´Government´s flotilla decision-making process was flawed´ (ISRAEL HAYOM) Shlomo Cesana and Israel Hayom Staff 06/13/12)
Source: http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=4665
Israel Hayom
Israel Hayom Articles-Index-Top
Publishers-Index-Top
State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss: No organized staff work, no
coordination, no minutes of meetings were kept • PMO: Israelis enjoy
a level of security they haven´t had in years • Amidror: Today´s
decision-making process is much, much better.
A report released by State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss on
Wednesday is scathing in its criticism of the government´s handling
of the lead-up to the 2010 naval commando raid on a Gaza-bound
flotilla during which nine Turkish citizens were killed, dozens of
activists and several commandos were injured, and which set Israel´s
relations with Turkey, a regional superpower and former ally, on a
path of ever-intensifying confrontation and enmity.
The 153-page report focuses on the government´s decision-making
process and lack of organization and not on the military operation
itself.
The comptroller´s report includes two sections, the first of which
deals with implementation of the 2008 National Security Council Law,
and the second dealing with the incident on May 31, 2010, in which
Israeli naval commandos boarded a flotilla of ships bound for
blockaded Gaza. On the Mavi Marmara, the largest ship, commandos
faced violent resistance from a group of activists from the Turkish
humanitarian organization known as the IHH.
The report also points out the way the country´s public diplomacy
organizations failed to work effectively with the military and other
bodies during the Marmara incident, as well as confusion between and
amongst the various public diplomacy groups. A separate undisclosed
section deals with Israeli intelligence concerning the Turkish
flotilla in 2010.
On the issue of the Mavi Marmara raid, Lindenstrauss
found "substansive and significant deficiencies" in the decision-
making processes of the government led by Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, and holds him responsible for the way in which the
incident was handled. "The decision-making process was done without
any organized staff work, no coordination, and no minutes of meetings
were kept, despite the fact that the IDF brass, intelligence
agencies, and the National Security Council were all aware of the
uniqueness of the Turkish flotilla," the report said.
Netanyahu, the report continued, “did not internalize that the
forcible stopping of the flotilla was liable to spark a violent
confrontation on the decks of the Mavi Marmara.”
A U.N. report on the Mavi Marmara raid, which was released in
September 2011, described the activists as a "separate hardcore
group" who had been armed with iron bars, chains and knives. The
report acknowledged the legitimacy of Israel´s naval blockade of
Gaza, but criticized its use of "excessive force" during the
operation. It also said Turkey should have done more to prevent the
flotilla from sailing towards Gaza.
Turkey has consistently requested that Israel apologize for the
deaths of the Turkish citizens and compensate families of the
victims. Two weeks ago, Turkish prosecutors submitted to the High
Criminal Court in Istanbul indictments of four former Israeli
military leaders they claim were responsible for the incident,
including former Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. (res.) Gabi
Ashkenazi. Prosecutors requested nine life sentences for each
defendant.
Israel has officially refused to apologize for the incident, although
government officials have said they are willing to discuss the matter
to reach a mutually acceptable compromise.
Lindenstrauss blamed Netanyahu for not instructing the relevant
authorities to form an integrative work group to deal with the
flotilla.
He stated that separate meetings were held between the prime minister
and the defense and foreign ministers, but no meeting was held at the
cabinet level to discuss the issue. "The only meeting held by
the ´forum of seven ministers´ took place only five days before the
flotilla arrived. It was a last-minute discussion with no real
direction, preparation or proper representation by officials who
should have been involved in the matter," Lindenstrauss wrote.
The state comptroller emphasized that his criticism is directed at
the way the discussions were held, the lack of leadership on the part
of the National Security Council and the lack of documentation
concerning the meetings, and not at the political or military results
of the flotilla operation.
According to the report, Israel´s public diplomacy during the raid
was also faulty. Lindenstrauss lashed out at the Foreign Ministry´s
inability to operate during the raid the way it was expected to. No
one was responsible for briefing the foreign media which determines
the tone of response to Israel´s actions, and there was no organized
procedure for releasing government statements as there is in other
countries, the comptroller wrote.
Netanyahu responded to the report´s accusations, which he was aware
of before the report was released to the public on Wednesday, in a
meeting with Lindenstrauss in 2011. During that meeting, the prime
minister commented on the matter of conducting inter-office meetings
concerning security-related issues, saying "We must leave that to the
discretion of the prime minister, who cannot operate properly
otherwise. There are different ministerial panels, some of which may
need to be placed under the authority of the National Security
Council."
As for the National Security Council Law, which in 2008 officially
established the body that acts as a conduit for the prime minister
and the government concerning national security issues, the
comptroller´s report says that since the approval of the Law three
years ago, "there are still gaps between the law´s instructions and
its implementation."
It was Netanyahu himself who established the National Security
Council during his first term of office in 1996.
Citing the prime minister´s responsibility for the law´s
implementation, the report states that the council has not been
fulfilling its role as set out by the Winograd Commission, formed
after the Second Lebanon War in 2006 to review the way the war was
run, as well as the Lipkin-Shahak committee, formed a year later to
implement the Winograd Commission´s report. Neither commissions´
recommendations about the National Security Council have been
implemented to date.
"There are significant gaps between the law´s instructions and its
implementation. In many areas, there is no overall staff work by non-
executive bodies which can shed light on all the different aspects of
the issue under discussion. Therefore, the decision-making process at
the highest level of the Israeli government, for some crucial topics,
is not the best it can be," wrote Lindenstrauss.
The comptroller recommended that all intelligence data be
concentrated in the National Security Council, to enable it to
provide a more comprehensive picture of the matter at hand for the
prime minister and defense minister, and that the prime minister take
responsibility for the National Security Council´s operation, since
its work is relevant to both the Prime Minister´s Office and his
military secretary.
According to Lindenstrauss, Netanyahu said that some of the foreign
and security related information he receives is not passed on to the
National Security Council, which negates instructions covered by the
law which Netanyahu himself initiated. Netanyahu also was said to
have transferred some functions assigned to former National Security
Council head Uzi Arad to his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Yohanan
Locker instead, including overseeing a daily meeting schedule,
following up on decisions made during meetings conducted by the prime
minister and coordinating work by ministers in the areas of foreign
affairs and state security.
In another apparent violation of the National Security Council Law,
Lindenstrauss points out that Arad was not invited to meetings held
by the state´s covert services, as he should have been.
In the meeting with the state comptroller in 2011, Netanyahu
explained his position, saying "I have never thought, even though it
was determined by the law, that one individual was to give me all the
advice. This is a recipe for disaster. The National Security Council
should be the primary body, but not the only one. I truly believe it
is dangerous for the prime minister to be in a position where he
receives, in almost all the areas I mentioned, a single opinion or an
opinion that includes other opinions the individual has gathered."
Concerning the division of labor between the National Security
Council and the military secretary, Netanyahu said "We must first
conduct all security-related cabinet and ministerial-level meetings.
The military secretary handles daily intelligence reports and
operations. The two bodies have clear and different functions. It is
difficult to plan in advance and say that a particular operation will
need to be handled by the council."
Netanyahu said he decides which operations will be handled by the
National Security Council based on, among other things, the way he
perceives the council´s ability to handle them.
The state comptroller´s report also raised questions about whether or
not Netanyahu knew that the raid on the Turkish flotilla could turn
into a violent clash.
Netanyahu´s office claimed in the meeting with the state comptroller
in 2011 that then-Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Gabi
Ashkenazi did not express any concern to him that the flotilla
members could, or would, turn violent against Israeli soldiers.
Responding to the report Wednesday, the Prime Minister´s Office
said, "The Prime Minister wishes to convey his admiration for the
State Comptroller for his work. Based on current results, Israeli
citizens enjoy a level of security they haven´t enjoyed in years.
This security is a direct result of responsible management and
determined policies. Security-related meetings held in the past three
years have been unprecedented in their scope and depth and everyone
who participated in them will testify to that."
The PMO statement added that, "All relevant political and security
officials participate in the meetings. Proof of this can be found in
the comptroller´s report itself, which states that between Jan. 2010
and Apr. 2011, there were 57 meetings on classified topics, which are
handled by the military secretary under the prime minister´s
supervision. The meetings also involved matters related to operations
conducted by the different security services. Many more meetings were
held to discuss the political and security challenges Israel faces."
The statement said that Lindenstrauss pointed out that even if the
decision-making process during the Turkish flotilla incident in 2010
were different, "the results would not necessarily have been
different as well."
The statement said that "the same processes were used during the
attempted Greek flotilla and two flights of activists to Ben-Gurion
International Airport, all of which were thwarted. The prime minister
told the comptroller that the Greek flotilla was stopped without a
meeting by either the cabinet or the council on the matter."
The PMO statement pointed out that in the period prior to the Turkish
flotilla incident and during it, the government conducted many
activities in which Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and
Defense Minister Ehud Barak took part. The activities focused on
preventing the flotilla´s launch or preventing it from reaching Gaza
once it set sail. According to the statement, Netanyahu sent messages
(through third parties) to the Turkish prime minister, which made
prevention of the flotilla a definite possibility.
Concerning the National Security Council Law, the PMO statement
said "The comptroller mentioned that there was significant progress
which noticeably increased the council´s involvement in the decision-
making processes."
A statement by the Public Diplomacy Ministry said "In accordance with
the comptroller´s recommendations, we will formulate a plan for
necessary rectifications and improvements within the public diplomacy
realm. We have already begun to make changes in accordance with some
of the failures pointed out by the comptroller."
Commenting on the report, Barak said he accepts the criticism and
will work, as he did in the past, to rectify anything that needs to
be repaired in the Israeli military and the entire defense
establishment. "That is what must be done, and that is what we will
do," he said.
National Security Council Director and National Security Adviser Maj.-
Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror also responded on Wednesday to the report,
saying, "The State Comptroller himself says that he is not at all
sure that there is a link between a different process and better
results. Since the Turkish flotilla, there have been another flotilla
(the ´Greek flotilla´), two fly-ins and other incidents. The result
in these was different. Today, there are other major issues that we
are dealing with in the international arena. I think that if one
looks at all these events, one understands that the decision-making
process is much, much better. All of the aforesaid events were dealt
with in an orderly decision-making process." (Copyright 2012 ©
Yedioth Internet 06/13/12)
Return to Top
MATERIAL REPRODUCED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY