Hizballah’s Threat to Regional Security (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Vol. 2, No.20 Jerusalem Issue Brief By Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman 03/16/03)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-20.htm
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Hizballah is an international terrorist organization that has
been killing Americans and other Westerners for decades. Indeed,
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said if al-Qaeda is the B-
team of terrorism, Hizballah is the A-team.
Hizballah has a very large capability to do harm throughout
northern Israel, with hundreds of Grad missiles, dozens of short-
range missiles like the “Fajar 3” and “Fajar 5,” and longer-range
rockets of Iranian make that can reach 40-70 km.
Israel asked the Turkish government to prohibit the Iranians from
using Turkish airspace to fly supplies to Hizballah via Damascus. The
Turks agreed, had a couple of Iranian planes land for inspection, and
the traditional supply route to Hizballah was closed. It is
imperative to get Syrian policy to change.
Lebanese prime minister Harari believes Lebanon cannot be
both “Hong Kong” (today, Lebanon carries on its shoulders the ability
of Syria to survive economically) and “Hanoi” (an adventurous
revolutionary state).
Hizballah, and the Iranians who back them, are currently more
focused on supporting terrorist organizations in the Palestinian
arena, primarily Islamic Jihad, which is directly responsive to
Iranian directives. The spin that Hizballah and many others in the
Arab world put on Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 has
had a direct impact on the minds of the Palestinian leadership, who
decided to return to the armed struggle
The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon
To appreciate the situation Israel is in today, we must look back to
the May 2000 withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, an event that
had a profound impact on all that we see around us. There was some
hope at the time among many within Israel’s political circles that
once Israel withdrew from Lebanon, Hizballah would turn into a new,
somewhat tougher, but manageable version of Amal, an older,
established Shiite political party representing the most down-trodden
but largest of all Lebanese population groups. It was hoped that, in
one way or another, Hizballah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah would
follow in the footsteps of Nabih Berri and the Amal leadership, and
merge into the Lebanese political landscape. Clearly, Hizballah made
one essential step in that direction by becoming an active political
party. They are the largest single bloc in the Lebanese parliament –
if only for the reason that the Lebanese parliament is even more
fractured than the Knesset. Eleven or 12 Hizballah-affiliated members
are enough to make a very large political bloc. On the other hand,
they have chosen to stay out of the government.
Hizballah has definitely not become a second version of Amal and has
retained the key features of a terrorist organization. In this
respect, Hizballah remains the terror group most wedded to the
totalitarian promise of Islamic revolution in the Middle East in its
purist form.
Hizballah: An Iranian Proxy
In this, Hizballah effectively serves as a proxy for the Iranian
revolutionary regime and its “conservative” wing of unreconstructed
revolutionary radicals who follow the line set by the Imam, Ayatollah
Khomeini. The rule of the Imam is a revolutionary recasting of
Islamist ideology, totalitarian in its mode and in its borrowings
from modern European political models. It is Shiite only in the sense
that it does borrow elements of the Shiite tradition, but these
elements are embedded in a totalitarian political system. This is not
Shiite tradition; this is not Iranian tradition; these are modern
revolutionary concepts, heavily leaning on the operational mode
offered by the Marxist and French “Third-Worldist” environment
Khomeini knew during his years of exile in Paris, and translated into
a bearded and black-clad version of the same revolutionary traditions
that twenty years earlier carried a Kalashnikov in the name of Marx.
It is Hizballah that is perhaps the purist representative of “Khatt
al-Imam” (the line of the Imam, in Arabic), while Iran itself has
changed beyond comprehension and is torn by internal disagreements.
Hizballah sees itself as the only successful one, from its point of
view. This has made their revolutionary commitment of crucial
importance to them, and Nasrallah is definitely not going to trade
away Hizballah’s self-image as the one successful revolutionary
movement that drove the Zionists out without an agreement – that beat
Israel. We must put aside the fact that this is not exactly why
Israel left Lebanon. The real consideration that drove Prime
Ministers Barak and Netanyahu to make the commitment to leave Lebanon
was a desire to disengage from the periodic casualties in Lebanon
that were being used by the Syrians as a tool to pressure Israel.
Regardless of what Israel thought it was doing, what was important to
Hizballah is what it thought it had achieved and the spin it has been
able to put on the story in the media. Hizballah controls “Al-Manar,”
a powerful TV station that reaches a very large audience in the Arab
world and to some extent sets the tone for others.
A Model for the Palestinians’ Armed Struggle
The ability of Hizballah to tell its story – that it is the only
revolutionary organization that has managed to do what no Arab Sunni
regime has been able to do – has become tremendously important to the
organization’s self-image. This self-image, moreover, has had a
profound impact on the current conflict. Regardless of the real
motives of Israel’s decision, the spin that Hizballah and many others
in the Arab world put on Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000
has had a direct impact on the minds of the Palestinian leadership,
in particular, the young cadres of Fatah. They decided not just to
launch a new “intifada,” but to militarize it: to transform it from
some kind of test of wills in the streets to a return to the armed
struggle. That decision was directly colored by the message of
Hizballah.
The position of Hizballah is certainly not just confined to removing
Israel from southern Lebanon. The Iranians and the Syrians have
forced on the Lebanese the fiction of “Shib’ah Farms” so that
Hizballah will have an excuse to keep fighting, even though Israel’s
total withdrawal from Lebanon was confirmed by the UN. It is enough
to look at a Lebanese 2000 lira note to see that the borders of
Lebanon are drawn where Israel and the UN say they are rather than
where Hizballah says they are. It is not really about southern
Lebanon or “Shib’ah Farms”; it is about Israel’s existence.
Nasrallah said in 1998: “We will never, never agree to live side-by-
side with the filthy bacterial growth Israel, the cancerous entity
that expands wherever there is a talmudic remnant.” When they talk
about liberating Jerusalem, they mean it; they mean the whole of
Israel. On several occasions Nasrallah has spoken not about Zionists
but about Jews, about Holocaust denial, about the need to deny the
Jews not just a country but even a village anywhere where they might
have sovereignty.
These are positions colored by the line of the Iranian leadership or,
to be specific, the Khomeini camp and the people who are trying to
keep Iran in line with the legacy of the Imam. All of the projections
about Hizballah modifying itself or becoming an element Israel can
negotiate with were based on sheer fantasy. Israel can negotiate with
Hizballah only on the exchange of prisoners and bodies, because that
is a manipulative element that Hizballah uses to remind the Israeli
people of its presence and capabilities. At the same time, Hizballah
proves that it can manipulate Israel better than any other player in
the region, a claim with some validity. Nobody has read Israeli
society and the Israeli leadership with greater accuracy than Hassan
Nasrallah.
The Threat to Northern Israel
Hizballah currently has a very large capability to do harm throughout
northern Israel, with hundreds of Grad missiles, and 107-mm rockets
that can be carried by donkey and launched from everywhere. It also
has dozens of short-range missiles like the “Fajar 3” and “Fajar 5,”
and longer-range rockets of Iranian make, some that can reach 40-70
km.
During the past year Syria has begun to provide Hizballah with Syrian-
made, 202-mm rockets that can reach all of northern Israel.
Interestingly, this Syrian enterprise started only after Israel asked
the Turkish government to prohibit the Iranians from using Turkish
airspace to fly supplies to Hizballah via Damascus. The Turks agreed,
had a couple of Iranian planes land for inspection, and the
traditional supply route to Hizballah was closed.
“Hong Kong” vs. “Hanoi”
Three months after Israel was “driven out” of southern Lebanon there
were elections in Lebanon, won, against the Syrian leadership’s
wishes, by the current prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, and his
allies, the Druze. Hariri hopes to put an end to Hizballah activity
because it threatens the prospects for reviving the Lebanese economy.
Harari’s message was: Lebanon cannot be both “Hong Kong” (today,
Lebanon carries on its shoulders the ability of Syria to survive
economically) and “Hanoi” (an adventurous revolutionary state).
Nasrallah is acutely aware of the will of the majority of Lebanese
and has had to tread carefully over the past two and a half years in
order not to overstay his welcome. At Syria’s instructions, Lebanon
has allowed Hizballah free rein in the areas from which Israel
withdrew in May 2000. There is no real governmental authority and no
international presence in these areas, which have become “Hizballah-
land.”
Nevertheless, Hizballah is acutely aware that this sufferance is
tenuous. If it actually crosses a certain line and provokes a massive
Israeli reaction that will disrupt and destroy everything that Hariri
has been trying to build in Lebanon over the last few years,
Hizballah might suffer the consequences from within the Lebanese
system.
The Syrians are also a factor. There is a balance of deterrence
between Israel and Syria today and for the foreseeable future. The
Syrians have a very large standing army that can inflict a lot of
pain. They have systematically and deliberately provided Hizballah
with the ability to inflict even greater pain in some ways, since it
can now hit large populated areas of Israel relatively quickly,
without having to deploy the Syrian military. At the same time,
conventional deterrence of Syria works. Bashar Assad is under no
illusions whatsoever as to what will happen to Syria in a general
conflict, and this has acted to modify and restrain Hizballah on a
day-to-day basis.
During the past two and a half years there have been limited breaches
of the peace, such as attacks on Israeli positions at the “Shib’ah
Farms.” There were some artillery duels with Hizballah in the north
during Israeli operations in Jenin. There has been one major
Hizballah-sponsored terrorist attack across the border near Hanita
that killed five civilians and one soldier. Yet this is nowhere near
the full use of Hizballah capabilities. How do we keep it this way in
time of crisis?
Aiding Palestinian Terrorism
Hizballah, and the Iranians who back them, have to some extent
reduced the level of direct activity across the border because they
have turned much of their energy toward the manipulation of terrorist
activity within the Palestinian areas and within Israel. Essentially,
the Iranian establishment is more focused on supporting terrorist
organizations in the Palestinian arena, with Hizballah as backers and
suppliers of arms and technology. The major conduit they use is
Islamic Jihad, which is directly responsive to Iranian directives.
The infusion of Iranian money, support, and technology accounts for
the tremendous rise in the effectiveness of Islamic Jihad operations,
as compared to a couple of years ago.
Hizballah has also infiltrated the Palestinian Authority itself. The
use of mortars in Gaza was begun by PA officers working under the
influence and direction of Hizballah. The bombing on Tel Aviv’s Neve
Sha’anan Street, which took 23 lives, was also the result of a link
with Hizballah.
The “A-Team” of Terrorism
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has said of Hizballah that
if al-Qaeda is the “B-Team” of terrorism, Hizballah is the “A-Team.”
Hassan Nassralah was in the business of killing and maiming Americans
when bin Laden was still taking CIA money to kill Russians in
Afghanistan. Hizballah, with fundraising operations in the U.S.,
Canada, and Australia, helped carry out two attacks in Argentina and
certainly qualifies as a terrorist organization with global reach.
Prospects for Change in a Post-Saddam Middle East
What is needed to stop Hizballah? First, Syrian attitudes will need
to change. With Syria surrounded by Turkey, a new Iraq, Jordan with
its current strategic orientation, Israel, and a restive population
in Lebanon, Syria’s calculus could change very quickly.
There are many people in Iran who are hoping that change in Iraq will
also facilitate a transformation of Iran. These are the same people
who have shouted in the streets, “Why do we have to bother with
Palestine? We have problems of our own.”
Should these changes occur, Hizballah will have to reconsider its
arrogance. Until then, however, it remains a very serious risk.
Israel must maintain a firm deterrent posture vis-a-vis Lebanese
society, on the one hand, and the Syrians, on the other, in
conjunction with a firm American message to Iran as to how it should
act if it does not want to be next in line.
Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is the Director of the American Jewish
Committee’s Israel/Middle East office. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is
based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs
in Jerusalem on 20 January 2003. (JCPA.ORG 03/16/03)
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