Beware ‘Flexibility’ (WEEKLY STANDARD) By JAMIE M. FLY and ROBERT ZARATE 03/29/12)
Source: http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/beware-flexibility_634910.html
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President Obama didn’t intend the world to hear him tell outgoing
Russian president Dmitri Medvedev that he’d have “more flexibility”
to accommodate the Kremlin’s concerns about missile defense and other
issues after the election in November. But as his now infamous
meeting with Medvedev in Seoul drew to a close on March 26, a hot
microphone caught the president saying just that, adding: “On all
these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved,
but it’s important for him”—by which he meant incoming Russian
president Vladimir Putin—“to give me space.”
In the days that followed, congressmen and commentators rightly
wondered on what other critical issues the president might show “more
flexibility” if he were to win a second term. Might the president
offer concessions to Iran rather than stand firm in his insistence
that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable? Might he accelerate the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and go to greater lengths
to reach a peace agreement with the Taliban? Might he once again
pressure the Israeli government on settlements and more once he was
safely beyond his reelection?
The president’s inadvertently public comment raises serious questions
about a possible gulf between his administration’s public statements
and his actual views on foreign policy. But what do the president’s
comments mean for missile defense and nuclear weapons—the subject
that the two leaders were actually discussing?
President Obama’s hostility to ballistic missile defense is well
documented. In 2001, he said on a Chicago television show, “I don’t
agree with a missile defense system.” During the 2008 presidential
campaign, he declared, “I will cut investments in unproven missile
defense systems.”
Even so, he stunned lawmakers and allies in September 2009 when he
announced his decision to scrap President George W. Bush’s plans to
establish missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic
capable of protecting the United States and Europe from ballistic
missile attacks from Iran. This action damaged U.S. credibility in
the region and was widely seen as a sop to the Russians in an effort
to get Moscow to compromise on further nuclear arms reductions.
Although the Obama administration has moved to replace the Bush sites
with a system using different technology to protect against short-
and medium-range missile threats from Iran, Moscow remains opposed,
and Obama’s friends in the arms control community have relentlessly
pressed him to abandon those efforts, too.
More recently, the president has reneged on his promise to support
funding to modernize America’s aging nuclear arsenal and supporting
facilities—a pledge that he made to lawmakers during Senate debate
over the controversial New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START) with Russia in December 2010.
Moreover, while the New START treaty limits the United States to
1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, there are now reports that
the president has directed the Pentagon to study the option of
aggressively, and perhaps unilaterally, reducing America’s nuclear
deterrent by up to 80 percent—down to as few as 300 deployed
strategic warheads. In the meantime, Russia, China, Pakistan, and
other nuclear-armed nations are ramping up their efforts to modernize—
and, in many cases, expand—their nuclear arsenals.
Which brings us back to missile defense. The United States has
repeatedly assured Russia that the emerging missile defense system is
aimed at Iran and not at Russia’s capabilities. Yet Russia continues
to insist that it is alarmed by U.S. efforts. And instead of standing
firm, senior Obama administration officials talk of the need to come
up with more concessions to Russia in an effort to “build trust.”
This is in line with a Russia policy that has been characterized by
an interest in doing whatever it takes to avoid conflict with Moscow,
even if it means overlooking various and nefarious Russian activities
around the world, as well as abuses by the Putin-Medvedev regime at
home.
Therein lies the danger of a second Obama term for missile defense
and the U.S. nuclear stockpile. They stand in the way of the supposed
promise of the “reset” with Russia and of Obama’s fanciful vision of
a world without nuclear weapons.
The microphone mishap suggests that President Obama has not been
sobered by hard experience during his first term. He has put some of
his dangerous dreams on hold—until his reelection. After that, watch
out. At least we can now say that, if he is reelected, we were warned—
inadvertently—by what he was caught saying, on a hot microphone, to
President Medvedev.
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