Diplomatic and Legal Aspects of the Settlement Issue (JCPA-JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 16 By Jeffrey Helmreich 01/19/03)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-16.htm
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One may legitimately support or challenge Israeli settlements in the
disputed territories, but they are not illegal, and they have neither
the size, the population, nor the placement to seriously impact upon
the future status of the disputed territories and their Palestinian
population centers.
The outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada in the fall of 2000 began to
erode the orthodoxy that settlements were driving Palestinian anger
and blocking peace. New York Times foreign affairs analyst Thomas L.
Friedman wrote in October 2000: "This war is sick but it has exposed
some basic truths." In particular, Friedman wrote, "To think that the
Palestinians are only enraged about settlements is also fatuous
nonsense. Talk to the 15-year-olds. Their grievance is not just with
Israeli settlements, but with Israel. Most Palestinians simply do not
accept that the Jews have any authentic right to be here. For this
reason, any Palestinian state that comes into being should never be
permitted to have any heavy weapons, because if the Palestinian had
them today, their extremists would be using them on Tel Aviv."
In recent months, however, the settlements have re-emerged as an
explanation for the failure of nearly every ceasefire and diplomatic
effort to quell the conflict. The Mitchell Report in 2001 and recent
remarks by visiting U.S. senators have raised the question of
settlements (though not directly blaming them for the conflict), and
the UN General Assembly concluded its 2002 session with over 15
agenda items condemning "illegal" Israeli settlements. Settlements
have also become a focal point in the Quartetīs December 2002 "road
map."
In fact, since their establishment nearly three decades ago,
settlements have been the cause celebre of critics seeking to
attribute the persistence of the conflict to Israeli policy. The
criticism falls into two categories: moral/political arguments that
settlements are "obstacles to peace," and legal claims that
settlements are illegitimate or a violation of international norms.
The pervasiveness of these claims masks the fact that, upon closer
scrutiny, they are false, and they hide the true source of grievances
and ideological fervor that fuel this conflict.
An Obstacle to Peace?
1. Settlements make up less than 2 percent of the West Bank.
According to Peace Now, which opposes Israeli settlement in the
territories, the built-up areas of the settlements take up only 1.36
percent of the West Bank (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000).
BīTselem, an Israeli human rights watchdog group, places the figure
slightly higher, at 1.7 percent. The much larger numbers often used
to describe the land comprising Israeli settlements are reached only
by including roads and adjacent areas, as well as land between
settlements or between settlements and roads, nearly all of which is
unpopulated. In truth, settlements simply do not comprise enough land
to be serious obstacles to any political or geographic eventuality in
the area, be it a Palestinian state or a continuation of the Oslo
process.
2. Settlements do not block the eventual establishment of a
contiguous Palestinian entity. Some critics charge that settlements
prevent peace by blocking the potential for a contiguous Palestinian
state in the West Bank, which is proposed in most peace plans. This
claim ignores certain basic realities.
a. The settlers would not block a peace agreement. Most Jews living
in the West Bank express a deep love of the land and an attachment
borne over two millennia when Jews yearned, prayed, and at times
sought to return to their ancestral homeland. This natural bond has
led to the view, popular in some Western circles, that these Jews
prefer land to life, and would sacrifice the blood of Palestinians
and fellow Jews on the alter of their biblical vision. This image --
while dramatic and a neat counterpart to the image of Islamic
fundamentalism -- is simply untrue of the settlers today.
A majority of the settlers have already indicated a willingness to
relocate if a final agreement should require it, according to a poll
taken by Peace Now (Agence France Presse, July 31, 2002). Even if
such polls are disputed by opponents of Peace Now, such data
indicates a far more pragmatic approach on the part of large numbers
of settlers than has been allowed them by their critics.
Recall that the residents of Yamit in the Sinai were relocated as a
result of the peace agreement with Egypt. Thousands of Israelis were
involved in this operation. The Yamit community was removed by none
other than Israelīs Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when he served as
minister of defense in the second Begin government.
b. The overwhelming majority of settlers, close to 80 percent, live
in communities such as Elkana, Maale Adumim, Betar, and Gush Etzion,
located close to, if not contiguous with, pre-1967 Israel, and which
can be connected geographically to the "Green Line" without involving
Palestinian population centers. For separate reasons, the settlements
in the strategic Jordan Valley do not impede the contiguity of the
main Palestinian population centers, or prevent their expansion --
the Jordan Valley is, after all, sparsely populated by Palestinians,
with the exception of Jericho, which is today under full Palestinian
control.
c. Most settlements are concentrated in a few areas that, for
security reasons, Israel cannot afford to cede. For example, the
settlement of Ofra is located next to Baal Hatzor, the highest point
in the West Bank and the location of the main early warning station
for the Israeli air force. It was from high points along the West
Bank hill ridge that neighboring Arab armies twice invaded Israelīs
low-lying heartland, in 1948 and in 1967, which was then nine miles
wide and completely exposed.
The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the Oslo Peace
agreements, coined the term "security settlements" to describe those
communities, in order to emphasize those settlements located on
strategic terrain essential to Israelīs security interests. And yet,
as noted above, these areas make up barely two percent of West Bank
territory and nearly all of them do not encroach upon Palestinian
population centers or block their contiguity. Moreover, Israel
cannot, in any event, afford to withdraw from these small but
strategic points even if they were entirely unpopulated. Thus, the
presence of settlements in such locations is not the reason Israel
remains in these areas.
Settlements are Not Illegal
1. binding international legal instrument which divided the territory
in the region of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza was the League of
Nations Mandate, which explicitly recognized the right of Jewish
settlement in all territory allocated to the Jewish national home in
the context of the British Mandate. These rights under the British
Mandate were preserved by the successor organization to the League of
Nations, the United Nations, under Article 49 of the UN Charter.
2. The West Bank and Gaza are disputed, not occupied, with both
Israel and the Palestinians exercising legitimate historical claims.
There was no Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
prior to 1967. Jews have a deep historic and emotional attachment to
the land and, as their legal claims are at least equal to those of
Palestinians, it is natural for Jews to build homes in communities in
these areas, just as Palestinians build in theirs.
3. The territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was captured by
Israel in a defensive war, which is a legal means to acquire
territory under international law. In fact, Israelīs seizing the land
in 1967 was the only legal acquisition of the territory this century:
the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank from 1947 to 1967, by
contrast, had been the result of an offensive war in 1948 and was
never recognized by the international community, including the Arab
states, with the exception of Great Britain and Pakistan.
The Settlements are Consistent with Resolution 242
Many observers incorrectly assume that UN Security Council Resolution
242 requires a full Israeli withdrawal from the land Israel captured
in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Some may have a hidden agenda aimed at
depriving Israel of any legal rights whatsoever in the disputed
areas. In either case, they use this misinterpretation to conclude
that settlement activity is unlawful because it perpetuates
an "illegal" Israeli occupation.
The assumption and the conclusion are deeply flawed. Resolution 242
calls for only an undefined withdrawal from a portion of the land --
and only to the extent required by "secure and recognized
boundaries." Israel has already withdrawn from the majority of the
land it had captured, and nearly all of the areas in which it retains
communities are essential to "secure and recognized boundaries." The
specific location of Israeli settlements was determined by Israelīs
Ministry of Defense over the last 30 years, not by the settlers
themselves, and they were set up in order to strengthen Israelīs
presence in those few areas from which it cannot, militarily, afford
to withdraw.
Settlements are Consistent with the Geneva Conventions
In three recent emergency special sessions of the UN General
Assembly, Israeli settlement was cited as a violation of the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention. These international humanitarian
instruments, forged in the ashes of the Holocaust to prevent future
genocidal brutality and oppression, were never invoked in 50 years
until the case of condominium construction in Jerusalem during 1998.
Was such construction -- any settlement construction -- a violation
of the Geneva Convention?
No. The relevant clause, Article 49, prohibits the "occupying power"
from transferring population into the "occupied territory." Aside
from the fact that the territory is not occupied, but disputed,
Morris Abrams, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, had pointed
out that the clause refers to the forcible transfer of large
populations. By contrast, the settlements involve the voluntary
movement of civilians. The U.S. Department of State, accordingly,
does not view Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as
applicable to settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
For that reason, the official U.S. position has been over the years
that settlements are legal, even though successive administrations
have criticized them on political grounds. (Only the Carter
administration for a short time held that settlements were illegal;
this position was overturned by the Reagan administration.)
Settlement Growth Never Violated Oslo
Although certain Palestinian negotiators demanded a settlement
freeze, the peace agreement ultimately reached by Israel and the
Palestinians at Oslo, along with the Interim Agreement of 1995, allow
settlement growth as well as the growth -- and creation -- of
Palestinian communities in the disputed territories. The Palestinians
acquired planning and zoning rights in Area A, while Israel retained
the same rights in Area C where the settlements were located. Indeed,
their legal status was to be addressed and decided only in the final
status negotiations which, unfortunately, never took place. Until
this point is reached, settlement growth remains within the legal
scope of the Oslo Agreements.
At the October 5, 1995, session of the Knesset at which the Interim
Agreement was ratified, the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
proclaimed that we "committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to
uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement,
and not to hinder building for natural growth" (Israel Foreign
Ministry, http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00te0). On the
basis of this understanding of Oslo II, the Knesset voted to approve
the Agreement.
Conclusion
One may legitimately support or challenge Israeli settlements in the
disputed territories, but they are not illegal, and they have neither
the size, the population, nor the placement to seriously impact upon
the future status of the disputed territories and their Palestinian
population centers. (www.jcpa.org. Đ Copyright 01/19/03)
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