Inside the Octopus: Unraveling Iran´s terrorist Quds Force (ISRAEL HAYOM) Ronen Solomon 03/16/12)
Israel Hayom Articles-Index-Top
Headquartered in the same building that was once home to the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran, the elite "Jerusalem Force" is Iran´s global "long
arm" • The force includes an intelligence, finance, political,
sabotage and special operations branches • It fields some 3,000
agents, many of whom traverse the globe under the guise of
construction workers • Israel Hayom takes an extraordinary look at
the inner workings of Iran’s international terrorist arm.
This was not how the Quds Force, the elite division of the elite
Revolutionary Guards Corps responsible for overseas operations,
envisioned celebrating its third decade of existence. The string of
attempted attacks last month which targeted Israelis in India,
Thailand and Georgia exacted a greater cost than it derived benefit,
but it also signaled to Israel and the world that the Iranian threat
is not limited to missiles. The threat is everywhere.
If until now Western intelligence agencies were convinced that the
Quds Force would be called into action only in the event of an
Israeli strike against Iran, the Iranians proved that they are
capable of carrying out terrorist attacks when they are least
expected, with the goal of taking revenge for the assassination of
nuclear scientists and deterring more attacks on its scientists.
Western officials know that the mishaps in New Delhi, Georgia, and
Bangkok were miraculous in nature. They also know that the next
operation is already in the execution stages. The only remaining
question is who will strike first in this game of cat and mouse. Will
it be the Iranian terrorists, or the spy agencies that are after them?
As the initial reports began to emerge regarding attempted hits
against Israeli diplomats in Tbilisi and New Delhi, officials began
to speculate that Hezbollah was involved. The Shiite terror group has
been seeking revenge for the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, and the
anniversary of his death would be as good a time as any to strike.
But the Mughniyeh killing was not the only significant event that
occurred that week.
The day following the anniversary, Feb. 13, marks the anniversary of
the Islamic Revolution, an event that was celebrated in Iranian
diplomatic missions worldwide. A day later, the Iranian terrorist
attack was perpetrated in Bangkok. It was clear to all who exactly
was responsible, for while Hezbollah is looking to carry out large-
scale attacks that are usually carried out with car bombs, the
Iranians prefer more pinpoint operations, less for show,
more ´intimate.´ As Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah
vowed: “When we decide to avenge the Mughniyeh killing, Israel will
know that it is us.”
Iranian officials believe that Israel is responsible for the
assassination of its nuclear scientists. The string of attacks last
month were a reflection of the consensus that had taken hold among
Iran’s leadership in recent months: it was time to end the policy of
restraint in the face of the assassinations. Implicit criticism was
also being directed at Tehran’s domestic security agencies.
The killing of Professor Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, the fourth nuclear
scientist to be assassinated, was apparently the last straw for the
Iranians. From Tehran’s point of view, senior Israeli diplomats
posted in missions worldwide are of equal stature to Iranian
scientists. Hence the Iranians are eager to get their message across:
We will take revenge by exacting a price that is equal in currency,
and we will do it anywhere we see fit.
The magnetic explosive devices recovered from the crime scenes in
Bangkok, Tbilisi and New Delhi were familiar to forensic experts who
were searching for the fingerprints of the perpetrators. Dozens of
targeted hits were carried out in similar fashion in Iraq within the
last year, most of which involved affixing magnetic bombs to cars
waiting at traffic intersections or traffic jams.
Following the wave of terrorist attacks, Iraqi security forces raided
bomb laboratories run by Shiites supported by the Quds Force. The
authorities discovered hundreds of kilograms of explosives and dozens
of magnets that were to be used for stick-on bombs. “What happened in
India, Georgia, and Thailand is part of the same pattern, the same
bomb, the same laboratory, and the same factory,” noted Strategic
Affairs Minister Moshe (Bogey) Ya’alon.
Instructions from the top
Deconstructing the Quds Force´s modus operandi lays bare the full
extent of the potency of the terrorist octopus, where the most senior
officials in the ayatollah regime order its tentacles into every
corner of the world. Terrorist plans are not set in motion without
the knowledge and approval of the security unit in the Supreme Leader
Khamenei’s office (“Division 101”). The plans are brought up for
discussion at the Supreme Council for National Security, which is
charged with the important task of issuing recommendations for
operations. From there, the plan is then handed to a special
This council is overseen by Khamenei himself, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the defense and intelligence ministers, the secretary of
the Supreme Council for National Security, and a representative of
the Quds Force. The recommendations are then passed down to a
subcommittee, which then determines who will be the agency charged
with putting the plan into motion. It usually comes down to the Quds
Force of the Intelligence Ministry. From this point, control over the
planning stage is assumed by the division for special foreign
operations. It is this body which ultimately chooses the tactics and
the personnel that implements the plan.
The Quds Force (“Jerusalem Force”) was founded in the 1980s and is
charged with exporting the Islamic Revolution to foreign lands. It is
headquartered in Tehran, housed in the same building that was once
home to the U.S. Embassy. The force includes an intelligence branch,
a financial branch, an instructional division, a political wing, a
sabotage department, and a special operations division that oversees
operations worldwide. The force fields some 3,000 agents, with a
nucleus of 1,000 Iranian and foreign intelligence officers. It is
these individuals who man the force’s international cells.
The Quds Force’s stated mission is “to export the principles of the
revolution and [perform] special operations.” This is a wide mandate
that includes support for terrorist organizations like Hezbollah,
Hamas, and Islamic Jihad; activating terrorist networks and agents
trained in sabotage; providing military and financial support to
Islamist opposition organizations in Muslim countries; and operations
against the Iranian opposition in exile. The Quds’ personnel are
carefully chosen from an elite crop of soldiers and officers who
serve in the Revolutionary Guards and who espouse a militant
The outfit is held in high regard by the Iranian leadership, it is
essentially the regime´s pride and joy. As such, it is the
beneficiary of extensive government resources. It is also included in
the decision-making process on sensitive national security and
foreign policy issues. The commander of the force is appointed by
Khamenei, who keeps close tabs on him through his representative in
the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Shirazi.
Shirazi, who assumed his post in 2008, has already made numerous
promises regarding an Iranian response in the event of an attack on
the country’s nuclear installations. “Iran will burn Tel Aviv and
every U.S. vessel in the Persian Gulf,” he has said.
Ahmad Vahidi, the Quds Force´s first commander, is Iran’s defense
minister today. Vahidi provided input when it came to planning the
terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in the 1990s, most
prominently the bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos
Aires in July 1994 which killed 85 people and injured 330. He is
wanted by Interpol. To this day, nobody has managed to get their
hands on him.
For the last 14 years, the Quds Force has been commanded by Maj. Gen.
Qassem Suleimani, a man known to be one of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad’s closest associates. The 55-year-old Suleimani was born
into a family of poor agrarians in a town not far from the holy city
of Qom. In his youth, he enlisted in the Revolutionary Guards,
amassing the bulk of his military experience during the Iran-Iraq
War. It was during this conflict that he met Ahmadinejad, and the two
Ahmadinejad consults his old friend Suleimani on sensitive
operational matters before seeking the approval of his superior,
Khamenei. Michael Hayden, who headed both the CIA and the NSA, ranked
Suleimani as second on his list of the top seven “most powerful
defenders and offenders.” The only individual to top Suleimani on the
list was China’s defense minister.
It remains unclear how the Quds Force´s recent setbacks [arrests of
agents in India, Thailand, and Azerbaijan] will impact the its high
command. Observers in Iran recently predicted that Suleimani would
step down from his post in 2013. His deputy, Brig. Gen. Ismail
Kahani, is considered the likely successor. Kahani, a man in his 50s,
has occupied a number of positions within the Revolutionary Guards
intelligence apparatus and has also been involved in the war on drug
smuggling from Afghanistan. In a special pamphlet issued by Khamenei
to mark the Iran-Iraq War, he noted that Kahani was one of eight war
veterans who went on to take up significant posts in the Iranian
Kahani is considered more reserved and less charismatic than his
commander. The two men are almost never seen together at events,
perhaps due to security precautions in the event of an attempted
assassination. Suleimani has been known to make impromptu appearances
at various memorial sites and commemorative events, though he is
normally in civilian dress and surrounded by bodyguards.
Disguised as U.S. Troops
Basic training for Quds Forces combat troops ranges from three to
nine months. It takes place in three main facilities: the Imam Ali
Base near Tehran, which is used as the primary training ground for
foreign terrorists; an installation used by the police counter-
intelligence unit (the Iranian equivalent of the Shin Bet) at the
Wali-I-Assar Base in Shiraz; and the “Jerusalem Operation” College in
Qom, which is tasked with training enlistees in the spiritual and
ideological sphere. Other specially tailored training facilities are
used to prepare armed groups from foreign countries, particularly
those in Hezbollah and Shiite organizations in Iraq, Pakistan, and
A special division of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is responsible for
arranging transportation for Quds Force conscripts. Part of their
duties includes manufacturing passports in order to make foreign
travel easier as well as covering their tracks. Upon completing their
course, the new agents leave Iran via a neutral country and resume
usage of their original passports that were issued in their native
lands. Most of the agents are sent on months-long missions to
Afghanistan and Iraq to gain experience in field operational work.
They usually travel under the guise of Iranian construction workers.
The Quds Force Operational Branch is divided up into regional
divisions, with each division responsible for a separate geographical
The force’s intelligence headquarters, which is responsible for
overseeing activity in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel (or “Palestine,” as
they like to call it), are based in Damascus. It operates under the
command of Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who frequently shuttles from
Beirut to Damascus using his diplomatic passport. After the outbreak
of demonstrations throughout Syria last year, the Quds Force divided
its operations pertaining to Lebanon, naming another general, Ibrahim
Jabri, to oversee activities there. Jabri is the top Iranian official
responsible for providing assistance to Bashar Assad’s efforts to
suppress the rioting as well as the deployment of Iranian forces to
help protect Iranian and Hezbollah installations throughout Syria.
Cooperation with Syria takes place on a number of levels, including
finance, building international ties, intelligence sharing,
recruiting of activists, running training bases, weapons smuggling,
joint operations, and terrorist attacks. The Lebanon-based apparatus
has an advanced sabotage division that deals with car bombs and
sophisticated explosive devices that can be embedded in small
objects, like cell phones or transistor radios.
The Quds Force operations branch is headed by Gen. Hamed Abduli. In
the last 20 years, this outfit has organized a number of hits on
government officials, journalists, and exiled Iranian oppositionists.
Among the operations which it is allegedly behind are the murder of
Qazim Rajawi in Geneva in 1990; the 1992 bombing of the Israeli
embassy in Buenos Aires; and the 1991 assassination of Hitoshi
Igarashi, the Japanese translator of Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic
The head of the Quds Force division for special foreign operations is
headed by Gen. Abdel-Raza Shakhlahi. This division includes Unit
5000, which is very similar to the Mossad’s Caesarea division. It is
a small unit that is well-trained in assassinations, kidnapping, and
special operations. Its people are not concentrated in one area but
are rather deployed in numerous secret hideouts. These cells have
been activated in Western countries, but in recent years the division
has concentrated mainly on assassinations of Iraqi government
officials. Its engineers and saboteurs have been aided by the
knowledge they amassed in Iraq and Afghanistan, with assistance from
their colleagues in Hezbollah. In 2007, one crew belonging to Unit
5000 dressed up as American soldiers, raided a NATO base in Karbala,
and killed five soldiers.
Close to Hezbollah
Most of the Quds Force’s activities in foreign countries are
undertaken with close cooperation from the Iranian intelligence
apparatus. This apparatus, which underwent a re-organization in 1984,
employs close to 15,000 people tasked with gathering intelligence and
surveillance of government officials, lecturers, and religious
It is commanded by Omed Haider Musalhi, a native of Isfahan who
completed a master’s degree in international law and who once served
as Khamenei’s representative in the Revolutionary Guards. The 56-year-
old Musalhi took up his current posting over two years ago, yet he
has already managed to clash with Ahmadinejad over a controversial
appointment that he made.
Another agency that has partnered with the Quds Force is the
Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence office, which answers directly to
Khamenei. This 2,000-man outfit is tasked with intelligence gathering
in Muslim countries. Since October 2009, it has been headed by
Hussein Taib, a cleric and former disciple of Khamenei during the
revolution in 1979. He most recently served as the coordinator of
Revolutionary Guards operations in the Khamenei’s office.
Hezbollah is considered a natural partner for Quds Force operations.
The cooperation between the two organizations runs through Unit 2800,
which is responsible for Shiite affairs in Lebanon, as well as the
special operations division, the department that works opposite
Hezbollah’s terror operations apparatus. Both agencies have liaisons
tasked with coordinating their respective operations and joint
Missions that are quasi-military in nature are jointly carried out in
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip. Recently,
authorities in Kuwait uncovered a spy ring comprised of agents
working on behalf of the Revolutionary Guards intelligence apparatus,
the Quds Force, and Hezbollah. Seven suspects who were detained
revealed that as part of their work, they were assigned to recruit
operatives to the Revolutionary Guards. The head of the ring was
found to have maps showing American military bases in Kuwait,
advanced means of communication, and $250,000.
Another division that wields a great deal of clout is the North
African Affairs Unit (Division 6000), responsible for overseeing
activities in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Gambia, and
Nigeria. The division’s headquarters are in Sudan. This is the
division that was responsible for activating Mahmoud Yosef Ahmed
Mansur, the man who headed the Hezbollah spy ring uncovered in Egypt
in 2009. Mansur was arrested in a safe house located 100 meters from
the Iranian embassy in Cairo. During the riots that raged in Cairo
last year, this division helped Hezbollah extricate its operatives
from the jail near Cairo by providing fake Syrian passports and
smuggling them into Sudan and back to Lebanon.
In Sudan, the Quds Force runs training camps for new African
recruits. After undergoing practical and theoretical instruction,
they are sent to train in real combat areas, including South Sudan,
Yemen, and the Gaza Strip.
The Iranian embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja has been frequently
used by the Quds Force. In 2004, an Iranian diplomat was arrested by
local authorities after he was seen taking photographs and surveying
the Israeli embassy building. In 2010, Nigerian security forces
discovered 13 containers filled with weapons that were smuggled from
the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and unloaded at Lagos. These arms
were destined for Gambia, whose president and a Lebanese partner run
a company that procured the weapons. A subsequent investigation
yielded numerous arrests as well as more manhunts against additional
suspects, including two senior officials in the Quds Forces, one of
whom is the commander of Division 6000. These two men found
diplomatic asylum in the Iranian embassy in Nigeria.
Four months later, the division commander was smuggled out of the
country in the plane that carried the Iranian foreign minister who
was dispatched to Abuja to extricate him. The commander was recently
spotted in Venezuela, where he is now in charge of the South American
arena. This affair exposed the fact that Iran’s embassy in Gambia was
a forward base for the Quds Force, which used it to smuggle arms
through West Africa. Gambia subsequently expelled Iran’s entire
Another division in the Quds Force is tasked with overseeing the
agency’s activities in the Arabian Peninsula – Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Somalia. From its headquarters in the western
Iranian city of Bushehr, the order was given to kill the Saudi
ambassador in the U.S. in late 2011. It also appears that this was
where the planning for an attack on the Israeli embassy in Washington
took place. An American of Iranian origin with a criminal record was
recruited for this mission, as was his cousin, a senior operative in
the Quds Force foreign operations unit. They sought to recruit
assassins from a Mexican drug cartel in exchange for a supply of
drugs estimated to be worth $1.5 million. The head of the ring, Gen.
Golam Shakuri, is in direct contact with Sheikh Naim Qassem, the
deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah. The two men coordinate joint
activities in the Arabian Peninsula.
The pin on the American grenade
Iranian intelligence’s decision to choose New Delhi as the site to
commit a terrorist attack – one in which Tal Koren-Yehoshua was
wounded – was hardly an obvious one. Tehran’s relations with India
are strong, and they are vital to Iran. The Iranians have an
extensive infrastructure in the country. But the juicy bits of
intelligence gathered about the Israeli embassy were apparently worth
the risk of damaging ties with New Delhi, particularly since it
entailed the use of subcontractors to carry out the attack. These
subcontractors were supposed to cover the ayatollahs’ tracks.
National Security Council chief Ya’akov Amidror met with a number of
Indian defense chiefs in India this past week and provided them with
damning proof that ties Iran to the attack.
The investigation in India led to the arrest of an Indian Urdu
journalist, Mohammad Kazmi, who in recent years has worked for the
Indian department of Radio Tehran as well as the Iranian student news
agency. Kazmi was recruited in February of last year, enticed by
thousands of dollars for which he was to serve as the liaison between
local youths and Iranian intelligence agents in New Delhi. These
agents were welcomed in his home and even used his car to carry out
surveillance on Israeli embassy vehicles.
According to reports in the Indian press, the police have managed to
accumulate sufficient evidence that proves Kazmi was in contact with
an Iranian intelligence officer. There is also reported to be proof
that Kazmi even met with the individual who affixed the explosive
device to Keren-Yehoshua’s car. Kazmi was arrested 10 days after he
returned home from a trip to Damascus. The identity of the man who
planted the bomb is also known to Indian authorities. Details of the
investigation were relayed to Amidror.
All of the other four Iranians who were part of the ring that plotted
and carried out the attack left India the next day, although their
identities are known to Indian authorities. One of them has already
been arrested in Malaysia.
Due to its lax security arrangements and the porous border that it
shares with neighbors like Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia, Thailand is
also considered convenient ground for Quds Forces and Hezbollah
activity. It is relatively easy to receive assistance from local
residents in Thailand, and foreigners can rent homes or storage
facilities without background checks or unnecessary hassles.
The Quds network that was exposed in Thailand following the attempted
attack there last month set out for Bangkok from Tehran and Malaysia.
Four members of the network were in their safe house in Bangkok when
one of the explosive devices suddenly detonated. In the subsequent
investigation, it emerged that the safe house was used as a weapons
lab to manufacture stick-on bombs designed to detonate via remote
control. The system was specifically tailored and installed by
engineers who traveled to Thailand for this purpose.
During the terrorists’ attempted escape, one of them threw a grenade,
inadvertently injuring himself in the process. The bag that he was
carrying, his passport, and the statements he made during his
interrogation led to the arrest of three others as well as the
issuance of arrest warrants for two more cell members who managed to
escape to Malaysia.
Each one of the six booby-trapped radio devices seized in the safe
house contained between one-half and two kilograms of explosive
powder as well as tiny, magnetic balls that allowed the bombs to be
affixed to cars. Upon detonation, these balls also travel far and
inflict extensive damage.
The devices were installed with a timing mechanism that was activated
by a safety pin similar to those on U.S.-made grenades, an
interesting technical detail given that this is an item that is not
available commercially and can only be obtained at American military
bases, or war zones in Iraq or Afghanistan where American forces
Most of the component parts that make up the explosive devices are
available for purchase on the Internet. They are usually bought at
sites frequented by operatives who work for the Revolutionary Guards
logistics branch. Similar items can be obtained by the Guards’
acquisitions and purchasing department, who usually operate through
straw companies. The equipment is then sent to its destination via
airmail or by boat. An Iranian intelligence officer or a Hezbollah
operative would then wait for it at its final destination, where it
is delivered to a safe house.
The devices that were discovered in Bangkok are similar to those that
were found to have been used by terrorist organizations in the past.
Libyan intelligence booby-trapped a portable cassette player which
downed the Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie in 1988. In November 2010,
Al Qaeda in Yemen tried to bring down a passenger plane by detonating
a bomb planted in printer toners. They also sent booby-trapped toners
to Jewish institution in the U.S. via airmail.
Malaysia is used for recruiting and directing Iranian agents and
terrorists. It is a key transport conduit for terror networks who are
assigned tasks in Bangkok and New Delhi. Thousands of Iranians have
resettled in Malaysia, where they have built factories and companies.
In addition, there are thousands of Iranian students who study there.
Iranians who travel to Malaysia are not required to produce a visa.
It is no wonder that the Iranian embassy in Kuala Lumpur has become a
key forward post for Iranian intelligence in central Asia.
Bombs for drugs
Turkey is also a convenient country for terrorist activity and
weapons smuggling, primarily due to its geographic location as well
as a sympathetic Muslim community. The Quds division in Turkey is
also responsible for Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Georgia. Iran
shares a land border with Azerbaijan that stretches for hundreds of
kilometers. It is through this frontier that Iran smuggles terrorists
and arms into Azeri territory, from whence they have access to
Russia, Georgia, and Armenia. The religious and cultural ties as well
as the familial connections that link the Shiite populations in the
two countries also enable Iran greater freedom and ease in operating
The head of a terrorist operation disrupted by Azeri authorities this
month was Belgradash Dadasheb, who has been wanted by Azeri
authorities for 18 years due to a series of murders, kidnappings, and
weapons smuggling. Dadasheb was given shelter in the Iranian town of
Ardabil, which lies not far from the Azeri border. In exchange, he
was to have provided terrorist and smuggling services to Iranian
intelligence in Azerbaijan and Iraq.
In August 2011, he met with a relative in Ardabil. During the
meeting, he offered his relative a chance to kill two Chabad
emissaries and the Israeli ambassador in exchange for $150,000. The
mercenary gathered intelligence on the intended targets, including
photographs of them and their vehicles, their work environments and
routines, and their places of residence. In October, Dadasheb
prepared a delivery of armaments for the relative, which included a
sniper rifle, three handguns, and explosive devices. But the package
was uncovered at the last minute by Azeri authorities who noticed it
hidden on the side of the road.
A few weeks ago, Azeri authorities uncovered another local terrorist
network. This network was recruited by Iranian agents who were
operating in the Azeri capital under the guise of journalists working
for the Fars television news agency. The weapons and arms were
smuggled into the country from Iran. The terrorists who made up the
network were instructed to carry out a series of attacks against
Israeli targets in exchange for drugs.
The Iranian octopus extends to Bulgaria. In early January of this
year, Bulgarian security agents discovered three booby-trapped
suitcases that were placed on a bus scheduled to take a group of
Israeli tourists from the Turkish border to the capital of Sofia and
subsequently to a ski site. The bus driver said during his
interrogation that the suitcases were put there the night before the
trip while the bus was parked outside his home. The perpetrators left
fingerprints that eliminated all doubt: they were working for Iranian
Each and every one of the cities that were mentioned in recent months
as being the scenes of attempted attacks on Israeli targets - Ankara,
Istanbul, Tbilisi, New Delhi and Bangkok, and the Malaysian capital
of Kuala Lumpur, through which the Bangkok attackers sought refuge
and asylum - are also host to Iranian cultural centers.
Iran operates its cultural centers by using the diplomatic cover
provided by its embassies and consulates in numerous countries that
are home to large Iranian and Muslim communities, particular
communities from Lebanon and Iraq. These centers are used to
disseminate the ideas and principles espoused by the Islamic
Revolution and to recruit local supporters, but they are also
utilized as logistical infrastructures for intelligence operations.
Liaison offices that have been established in the vicinity of Islamic
holy sites and whose job is to tend to the needs of Iranian pilgrims
visiting these places have in effect become platforms for recruiting
members to Iranian intelligence and terrorist organizations that
enjoy its backing. These offices are active in Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and Iraq. The most important recruitment office is located in
the “Dar al-Tawahid” hotel in Mecca. One of the recruiting officers
is a man known as Nabil Mahzouma, a Palestinian who is well-known to
Israeli security agencies. Mahzouma fled to Syria after he was wanted
by the Israelis for numerous security violations.
The link between Iranian embassies and Iran’s terrorist and
intelligence activities has endured for years. Nosratollah Tajik, the
man who served as Iran’s ambassador to Amman until 2004, engaged in
recruiting and fund-raising activities on behalf of the Quds Forces.
Upon completing his diplomatic service, he moved to Britain and found
work as a lecturer on Middle Eastern issues at Durham University,
where he continued his dalliance with Iranian intelligence. In 2006,
he was arrested at a hotel in London after being caught trying to
complete a weapons deal that would procure arms for Hezbollah. He had
no idea that his “buyers” were in fact American agents.
A few years ago, Gen. David Petraeus, who at the time was commander
of U.S. forces in Iraq, discovered that the Iranian ambassador in
Baghdad, Hassan Kazmi-Kumi, was a member of an elite unit in the
Revolutionary Guards that was aiding local militias in their war
against American troops.
Bahrain recently expelled Iranian embassy officials from the capital
of Manama after allegations surfaced that the ambassador and his
secretary were responsible for running a spy ring in his country. Abu
Dhabi also expelled three Iranian diplomats after they were revealed
to be involved in a Revolutionary Guards spy ring.
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