The Hamas Interest in the Tahdiya (Temporary Truce) with Israel (JCPA) JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS) Jonathan Dahoah Halevi Vol. 8, No. 4 19 June 2008)
Source: http://www.jcpa.org/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=582&PID=0&IID=2224&TTL=The_Hamas_Interest_in_the_Tahdiya_(Temporary_Truce)_with_Israelwith_Israel_Axis
JCPA-Jerusalem Center Public Affairs
JCPA-Jerusalem Center Public Affairs Articles-Index-Top
Publishers-Index-Top
Hamas regards the temporary cease-fire as a tahdiya and not a
hudna. A tahdiya - "a period of calm" - is used by Hamas to describe
a simple cease-fire. A hudna implies recognition of the other party´s
actual existence, without acknowledging its legitimacy.
In an interview with Al-Jazeera (April 26, 2008), Hamas leader
Khaled Mashaal clarified that for Hamas, a tahdiya is "a tactic in
conflict management." He added that it "is not unusual for the
resistance...to escalate sometimes and to retreat a bit sometimes as
the tide does....The tahdiya creates a formulation that will force
Israel...to remove the siege...and if it happens it will be a
remarkable achievement."
Official sources in Israel have explained that Hamas´ interest in
a lull in the fighting is a result of its "distress." But the
organization did not experience "distress." Hamas has introduced and
maintained law and order in Gaza, strengthened its overall control,
suppressed opposition, and achieved broad popular support for its
policies.
An important objective for Hamas is winning the Palestinian
presidential election, which will be held when Mahmoud Abbas finishes
his term of office in December. The lull will permit Hamas to prepare
the field to take over from Abbas. Hamas is liable to claim that,
according to Palestinian law, administrative authority should be
passed on to the chairman of the parliament, who is a Hamas leader,
or should be decided by the parliament itself, where Hamas has an
overwhelming majority.
One diplomatic consequence of the tahdiya will be increasing
pressure on Israel to accept a future reconciliation between Hamas
and Fatah. That could lead to increasing demands on Israel to
negotiate a permanent status arrangement with a joint Hamas-Fatah
government, while Hamas remains committed to its political program of
the elimination of Israel.
The cease-fire also grants Hamas a golden opportunity to expand
its military build-up for the next round of terror and violence.
Emulating Hizbullah´s strategy, Hamas is striving to acquire longer-
range and more destructive missiles to be used for deterrence and as
a sword on Israel´s neck.
After eight years of armed Intifada, countless Palestinian terrorist
attacks, and more than 7,000 rockets fired against civilians in
Israel, the Egyptian government succeeded in securing an agreement by
Israel and Hamas for a cease-fire that took effect at 6:00 a.m. on
June 19, 2008. Officially, the Israeli government argues that there
is no understanding with Hamas, but only with Egypt. However, that
formalism is not necessarily the perception of the international
community.
The main terms of the unwritten agreement include the following:
All Gaza-Israel violence stops for six months. After three days,
Israel will ease its blockade of Gaza, allowing more vital supplies
in.
A week later, Israel will further ease restrictions at cargo
crossings.
In the final stage, talks will be conducted about opening the
Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt and for a prisoner exchange to
free IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas for two years.1
Hamas regards the temporary cease-fire as a tahdiya and not a hudna.
The difference between the two Arabic terms is substantial. Hudna
means "truce," which is more concrete than tahdiya - "a period of
calm" - which Hamas often uses to describe a simple cease-fire. In
traditional Islamic thought, a hudna is negotiated between an Islamic
entity and a non-Islamic entity, but it can be reversed the moment
the Islamic side has gained sufficient strength to resume fighting.
Nevertheless, a hudna implies recognition of the other party´s actual
existence, without acknowledging its legitimacy.
A tahdiya has less standing than a hudna. Khaled Mashaal, Hamas´
leader, and his deputy in leadership, Musa Abu Marzouq, elaborated in
recent months their interpretation of a tahdiya. In an interview with
Al-Jazeera (April 26, 2008), Mashaal clarified that for Hamas, a
tahdiya is "a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the
framework of the resistance [meaning all forms of struggle]." He
added that it "is not unusual for the resistance...to escalate
sometimes and to retreat a bit sometimes as the tide does....The
tahdiya creates a formulation that will force Israel...to remove the
siege...and if it happens it will be a remarkable achievement....We
are speaking of a tactical tahdiya....As long as there is occupation,
there is no other way but resistance."2
When asked about Mashaal´s "tactical tahdiya," Musa Abu Marzouq
explained that "the tahdiya is not a strategy or a goal itself, but
it is a tactical step in this conflict....Our goal is to liberate our
land and to bring about the return of our people. The resistance is a
tool to reach this end."3
Official sources in Israel have explained that Hamas´ interest in a
lull in the fighting is a result of the "distress" it has suffered
from the extended blockade of Gaza.4 Israel´s policy did in fact
cause difficulties for Hamas, but these hardships do not explain
Hamas´ strategic motives for the lull. The organization did not
experience "distress" - neither in a strengthening of the opposition
to the Hamas administration, nor in an increase of popular protests
against it. In fact, the opposite is true. Even the official Israeli
evaluation of Hamas´ first year of rule since its military takeover
in June 2007 suggests that Hamas has managed to introduce and
maintain law and order in the Gaza Strip, strengthen its overall
control, suppress opposition, and achieve broad popular support for
its policies.
Hamas´ Motivation: Legitimacy and Recognition
Hamas´ motives have nothing to do with "distress," but rather
with "opportunities" - that is, the objectives it seeks to attain in
the international arena and especially in its own internal political
arena. First, the lull in the fighting is meaningless for Hamas; it
is not a cease-fire or a truce, but a "temporary" cessation of
hostilities with Israel. Next, Hamas is not committed to continuing
the lull when the six months run out, and it can use any excuse it
chooses to continue its terrorist campaign: Israeli building in the
settlements, Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem, or IDF anti-terror
measures in the West Bank. Hamas can also send other Palestinian
organizations to do its dirty work.
The tahdiya agreement for a lull is an important achievement for
Hamas. Hamas will gain the recognition it wants as the legitimate
ruler of the Gaza Strip. Despite the fact that the Israeli government
has defined Hamas-ruled Gaza as a hostile entity, Israel agreed to
the continuation of trade with it, and even recognized the hostile
entity´s authority to operate the Rafah crossing. Hamas regards that
as immensely important and wants to exploit it as a lever to open the
door to official relations with Europe, and to have itself removed
from the various lists of terrorist organizations.
Another important objective for Hamas is winning the Palestinian
presidential election, which will be held when Mahmoud Abbas finishes
his term of office in December. Hamas wants to present itself in the
contest as a legitimate ruling body worthy of inheriting the
presidency. High-ranking Hamas figures have already stated that the
organization will not recognize Abbas´ authority as president after
December 2008.5
Hamas is liable to claim that, according to Palestinian law,
administrative authority should be passed on to the chairman of the
parliament, who is a Hamas leader, or should be decided by the
parliament itself, where Hamas has an overwhelming majority. In other
words, for Hamas, the lull in the fighting will permit the movement
to prepare the field to take over from Abbas, thereby complementing
its military takeover of Gaza. Hamas´ challenge is also the
motivation behind Abbas´ desire to talk to Hamas about reaching an
understanding about new elections, and it explains why Hamas has
rejected the suggestion.
Main Implications of the Tahdiya
Hamas wants to exploit the lull in the fighting to upgrade its status
in the international community in order to gain legitimacy for its
campaign for the presidency after Abbas´ term is over in December
2008.
The cease-fire grants Hamas a golden opportunity to expand its
military build-up for the next round of terror and violence.
Emulating Hizbullah´s strategy, Hamas is striving to acquire longer-
range and more destructive missiles to be used for deterrence and as
a sword on Israel´s neck.
Israel has acknowledged Hamas, albeit unwillingly, as the de facto
ruling power in Gaza. Israel´s acceptance of the cease-fire is a blow
to the international war on terror and gives immunity to Hamas and
other terrorist organizations in Gaza, including Al-Qaeda affiliates.
Another diplomatic consequence of the tahdiya will be increasing
pressure on Israel to accept a reconciliation agreement between Hamas
and Fatah in the future. That could lead to increasing demands on
Israel to negotiate a permanent status arrangement with the joint
Hamas-Fatah government, while Hamas remains committed to its
political program for the elimination of Israel. It is important to
recall that the entire Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track since
the convening of the Annapolis conference was premised on the
exclusion of Hamas and the ultimate achievement of an agreement
between the Israeli government and the government of Mahmoud Abbas in
Ramallah alone.
Delaying the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit to a later phase of the
Israel-Hamas arrangement can have a demoralizing effect in Israel,
for it sends a message that the recovery of captured soldiers is not
the highest priority.
Notes
1. http://www.startribune.com/world/20167939.html?
location_refer+World:highlightModules:3
2. http://aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/41C8CBD6-5D3A-4F4B-B952-
CFBF766D6B6F.htm? wbc_purpose=basic_current_current_current_Current
3. http://www.alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=32872
4. http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/22/1291534
5. http://www.al-sharq.com/DisplayArticle.aspx?
xf=2008,June,article_20080608_103 &id=worldtoday&sid=arabworld
Return to Top
MATERIAL REPRODUCED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
