Power Dynamics Inside Hamas: The Increasing Weight of the Gaza Leadership (JCPA) JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Jonathan D. Halevi Vol. 11, No. 4 16 June 2011)
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-The recent overt confrontation between Mahmoud al-Zahar, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Gaza, and Damascus-based Hamas
political bureau leader Khaled Mashaal reflects underground currents
feeding the tension within the Hamas leadership in Gaza and Syria.
-Al-Zahar is demanding that Hamas-Gaza be given more weight in
decision-making, while the Hamas leadership abroad contends that the
center of power should remain outside of Palestine.
-Since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Hamas´ decisive
victory in the parliamentary elections of 2006, and Hamas´ military
takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the Hamas government has gained
significant political and economic power. It conducts foreign
relations and imposes taxes on imports from Israel and from Egypt
which have become remarkable revenue sources. This has weakened the
dependence of Hamas-Gaza on the Hamas leadership abroad.
-In addition, the consolidation of the Hamas regime in Gaza, where
the main military forces of the al-Qassam Brigades are stationed, has
gradually changed the balance of power inside Hamas. Al-Zahar
challenged Mashaal´s authority to lead the movement, arguing that the
center of power should move from abroad to "inside" Palestine. Fatah
underwent a similar process after the establishment of the
Palestinian Authority in 1994, which lead eventually to a majority of
the leadership living in the Palestinian territories.
-Mashaal intentionally refrained from directly referring to the
challenge posed by al-Zahar, probably to avoid granting him status as
an equal contender for the leadership. The current main interest of
Mashaal and his colleagues is to promote reconciliation with Fatah in
order to pave the way for Hamas to join the PLO and take over the
organization that is recognized internationally as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people.
Mahmoud al-Zahar Challenges Khaled Mashaal
The controversy inside the Hamas leadership recently became public
after a series of statements by Hamas political bureau member and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud al-Zahar in Gaza, who personally
challenged Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal. Two interviews with al-Zahar
provoked an uproar in Hamas ranks, particularly his blatant criticism
of Mashaal´s speech after Fatah and Hamas representatives signed the
reconciliation agreement in Cairo (May 4, 2011), which was
interpreted by al-Zahar and others as readiness to authorize the
Palestinian Authority to hold peace talks with Israel.
Asked by the Palestinian daily al-Quds (May 17, 2011) for his
reaction to Mashaal´s statement, al-Zahar said:
The position of the [Hamas] movement regarding the negotiations and
the resistance has not changed. We´re in favor of the way of
resistance, and the way of negotiations was and still contradicts the
position of the majority of the Palestinian people, who voted for
Hamas in the 2006 general elections. Today, there is someone saying
that we´re giving Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] the option to hold a new
round of negotiations [with Israel]. We did not agree to the
negotiations and we did not encourage him [Abbas] to hold
negotiations. On the contrary, we embarrassed him day and night on
this issue of negotiations. Therefore, what happened on the day in
which the reconciliation agreement was signed was not agreed upon
[within Hamas], we don´t recognize it and I think that it does not
express the position of the movement, whose platform is based on
resistance, not negotiations....
We did not agree to these statements and we were surprised when it
was said. The world should know that there was no change in the
position of the movement regarding resistance, as it is the only way.
We can only negotiate issues within the framework of resistance.1
Al-Zahar also criticized Musa Abu Marzouq, Hamas´ second in command,
who abstained from backing Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh after
Haniyeh denounced the killing of Osama bin Laden, describing him
as "a Muslim mujahid [jihad warrior]."2 Abu Marzouq told al-Arabiya
TV that Haniyeh did not express the official position of Hamas, but
rather "his personal feelings."3
In the al-Quds interview, al-Zahar supported Haniyeh´s stance. "We
regard anyone who fights the occupation as a mujahid and a fighter,
and primarily as one who adopts an Islamic outlook," al-Zahar
said. "We disagree with bin Laden on his modus operandi and oppose
moving the battlefield to the U.S. and Europe, but we will never
accept the American position."4
Al-Zahar repeated his criticism of Mashaal in another interview with
the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, referring to the roots of the
controversy between him and the Hamas leadership based in Syria. "We
had no knowledge of Khaled Mashaal´s position, no one consulted us
regarding it and therefore this position is unclear," al-Zahar told
al-Akhbar.
We´ve never given Fatah an option or authorization to hold
negotiations on our behalf or on behalf of the Palestinian people.
Our platform stands against negotiations [as these were held],
because it is a waste of time. Actual experience proves that. Since
the Madrid conference twenty years ago and until now, we´re still
hearing about negotiations, negotiations, negotiations - and the
scandals of the negotiating team headed by Saeb Erekat. This is
public knowledge and known to all. Anyone who says that we authorized
[the PA] or that we will authorize it to hold further negotiations
does not represent the position of the movement.
Referring to media reports (later officially denied) that Hamas is
considering transferring its headquarters from Damascus, al-Zahar
said: "The real center of the Hamas movement is located in the
occupied land and its real weight is there. Blood was spilled there,
the leadership is there, and the complementary part [of the Hamas
leadership] is outside [of Palestine]. This issue [of transferring
Hamas offices from Damascus] is being deliberated. Circumstances have
divided the movement´s leadership into several locations and we have
to discuss it. This is a legitimate issue and from time to time a
review is conducted in order to assess the drawbacks and advantages
of the developments occurring around us." Asked whether he meant to
say that Mashaal will return to Gaza, al-Zahar said: "I didn´t mean
that. However, anyone who wants to return to Gaza is welcome. Gaza is
open. Even Fatah members, who did not commit crimes after 2007 and
wanted to return, have come back, and we have many other examples of
that."5
Hamas Leaders in Syria Push Back
The Hamas leadership in Syria reacted with discontent to al-Zahar´s
explicit criticism. Hamas´ political bureau, its supreme leadership
forum, convened on June 1, 2011, and issued the following statement:
The political bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
convened on Wednesday, June 1, 2011, in Damascus to discuss several
important political issues, particularly Palestinian reconciliation
and its actual implementation, in coordination with the brothers of
the Fatah movement and Palestinian organizations. In addition, [the
political bureau] discussed the issue that provoked interest in the
media regarding statements and comments on the speech of brother
Khaled Mashaal, the head of the political bureau of the movement, at
the reconciliation ceremony in Cairo. In this regard, the political
bureau emphasizes the following:
-First, the statements made by brother Khaled Mashaal, the head of
the political bureau of the movement, reflect and represent the
movement´s positions and its principles, and any other statement from
any source contradicting them does not represent the movement and its
institutions.
-Second, the statements made by the head of the political bureau and
the members of the political bureau represent the movement and its
positions. The political bureau is the only authorized body to
interpret or amend the statements of the head of the political bureau
and its members if there is a need.6
The absence of al-Zahar from the Hamas political bureau meeting in
Damascus, even though he is a full-fledged member, speaks for itself.
In media interviews, al-Zahar tried to downplay his absence,
explaining that it had nothing to do with the internal controversy
and that he was visiting Algeria at the time.7
After the Hamas political bureau meeting and its unanimous support of
Mashaal, al-Zahar changed his tone. He said that the diversity of
positions is a sign of a robust movement and accused media outlets of
inflating the issue. "Disagreements exist in all organizations, but
what differentiates us from other organizations is that decisions are
made by [the vote] of the majority, and we still adhere to this
way....The coming days will prove that we have overcome these
disagreements," al-Zahar said. He added that the controversy
regarding Mashaal´s speech "is over and has no importance" and
that "some people tried to re-provoke the issue in the media."8
The overt confrontation between al-Zahar and Mashaal reflects
underground currents feeding the tension within the Hamas leadership
in Gaza and Syria. Senior Hamas members told al-Hayat (June 3, 2011)
that the participation of Gaza representatives (Khalil al-Haya and
Nizar Awdallah) in the recent meeting of the political bureau
indicates the unity of Hamas and contradicts reports of a split,
meaning that al-Zahar´s positions are exceptional and have no power
to create an opposition that would undermine the authority of the
current leadership.
They further argued that senior Hamas members in Gaza had criticized
al-Zahar´s statements in favor of transferring Hamas headquarters
from Damascus, saying that Syria has a special status in Hamas´ eyes
in light of its unique support of Hamas for many years, and more than
any other Arab state.
According to Hamas sources, al-Zahar also came into conflict with
Mashaal regarding a diplomatic mission in Europe. Al-Zahar had
accepted an invitation by Daniel Roch, Swiss special delegate to the
Middle East, to visit Switzerland a few days after the political
bureau convened in Damascus. Hamas sources told al-Hayat that al-
Zahar did so without consulting Mashaal or asking for his consent,
and therefore was not in a position to represent Hamas. Eventually,
al-Zahar´s application for a visa was denied, probably because of
Mashaal´s intervention, and his meeting with Roch was canceled.9
Khaled Mashaal has been refraining from any public reaction to al-
Zahar´s direct attack. His only indirect response to al-Zahar´s
allegations were in an interview with an Egyptian TV station a few
hours after signing the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and
Hamas. Mashaal explained that his speech at the ceremony did not
include any consent to negotiations with Israel, but was based on the
understanding that both sides concurred on joint decision-making.
According to the reconciliation agreement, Hamas is ready to give
Fatah another opportunity to realize by itself that there is no hope
for the peace process and at the end of the day it will adopt Hamas´
strategy, which strives to change the regional balance of power to
force Israel to recognize Palestinian rights.10
Hamas senior officials in Damascus and close associates of Mashaal
launched a counter-attack on al-Zahar. Izzat al-Risheqa, a member of
the Hamas political bureau, said in a press release that "the
statement made by brother Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar was a mistake, does
not represent the positions of the movement and its institutions, and
is an exception to the traditions of the movement, according to which
no one can publish announcements against the head of the movement and
its leaders....[Al-Zahar] has no authority to interpret the
statements of the movement´s leader or to amend them. The political
bureau is the only body authorized to supply any clarifications or
amendments, if any are needed, to statements made by the leadership."
Al-Risheq added, "there are no disagreements within the Hamas
movement and it is characterized by a very responsible approach and
its decisions are one and united."11
Osama Hamdan, responsible for Hamas international relations, said
that "al-Zahar´s statements reflect his personal views" and
that "those who express the movement´s positions and policy are the
head of the political bureau of the movement, its leaders and the
brother members of the movement´s leadership." He emphasized
that "what the head of the political bureau [Mashaal] said was an
accurate expression of its positions, as long as the political bureau
of the movement has not published any amendment or clarification, as
it is the only authorized body to issue clarifications to statements
and positions of the members of the movement´s leadership." He
added: "On this basis, the statements made by brother Dr. al-Zahar
are an exception to the traditions and rules followed by Hamas and
are opposed to its policy."
Senior Hamas officials told the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar (May 25,
2001) that they disassociate themselves from al-Zahar´s statements,
arguing that his relations with the majority of the Hamas leadership
in Gaza and abroad are problematic because he tends to mix up his
position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hamas government
in Gaza with being "Hamas Minister of Foreign Affairs." According to
these officials, al-Zahar has demanded that Hamas-Gaza be given more
weight in decision-making, while the Hamas leadership abroad contends
that the center of power should remain outside of Palestine, taking
into consideration the siege on Gaza and the persecution of Hamas
activists by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. In a
scolding tone, they said that al-Zahar does not belong to the
generation of Hamas founders since he only joined Hamas in the late
1980s.12
Salah Bardawil, a senior Hamas official in Gaza and member of
parliament, tried to mitigate the impression of severe controversy
between the two sides, suggesting that diversity of opinion does not
necessarily mean polarized positions. In this context, he argued that
in his controversial speech, Mashaal "cast the responsibility to the
Israeli side [and] the Palestinian Authority and their way of
behavior in the negotiations as the cause of not achieving
Palestinian objectives." He further noted that "as we assume that the
following months will be the decisive ones, Mashaal said that ‘we
will see if the following months can bring about these objectives and
we will not stand against them [Fatah].´ His statement contained an
assumption and not an expression of positions of Hamas or of the head
of the political bureau regarding the benefits of the negotiations.
This is the meaning of what Dr. al-Zahar has said."13 According to
Bardawil´s interpretation, the dispute between al-Zahar and Mashaal
is just semantic and does not deal with core issues.
In another press release, Bardawil said that the statements of al-
Zahar and al-Risheq were made "in the framework of the diversity [of
opinions] within the one organization," denying any controversy in
Hamas, which "has a united leadership inside [Palestine] and outside
[Palestine] headed by Khaled Mashaal."14 He added that Mahmoud al-
Zahar is still a member of the political bureau and emphasized that
the dispute is over.15
Analysis and Assessment
The controversy between Mahmoud al-Zahar and Khaled Mashaal that
reached the public for the first time recently is the tip of the
iceberg of the struggle for power within Hamas. Its roots lay in the
Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Hamas´ decisive victory in
the parliamentary elections of 2006 that led to the establishment of
a Palestinian government dominated by Hamas, and Hamas´ military
takeover of Gaza in June 2007. Since then, the Hamas government has
gained significant political and economic power. It portrays itself
as a contender to head the Palestinian Authority and as the pioneer
of the struggle against Israel. The Hamas government conducts foreign
relations and imposes taxes on imports from Israel (via the land
crossings) and from Egypt (at the Rafah crossing and the tunnels)
which have become remarkable revenue sources. In addition, part of
the international financial support to Gaza is also funnelled to
Hamas. These factors have weakened the dependence of Hamas-Gaza on
the Hamas leadership abroad.
The consolidation of the Hamas regime in Gaza, where the main
military forces of the al-Qassam Brigades are stationed, has
gradually changed the balance of power inside Hamas. Al-Zahar not
only debated with Mashaal over Hamas policy, but in fact challenged
his authority to lead the movement, arguing that the center of power
should move from abroad to "inside" Palestine, which bears the main
burden of the struggle against Israel. The Fatah movement underwent a
similar process after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority
in 1994, which lead eventually to a majority of the leadership living
in the Palestinian territories.
Evidence of al-Zahar´s defiance is also to be found in the
controversy over how Hamas should regard Osama bin Laden, and in al-
Zahar´s act of independence when he intended to meet a senior Swiss
diplomat without asking permission from Mashaal. Al-Zahar is probably
not alone and it is possible that Ismail Haniyeh shares some of his
views, as Haniyeh is supposed to lose his position as prime minister
after a future unity government with Fatah is established.
The controversy also gives new insight into Mashaal´s status in
Hamas. He is widely accepted as the leader, including by the military
wing, but he lacks the aura of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas´ founder
who was also its spiritual leader, or the charisma of Abd al-Aziz al-
Rantisi, Yassin´s successor.
Mashaal ended this round with the upper hand. The Hamas leadership
stood by him and backed his positions in the unequivocal statement by
the political bureau after its Damascus meeting, which was also
attended by representatives from Gaza. At the same time, al-Zahar did
not receive any public support from his Hamas colleagues in Gaza and
the West Bank, and he was forced to retreat, downplaying the
disagreements.
However, the bone of contention remains. Al-Zahar is likely to try to
seek support from other senior Hamas leaders, including those in the
al-Qassam Brigades, in his demand for more weight in decision-making
for Gaza.
Mashaal intentionally refrained from directly referring to the
challenge posed by al-Zahar, probably to avoid granting him status as
an equal contender for the leadership. The current main interest of
Mashaal and his colleagues is to promote reconciliation with Fatah in
order to pave the way for Hamas to join the PLO and take over the
organization that is recognized internationally as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people.
Apart from this strategic political objective, the future elections
to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) of the PLO may affect the
balance of power within Hamas. In accordance with the reconciliation
agreement with Fatah, the elections will be held in the West Bank,
Gaza, and "outside" Palestine. Delegates from "outside" Palestine are
entitled to receive at least half of the seats in the PNC, and Gaza
will receive a relatively small minority of seats, which may be
reflected in its share of leadership.
The Hamas leadership abroad, that seeks to replace Fatah in leading
the PLO and the Palestinian people, differentiates itself from the
Hamas government by describing that government as responsible for
running the affairs of Gaza. Sorting out relations with the Hamas
leadership in the West Bank is also essential as the Hamas leadership
abroad seeks to restrain al-Zahar and others who may consider
supporting him.
The Arab Spring is another factor in the equation. Escalating
instability in Syria, the long-time backbone of Hamas, may force the
Hamas leadership to consider alternatives to their headquarters in
Damascus. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has founded a new
political party in preparation for the oncoming elections. The rising
political power of the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother movement of
Hamas, may play a greater role in Hamas politics. Traditionally, the
Muslim Brotherhood has been closer to Hamas-Gaza, and during recent
years relations have been even stronger, as seen in its transferring
of financial support used for the purchase of weapons.
Negotiations over the release of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad
Shalit in return for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners may be
hampered by the internal Hamas power struggle. Senior Israeli
officials have already argued that the top commander of the al-Qassam
Brigades, Ahmed Jaabari, is sticking to uncompromising positions and
has thus thwarted a proposed deal. The Hamas leadership will probably
find it harder to make concessions in the negotiations, fearing
confrontation with hardliners. Al-Zahar´s move had no immediate or
actual effect, but it represents a declaration of intent, which the
leadership will have to consider in future decision-making, including
on the issue of Gilad Shalit´s release.
The controversy within Hamas is focused on power, not on policy.
Hamas still adheres to the principal of the liberation of historic
Palestine and the destruction of Israel. The only field for maneuver
lies in Hamas´ readiness to establish a Palestinian state on the 1967
lines and to declare a temporary cease-fire (hudna), on condition
that Israel opens its borders to absorb millions of Palestinians to
resettle in its territory, which would mean the end of Israel and its
transformation into a Palestinian state.
Notes
1. http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/266596
2. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZAFBYVcWnQ
3. http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=406761&
4. http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/266596
5. http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/13186
6. http://palestine-info.info/Ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%
2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7aiPh%
2bRpJ0nlJyUgzQw4Gr1McT8zPXzKc9SLEdPKhB0NnPMnb4PMn5DINammtdot7%
2faDjO8XwEqp9YOtbgKkspJJ95p%2bcPubEMEj7MDoDCl4%3d
7. http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/06/08/article639547.html
8. http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/06/08/article639547.html;
http://www.felesteen.ps/details/20884/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%
D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%
D8%AA%D8%A4%D8%AE%D8%B0-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%BA%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%
8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%
A7%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA.htm
9. http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/273732
http://aawsat.com/details.asp?
section=4&issueno=11875&article=624852&feature=
10. http://palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%
2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s72JSiGvTCh6h5Y%2f%2b8%2fvj3WuIuafkhLa0%
2f4DxAZoIeLbtkHnWijorI7h95Dv5jIUA6LDUT8gec1kEU9iIADfHVF%
2fd9eBct6KkiO9P8uE%2bmNHU%3d
11.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iCxEOyybKqzJTmgNoAW
MrqQJ3yrw?docId=CNG.b2631bdc806960053dcc74bad5fb0023.3e1
12. http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/13250
13. http://www.alriyadh.com/2011/05/19/article633816.html
14.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iCxEOyybKqzJTmgNoAW
MrqQJ3yrw?docId=CNG.b2631bdc806960053dcc74bad5fb0023.3e1
15. http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today%
5C05qpt970.htm&arc=data%5C2011%5C06%5C06-05%5C05qpt970.htm
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