Overview: 1. In the two years since Operation Cast Lead there has
been a significant reduction in the extent and severity of terrorist
attacks carried out by Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the
other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza
Strip. That created a new security situation, and improvement on that
before Operation Cast Lead. The decrease in terrorism reflects
Israel´s power, restored by Operation Cast Lead, to deter the
terrorist organizations. However, even the current level of rocket
and mortar shell fire and the frequent attacks on IDF forces along
the border fence disrupt the daily lives of the western Negev
residents.
2. The relative quiet has been exploited by Hamas and the other
terrorist organizations for the as yet incomplete process of
rehabilitating and upgrading their military capabilities. The process
is implemented by the vast support provided by Iran and Syria. In any
case, Hamas continues to make it possible, sometimes with its own
involvement or through its proxies, for low-signature shooting
attacks and other terrorist activities to be carried out, and tries
to keep a balance between preventing escalation and waging a campaign
of attrition against Israeli civilians.
3. Hamas, to enforce its strategic policy of restraint on the other
terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, some of which
occasionally try to challenge it, uses its security (and sometimes
military) enforcement apparatuses. Hamas also coerced other terrorist
organizations into accepting its policies through agreements meant to
preserve the lull. Its enforcement apparatuses reduced rocket fire
and showcase attacks from the Gaza Strip and at the same time tried
to channel the rogue organizations into accepting the ground rules
deemed suitable by hamas.
4. Those Hamas policies have been carried out with varying levels of
effectiveness and determination. Judging by the results, it can be
said that Hamas has generally succeeded in enforcing its policy of
restraint on the other organizations, including its rivals. However,
at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 there was been an
erosion in the willingness of the various organizations to obey
Hamas´ policy, and there was a certain increase in shooting and other
terrorist attacks against Israel.
5. On the ground, in 2009 and 2010 Hamas´ restraint policy was
effective both quantitatively and qualitatively. The number of
showcase attacks decreased and there was significantly less rocket
and mortar shell fire from the Gaza Strip. In the two years since
Operation Cast Lead, 261 rocket hits were identified in Israeli
territory, 158 in 2009 and 103 in 2010. One hundred sixty-one mortar
shell hits were identified, 108 in 2009 and 53 in 2010 (half of them
in December). In addition, several hundred rockets and mortar shells
misfired and landed in the Gaza Strip. The numbers are far lower than
those recorded in the years preceding Operation Cast Lead,
illustrated by the following graphs:
6. To "compensate" for the need to restrain attacks along the Gaza-
Israeli border, Hamas and the other terrorist organizations looked
for indirect routes into Israel through the Sinai Peninsula and naval
routes from the sea. Efforts were made to hide them and on occasion
to deny their existence, especially to avoid complicating relations
(complex in any case) with Egypt, which regards the exploitation of
the Sinai Peninsula for terrorist attacks as detrimental to its
national security and economy.
7. The use of indirect routes in 2010 was manifested by two instances
of launching of 122mm Grad rockets from the Sinai Peninsula at Eilat,
Israel´s southernmost city. Responsible for both attacks were
operatives from Hamas´ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the Gaza
Strip. Hamas, however, did not admit responsibility for the attacks
and in one instance even denied the attack had been carried out. In
other instances Hamas and the other terrorist organizations operating
in the Gaza Strip sent terrorist squads into Israel through the Sinai
Peninsula to carry out various types of attacks. Those plans included
the abduction and murder of an IDF soldier, his body to be used as a
bargaining chip, and mass-casualty attacks in crowded population
centers.
8. The relative quiet was disrupted at the end of 2010 by increasing
mortar shell fire aimed at military and civilian targets and by
increasing rocket fire. In February 2011 a 122mm Grad rocket attack
was carried out against Beersheba, 42 kilometers (26 miles) from the
Gaza Strip (for the first time since Operation Cast Lead). There was
also an increase in the number of attempted attacks (IEDs, anti-tank
fire, sniper attacks) on IDF forces conducting counterterrorism
activities near the border fence, both within Israeli territory and
inside the Gaza Strip (several hundred meters from the fence).
9. In our assessment, Israel´s deterrent power still exists and Hamas
clearly wants to continue its policy of restraint to keep the
situation from deteriorating. However, Hamas, its military wing and
the other terrorist organizations have increased their activities and
become bolder. Their objective is to test what they can and cannot do
vis-à-vis Israel and extend the limits of their terrorist attacks.
Hamas still enforces its enforcement actions, although on occasion it
allows the other organizations slightly more freedom of action, and
infrequently even participates in attacks near the border fence.
10. Hamas and the other terrorist organizations are exploiting the
relative quiet on the ground for a rapid process of rehabilitating
and upgrading their military capabilities. Hamas gives the process
priority over rehabilitating the civilian infrastructure, which
demands greater resources. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
particularly emphasize improving their rocket and mortar shell
capabilities, considered Israel´s home front to be its Achilles heel,
and want to be able to strike Israeli civilians while using
Palestinian civilians as human shields.
11. In the two years since Operation Cast Lead, Hamas (with aid from
Iran) has doubled and upgraded its rocket arsenal. It now has
thousands of rockets of various ranges, both standard and homemade,
including Fajr 5 rockets which can reach the center of Israel. The
Palestinian Islamic Jihad has also upgraded its rocket capabilities.
12. Hamas also particularly emphasizes rehabilitating and upgrading
its anti-tank system, which it regards as a response to the IDF´s
armored advantage. In the past two years the terrorist organizations
operating in the Gaza Strip have equipped themselves with advanced
anti-tank guided missile systems with deeper penetration
capabilities, such as Kornet missiles (the first of which was fired
from the Gaza Strip on December 6, 2010).
13. The process of rehabilitating the terrorist military
infrastructure is based on weapons and knowhow supplied by external
sources. It entails exploiting Sudanese territory and using border-
crossing networks of smugglers and merchants, passing through routes,
most of which originate in Iran. As in the past, Iran plays a
principle role, regarding the growing military capabilities being
constructed in the Gaza Strip as a tool for advancing its own
strategic objectives.
14. Iranian and Syrian support is manifested in supplying Hamas and
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad with highly advanced weapons,
logistical aid in smuggling them into the Gaza Strip, instruction and
training, transferring funds to the organizations in the Gaza Strip
and giving the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip
political and propaganda support. In addition, Iran fosters special
relations with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an Iranian proxy which
is not subject to some of the governmental considerations restraining
Hamas.
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