
of a barrier should lead to reductions in defense outlays associated
with a resulting decrease in vulnerability to terror.
For the Palestinians, estimates of the economic impact of separation
are more ambiguous. The claims regarding inaccessibility of
agricultural land are not substantive, as the effected areas are
minimal, and arrangements are in place to allow individual farmers to
go through the gates in the fence in order to work their plots.
The more serious factor concerns access to employment in Israel.
Before the campaign of violence was launched in September 2000,
salaries from workers in Israel were the largest source of income for
Palestinians. Tens of thousands of Palestinians crossed into Israel
daily, earning a significant portion of the per capita income of this
society. However, when terror attacks led to closures, this income
was disrupted, and since September 2000, the closures have been
consistent and the Palestinian areas largely isolated economically.
The completion of the full separation barrier - regardless of the
route - will not change this situation significantly. However, in the
long term, the Palestinian economy will need links with the outside
world, including Israel. Disengagement does not preclude economic
relationships, but, in contrast to the situation that had existed
since the 1967 war, transactions between the two societies would be
regulated and require formal access through one of the many official
border crossings. If security conditions improve to the point that
Israelis are prepared to allow large numbers of Palestinian workers
to cross regularly into Israel, the creation of a barrier will not
prevent this. (The fence around Gaza that has existed for a number of
years works in such a manner.) Similarly, goods can easily be shipped
through the same points of entry, as is the case at numerous border
points around the world. A recent World Bank study concluded that the
separation of the Palestinian economy from dependence on Israel would
be the best strategy for development and long-term growth.
Political Dimensions
During the Barak government, serious consideration of the unilateral
separation option took place immediately after the failed Camp David
summit and the violence that began shortly afterwards. Advocates of
this option recognized that such separation would accomplish many of
the goals that were sought through the failed Oslo process, by
establishing borders and ending any remaining Israeli responsibility
over the Palestinian population. Israel would be able to establish a
clear political and security boundary within which the Israeli
government would have full sovereign control. In addition, unilateral
disengagement would encourage the creation of a Palestinian state,
leading to functionalist cooperative arrangements with Israel and the
eventual return to negotiations for an official and formal resolution
to the conflict.
Many of these factors continue to dominate Israeli policy
considerations, despite Prime Minister Sharon´s declaration that the
separation "fence" is a security border only. Indeed, for many
Israelis who support this policy, the political separation is at
least as important as the security dimensions. For the better part of
the past decade, public opinion polls and other evidence from the
political discourse clearly show that the Israeli consensus
(including the prime minister) now supports a two-state solution,
with the creation of a contiguous and demilitarized Palestinian
state. The "maximalist" separation route is seen as inconsistent with
this policy (and this explains the support for this option among
Israeli opponents of a Palestinian state).
However, to the degree that alternative separation routes are linked
to the isolation and eventual closure of settlements, this policy is
problematic. Unilateral removal of settlements cannot be implemented
easily. Indeed, from the beginning of the negotiation process, no
Israeli prime minister, including the late Yitzhak Rabin, has been
willing to dismantle any settlement in the absence of a negotiated
agreement. Settlements are seen as a permanent-status issue, and
closure without agreement would remove one of Israel´s primary
bargaining chips for these negotiations. In addition, since some
point to Israel´s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 as a key
factor in the Palestinian decision to use terror to force Israel to
withdraw from the West Bank, unilateral withdrawal from settlements
could be interpreted as a "reward" for terrorism that would encourage
additional Palestinian violence. In any case, permanent status
negotiations are viewed by many as a long way off, which is precisely
the basis for building the separation barrier.
Palestinian political opposition has become stronger as the barrier
has become a reality. This is reflected in the use of highly
exaggerated and inflammatory terms such as "apartheid" and
the "racist wall" in the media and diplomatic appearances. Prime
Minister Mahmoud Abbas used these terms in his meeting with U.S.
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who immediately conveyed
this position to the Israeli cabinet. (This pressure had the reverse
but predictable effect of increasing the expressions of support among
many Israeli ministers regarding the construction and completion of
the separation barrier.)
While Palestinian opposition is largely based on rejection of the
entire concept of separation, by highlighting the proposed maximalist
route, they are able to gain political support, not only from the
U.S. but also from Europe and the UN. Indeed, a decision to follow
the maximalist (600 km) route in the uncompleted sections of the
separation barrier, and to incorporate most of the settlements, would
generate the highest political cost for Israel.
At the same time, the political case for the minimalist separation
route along the 1949 armistice line (or "green line") is based on
questionable claims regarding the status of this demarcation.
The "green line" is not an international border, and the final
borders ("secure and recognized" under UN Security Council Resolution
242) are subject to negotiation.3 Thus, the U.S. government would be
acting inconsistently and against Israel´s security interests if it
were to press for the separation barrier along the armistice lines.
Indeed, as a result of security and other considerations, such
pressure would be unlikely to succeed.
Furthermore, since the Palestinian leadership chose extreme violence
over negotiations three years ago, their opposition to any particular
route beyond the "green line" is disingenuous. It would be highly
illogical for Israel to build a security or political boundary along
lines that are even more favorable to the Palestinian position than
offered and rejected in the negotiations.
While the maximalist separation route may be justified following the
Palestinians´ violent rejection of the Oslo process, it is
politically unrealistic. Similarly, the political argument for a
minimalist route following the "green line" is not compelling. On
this, as in other dimensions, the most sensible choice may be a
pragmatic route, advocated by many of the Israeli groups lobbying for
rapid completion of the separation barrier, which would run east of
the "green line," incorporating and protecting the consensus
settlements built after the 1967 war in order to defend Israel from
attack and to provide secure boundaries.
Impact on the Israeli Arab Population
Socially and politically, disengagement will be particularly
difficult for Palestinians with family and other connections on both
sides of the old-new border. As was the case between 1948 and 1967,
during the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank, the populations
will be divided and movement will be subject to government
regulation. While reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza, this could also heighten friction between
Israel´s Jewish majority and the increasingly militant Arab minority.
In addition, the increased Israeli military and police presence along
the separation barrier, passing through or in close proximity to
Israeli Arab towns and villages, could also be a source of friction.
Since most of this population is located in the area in which the
separation barrier has already been completed, in this dimension,
there is no difference between the various routes under
consideration.
Conclusions
Both supporters and opponents of separation acknowledge that
unilateral measures will not end or resolve this or any other
conflict. However, in the absence of a realistic option for conflict
resolution, at least for the time being, the next best objective is
conflict management. As shown in this analysis, unilateral separation
can allow for management of the conflict, thereby eventually creating
a modicum of stability, and a foundation for resumption of formal
negotiations towards an end to the conflict.
The case of Cyprus demonstrates that a physical barrier, however ugly
and intrusive, can also reduce daily frictions and allow a generation
on both sides of the divide to grow up without the intense hatreds
and misperceptions that help to maintain ethno-national conflicts. In
the Israeli-Palestinian case, following the bitter failure of the
effort to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict based on mutual
compromise and acceptance, a unilateral approach based on separation
into two separate political and territorial units is a logical form
of insurance to the highly uncertain roadmap process. In the existing
Israeli-Palestinian political and security environment, the
unilateral process of reducing friction, managing the conflict, and
creating stability can succeed, while more formal negotiations,
however well intentioned, are likely to add to the tension.
Finally, the political and conceptual objections to construction of a
separation barrier are moot, as major portions have been completed
and public support is overwhelming, particularly in the absence of a
realistic alternative. As for the debate on the route for the
sections from Elkana to Jerusalem and from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea
that are still in the planning stages, the case for the mid-range,
pragmatic path - neither maximalist not minimalist - is the
strongest. In terms of security, demographics, economic impact, and
political pressures, the costs of this route are acceptable and the
benefits are optimal.
Notes
1. Poll of a representative national sample of 503 adult Israelis
(including Israeli Arabs) by Israel Radio, 2 July 2003, translated by
IMRA: "As part of the implementation of the ´roadmap,´ the U.S.
called on Israel to stop building the separation wall. Should the
government of Israel continue building the separation fence?" Yes
70.7% No 18.7% No opinion 10.6%
2. Dan Schueftan, Disengagement: Israel and the Palestinian Entity
(Haifa: Zmora-Bitan, 1999); Gerald M. Steinberg, "A Post-Oslo Map for
the Next Israeli Government," Jerusalem Post, 4 August 2000; Amos
Harel, "Five New Checkpoints to be Set Up Near Green Line," Ha´aretz,
10 January 2001. (According to this report, Israel considered a
unilateral separation plan as part of possible reactions to a
possible Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence in
1998/99.)
3. Dore Gold, "Defensible Borders for Israel," Jerusalem Viewpoints
No. 500, 15 June 2003, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Gerald M. Steinberg is a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, director of the Program on Conflict Management and
Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University, and editor of NGO Monitor.
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