Inside Free Syria / Poorly armed, lacking in allies, and against all odds, an insurgency seeks to topple the Assad dictatorship (WEEKLY STANDARD) BY JONATHAN SPYER 02/27/12)
Source: http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/inside-free-syria_630045.html
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Idleb Province, Syria
The mountains outside Antakya were wrapped
in black clouds the day we
crossed the border from Turkey into Syria. The smugglers said this
was a good sign as the Syrian Army patrols don’t care for rain and
mud, and would tend to stay in their huts, making our crossing safer.
That was how it turned out. We pushed up the border fence and crawled
through at around 9 p.m. There were horses heavily laden with
contraband waiting for us just inside. We rode them across the
mountains in the rain and arrived in Syria without being seen.
I
had made contact with the smugglers in Antakya through Syrian
opposition friends, some days previously. This is the only way into
northern Syria for journalists at the present time. I wanted to head
to Idleb Province, one of the centers of the insurgency against the
Assad family dictatorship, and now one of the regime’s main targets.
My purpose was to gain an impression of the Free Syrian Army, the
increasingly important armed element in the revolt against Assad,
from inside one of its heartland areas.
Antakya itself is
buzzing with the semi-visible activities of both
the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Free Syrian Army in Antakya
is immensely security-conscious, particularly since the kidnapping
and forced return to Syria of its founding member, Colonel Hussein
Harmoush, last year. But the activities of the FSA are also severely
restricted by the Turkish authorities, which watch it carefully, and
whose gaze it seeks to avoid.
Antakya combines this sense of
intrigue with the questionable charms
of a mountain resort town in winter. Prior to crossing, I met with an
FSA officer, Captain Ayham al-Kurdi, for an initial briefing.
I
spoke with Kurdi in a rundown office in an apartment. A native of
Hama, the 30-year-old former signals officer in a Syrian antiaircraft
unit described to me how he came to the insurgency.
He was
stationed near Daraa, a town close to the Jordanian border and
the birthplace of the uprising, in mid-2011. He recalled his shock at
witnessing the use of anti-aircraft munitions against civilian
demonstrators in the area, as the Assad regime sought to murder the
revolt in its cradle.
The use of these munitions was intended as
a tool of terror. Their
bullets kill people no more or less than regular ordnance. But from
the regime’s point of view, they had the additional attraction of
setting the bodies of those they hit on fire, turning the corpse into
a symbol of deterrence to all who would challenge Assad’s rule. What
they also did was to make Ayham al-Kurdi and others reassess their
view of the government. Kurdi made his decision to desert, and help
set up the beginnings of armed resistance to Assad.
Kurdi’s
assessment of the strategic reality facing the Syrian
revolution was grim: “If there is no international or Arab
intervention,” he made clear, “this situation could continue for
years.” The revolution has powerful enemies. The captain counted them
on his hands, and the reasons for their enmity to the insurgency
against Assad. First, Iran: “The Syrian revolution,” said Kurdi, “was
a shock for the Iranian project. The Iranians want to control the
region—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf. The Syrian revolution came to
break this dream. So it is natural for the Iranians to help
Assad.”
But together with the Iranians, there were their
Lebanese clients,
Hezbollah, and beyond this Russia and China, looming and
impervious. “A great Arabic and international movement” is what
Captain Kurdi wants to counteract this. He is not confident that it
will come.
Before I left his office for the border and the
smugglers, as a way
of farewell, Kurdi shared with me a curious rumor—if it is a rumor—
that I would hear repeated a number of times in the days ahead. It
concerned the possible use of chemical warfare by Assad against
protesters. The claim was made regarding the Homs area, which even
more so than Idleb, is currently the main focus of the regime’s
violence. Homs city is being subjected to a merciless pounding by
government artillery.
In Talbisa, next to Homs city, Kurdi told
me, they sprayed pesticides
on demonstrators from the air. The soldiers were equipped with a new
type of gas mask. “Assad said before that we were germs,” he
concluded, “now we’re insects. I guess that’s progress.” He wished me
luck inside.
On the highway, once in Syria, we were vulnerable
to any sudden
spotchecks the army cared to place. But once we entered Idleb
Province, the extent of the precarious gains made by rebel fighters
in recent weeks became apparent. In towns like Binnish and Sarmin,
the regime of Bashar al-Assad no longer exists, at least in visible
form.
The roadblock that meets you at the entry to Binnish is
manned by
Free Syrian Army fighters. Armed opposition activists are everywhere.
A makeshift clubhouse established by Abu Steif, the big man in the
opposition in this backwater town, is buzzing with armed young men
going in and out until the early hours of the morning. The flag of
the Syrian revolution, which is the flag of the Syrian republic
before the Baath party took control in 1963, flies above the main
square.
The limitations of the revolt are also immediately
apparent from a
perusal of the armory assembled by the Free Army fighters in their
Binnish headquarters. The characterization often heard in the media
of the FSA as armed only with Kalashnikovs is not quite accurate, but
it’s not far from the truth. The AK-47 is indeed the main weapon of
FSA fighters. In addition, I saw RPG-7s, heavy machine guns, and a
mortar. Newly arrived body armor, smuggled over the mountains, was
stacked up in boxes. There seemed to be no sign of first-aid kits,
though, and little indication of any sophisticated communications
equipment.
The weapons were the subject of much discussion, and
discussion is
what the Free Army members in Binnish do a lot of, in their
clubhouse, drinking endless quantities of sweet tea and
smoking.
The RPG-7, in particular, was an object of enthusiasm.
I heard Abdo,
a fighter of the FSA and a former Syrian tank corpsman, extolling its
virtues to the heavily built, black-bearded Abu Steif on that first
evening. “At 300 yards, Abu Steif, at 300 yards, and it can stop a
tank. It can take a house down, too. You’ll see it when the time
comes.” Abu Steif, a ruminative figure, a prominent local businessman
before the revolt, reflected on this information before nodding and
concluding, “Praise God.” Assad’s army last entered the town in force
in October. No one thinks they won’t be back.
The fighters in
Binnish are a mixed bunch. Many are army deserters,
with harrowing tales similar to Ayham al-Kurdi’s. The names of the
places differ. The details are largely the same: orders to shoot at
civilians, a growing realization of having been lied to, and then the
decision to escape. The defections are recalled in graphic detail.
Sometimes they involve the deaths of friends who sought also to
desert, sometimes the turning of guns on fellow Syrian soldiers or
officers.
But there is another type of fighter in the ranks of
the armed
opposition in the town. On the first evening, away from the main
opposition center, I met a group of FSA members returning from an
attack on an army checkpoint outside Idleb city. Among them were
representatives of a type of man immediately familiar to all
observers of early 21st-century Middle East politics. A type of man
very calm, often smiling, with a sort of serenity about him. Bearded,
invoking the authority of holy text, though rarely in a histrionic
way. Salafi Islamist fighters are prominent among the FSA men in
Binnish. They tended to keep away from Abu Steif’s clubhouse and to
have their own gatherings elsewhere. They were local men, though, not
foreigners.
I interviewed one of the Salafis shortly after they
had returned from
the attack on the checkpoint. He was in his mid-30s, black-bearded,
and with the attitude typical of FSA fighters, a gloomy assessment of
the balance of forces combined with a kind of generalized
optimism. “We have no support from any country, and we receive no
weapons from anyone,” he told me. “The regime, meanwhile, has Iran,
Hezbollah, Russia, and China.” How long until Assad is destroyed? I
asked. “I give it,” he said, in the manner of a physician revealing a
prognosis, “roughly a month.”
The activists in Idleb Province
are keen to reassure you that the
regime really has gone, without a trace, from the liberated zones.
The reality is more complex. The creation of the free zones in Idleb,
Homs Province, and elsewhere is the most significant achievement to
date of the Syrian revolution. The Assad regime, it should be
remembered, was until recently a synonym for the airless, locked-down
Arab nationalist police state. In Idleb Province now, there is some
room to breathe.
And yet, of course, the regime is still there.
Its tanks and armored
vehicles are deployed some distance away, in the surrounding fields.
But the unseen mechanisms of the dictatorship are present far beyond
the FSA roadblock meant to keep out intruders.
Each Friday,
large demonstrations take place across Syria, under a
single slogan chosen by the opposition. On the Friday I was in
Binnish, the designated slogan was “Russia is killing us.” A British
Sky TV crew had entered the town, and was doing a live broadcast from
a rooftop next to the rally. All had been peaceful. But as the
cameras began to roll, in the area behind them, a large brawl
unaccountably erupted. Within seconds, the Sky reporter’s jaunty copy
about the revolution in Idleb Province was being recited, absurdly,
with a mass fistfight going on behind it.
Opposition activists
stepped in, and to the fury of the crew, stopped
the live broadcast. To the practiced eye, what had taken place was
very apparent. This was a provocation straight out of the dog-eared
East German playbook of the Baath regime. Primitive and lowtech, it
may have been. But it succeeded in disrupting the only piece of live
coverage coming out of Idleb Province that day and served notice that
whatever flag flew above the town square, the Assad regime had not
entirely left. It turned out that some members of an unruly local
clan had been paid to start the fight.
That evening, Abu Steif
and his activists began preparing a list of
200 families in the town who would send representatives to a
new “security committee” to be formed in Binnish. It is a
beginning.
Getting from Binnish to neighboring Sarmin requires
venturing back
onto the main highway to Damascus. We managed this without incident.
In Sarmin, the armed element looks better organized, more
professional than in Binnish. There is talk of around a thousand
armed men in the town.
I met with one of the commanders, 25-year-
old Lieutenant Bilal
Khaibar, at a position prepared by the FSA at the entrance to the
town. Khaibar, a seven-year veteran of Assad’s airborne forces, is
impressive in the classic manner of an elite infantry officer—
earnest, clipped, and precise. The outlines of his own story, and the
reasons he joined the FSA, were by now familiar.
He and his unit
were deployed in the south in the early months of the
uprising. They were told that armed Israelis had crossed the border
and that they were to engage them. On closing with the “enemy,” they
discovered that it consisted of unarmed Syrian civilians. The troops
were accompanied into the engagement by non-Arabic-speaking men, who
Bilal later discovered were Iranians. These men were responsible for
the execution of one of Bilal Khaibar’s brother officers, who refused
to fire on civilians in the Daraa area. Khaibar made his way in June
2011 to the Free Syrian Army days after the killing of his
friend.
Bilal Khaibar still wears his Syrian Army paratroopers’
wings on his
FSA uniform, and was careful to explain to me that he does this
because he regards himself as part of the legal army of Syria. “I am
with the law, not against the law. The regime is fascist and
criminal.” Nor does he have any illusions about what is to come. “We
expect what happened in Homs to happen here. But even with our simple
weapons, we are ready to fight. Either Bashar stays, or we
stay.”
As for what can bring victory, again, the demands are
familiar—above
all, a buffer zone. A place to which refugees can flee, and from
which fighters can organize. Without this, Khaibar sees no end to the
situation.
And again, the curious rumor: Three times, he says,
three times, in
his clipped, officer’s way, the regime has used chemical weapons and
pesticides against protesters in the Homs area.
“Freedom is the
promise of God on earth,” Khaibar tells me. So if
international help doesn’t come, he and his men will hold the Sarmin
free zone for as long as they can, and afterwards fight, he
says, “like peshmerga.” The regime, says Khaibar, “has the heavy
weapons, but the people are with us.”
Lieutenant Bilal Khaibar
of the Sarmin FSA was the most credible of
the military men I met in Idleb Province. The presence of individuals
of his type in the insurgency is an indication that it is real, it
means business, and it will not easily be destroyed. However, without
the buffer zone and the assistance that he and others repeatedly
demanded, it is difficult to see how victory can come.
In
October, when the army of Assad swept through Idleb Province, they
began their attack on Binnish from the graveyard outside of the town.
On my last day in Idleb, two young fighters of the FSA proudly
recounted their own role in the bloody battle in the alleyways of the
first neighborhood facing the graveyard, as the fighters sought to
stop Assad’s army and irregulars from forcing their way in. “Assad
wants to turn the whole of Syria into a graveyard,” one of them told
me as we stood by the grave of Ahmed Abd el-Hakim, an FSA fighter
killed by a sniper in the October clashes.
The Assad regime’s
choice to launch the attack in a graveyard seemed
particularly apt. Death and its political uses is the only currency
in which this most brutal of dictatorships has ever learned to deal.
It has traded in this coin, however, with vigor and skill, and it
continues to do so.
Umm Maher, the mother of Ahmed Abd el-Hakim,
later summed up for me
what this has meant in human terms for the people of
Syria.
Sitting in her front room, with her daughter seated next
to her
holding a picture of Ahmed, she told me that, “for 40 years we’ve
lived like this—no law, no rights. We live with terror. We are made
to live differently from all other people in the world by this
regime. So we’re proud of our son, who was trying to end this. He was
brave.”
Umm Maher’s words express a simple and obvious truth
regarding the
desire of human beings for dignity. As for the instruments in place
in Syria for achieving this, the Free Syrian Army in Idleb Province
includes many courageous and capable men. Some of them are committed
to Salafi Islamist ideologies. They are nearly all Sunni Arabs. There
is a clear sectarian logic at work—alongside a desire to see the end
of a regime that denies them the most basic and minimal of
rights.
In terms of their capabilities, the Free Syrian Army
remains
something of a fiction. What exists on the ground is a conglomeration
of locally organized militias, lacking any coherent central direction
or chain of command, and with no real strategy for victory beyond
the “buffer zone” constantly referred to.
For the people and the
fighters of Idleb, the fight goes on. They
know that once Assad is finished with Homs and Hama, and once he
thinks he can get away with it, he will turn his attention back to
the north. Then it will be their turn, and the dictator will exact a
bloody and terrible revenge for their effrontery.
What could
prevent this is an effective coalition to counter the anti-
Western one (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia) that currently underwrites the
dictator. This Western coalition can only happen outside the auspices
of the U.N., where Russia and China have already vetoed Security
Council resolutions demanding Assad step down. Part of that Western
response would involve turning the FSA from a collection of ragtag
militias into a more formidable force. And it would commit to the
creation of a free zone in Syria more solid and guaranteed than those
zones currently held, with hope and courage, by fighters armed only
with AK-47s and RPG-7s.
Jonathan Spyer is the author of
Transforming Fire: The Rise of the
Israel-Islamist Conflict.
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