JERUSALEM — Israelis went to bed on Monday night expecting that the Knesset would authorize early elections to be held in September, some 18 months ahead of schedule. They awoke Tuesday morning to discover a new super-majority, national-unity government. What was done in those nocturnal hours might herald a new dawn for Israeli politics and national identity.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu added the biggest opposition party to his governing coalition, giving him the largest coalition since 1984, with 97 members of the Knesset (MK) out of 120 (96 now that one MK defected on Wednesday). To his own Likud contingent and his coalition partners, Netanyahu added Kadima’s 29 MKs, led by their new leader, Shaul Mofaz, who serves as vice-premier in the new cabinet.

Such broad national-unity governments are the usual response to emergency situations, notably war. During the Six Day War in 1967, for instance, a coalition was formed that included 111 MKs. So why this surprising super-majority coalition now — in a time of relative peace? What great urgent and important task will Netanyahu seek to accomplish?

The most cynical explanation — never a bad place to start in politics — is that the opposition Kadima was worried about what would happen if early elections were to take place. Polls had them losing close to two-thirds of their current MKs. So Mofaz simply did what was expedient; unable to beat Netanyahu, he joined him, giving Kadima time to recover, and if not recover, at least to enjoy the spoils of power for 18 months.

My Palestinian friends here are nervous. A national-unity government, the kind often mandated by war, may well mean that Israel is preparing to attack Iran.

As President Shimon Peres said on his visit this week to Canada, war with Iran is neither straightforward nor a desirable first option. It would be the kind of effort that requires solid support from across the Israeli spectrum. With his supermajority, Netanyahu now has a coalition suitable for war.

My Israeli friends hope for something more elevated than base politics, and something less traumatic than war. They hope for a transformation of Israeli politics, and perhaps even a transformation of their society itself.

The first desired reform would be a change in the Israeli electoral system, a form of pure proportional representation in which all 120 MKs are chosen from party lists. With parties that garner as little as 2% of the overall vote entitled to a share of seats, there are a dozen parties in the Knesset, and governing coalitions invariably rely on the votes of several smaller parties. These parties, particularly those that represent the ultra-Orthodox and Israeli Arabs, represent relatively narrow interests. An electoral reform that raised the threshold for representation in the Knesset, as well as established geographical (Canadian-style) ridings for 60 of the 120 MKs, would weaken the power of the small parties. For that reason, they have never permitted it. But with 96 MKs, Netanyahu and Mofaz will have far more than the 80 votes needed to push the reforms through. It may well bring about a changed dynamic in Israeli politics, penalizing more extreme positions in favour of the moderate brokerage politics typically practised by parties in Western nations.

A second reform would likely precede the first. Israeli Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox have been effectively exempt from Israeli’s mandatory and otherwise universal military service. The Supreme Court struck down the law permitting those exemptions, and the Knesset has until this summer to replace it with a new law. There is widespread support in Israel for the idea that all citizens do either military or national service, the latter typically involving social, cultural or charitable service. The smaller parties would seek to block such changes; but facing a supermajority coalition, they now have an incentive to participate in the drafting of a law that will be transformative of Israeli society.

Mandatory military service in Israel is more than just a matter of national security. It binds the country together and commits young citizens to the ideals of a state that needs a robust sense of its reason for existence and its mission. For two large and growing groups — Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and the ultra-Orthodox — to be largely absent from this common task erodes national unity. It also breeds resentment among the rest of Israelis who are obliged to serve.

The two reforms together would, it is hoped, build a more cohesive, less fractured Israeli national identity. That is the most optimistic possible interpretation of the goal of this new national unity government. (© 2012 National Post, a division of Postmedia Network Inc. 05/11/12)